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Preface
Recent studies by the National Research Council have focused on the 
tension between the rapid advances in biotechnology that clearly benefit hu-
mankind and the potential use of the same advances for nefarious purposes. 
The 2004 report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism helped to 
focus attention on the issue, and among other recommendations called for the 
creation of a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB) to 
serve as a bridge between the government and scientific communities in raising 
awareness of the potential for misuse of biotechnology. A later report, Global-
ization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences carried the discussion 
forward with a global perspective and promoted a global common culture of 
awareness and a shared sense of responsibility among life scientists. In 2006, 
the NSABB issued Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to the Synthesis 
of Select Agents, which called for expert evaluation to determine whether an 
alternative framework based on predicted features and properties encoded by 
nucleic acids, such as virulence or pathogenicity, can be developed and used 
in lieu of the current finite list of specific agents and taxonomic definitions. 
Our committee was tasked with identifying “the scientific advances that would 
be necessary to permit serious consideration of developing and implementing 
an oversight system for Select Agents that is based on predicted features and 
properties encoded by nucleic acids rather than a relatively static list of specific 
agents and taxonomic definitions.”
Our committee was populated with persons who had expertise in several 
complementary fields. The amalgamation of scientific backgrounds allowed us 
to address our task from different viewpoints and to assess the potential impact 
of our recommendations on various sectors. We benefited by having commit-
tee members who were experts in human and animal health and leaders in the 
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development of policy relevant to these fields; leaders in fundamental struc-
tural, evolutionary, and computational biology and bioinformatics; scientists 
dedicated to the study of pathogenic viruses and bacteria; and experts from the 
commercial biotechnology sector. Many committee members were personally 
involved either directly or indirectly in research on plant or animal pathogens 
designated as Select Agents and thus had first-hand experience in dealing with 
the relevant regulations and security requirements implemented in recent years 
to reduce the risk of misuse. We were especially fortunate to have a senior scien-
tist and executive in the biotechnology industry who was able to offer a unique 
perspective on the role of industry in implementation of current and future 
steps that might be taken to reduce the risk of misuse of synthetic biology.
We were informed by the shared expertise of many professionals in syn-
thetic biology, security, public health, human and animal medicine, the life 
sciences, informatics and several other relevant fields as we grappled with 
our challenging task. Specifically, Julia Kiehlbauch, Robbin Weyant, Claudia 
Mickelson, Edward You, and Amy Patterson helped us to understand the 
current structure for oversight of Select Agents. Peter Pesenti, John Mulligan, 
Marcus Graf, Claes Gustafsson and Stephen Maurer discussed with us the 
current mechanisms and criteria for screening and surveillance at the sequence 
level. Stanley Falkow, Jeffrey Taubenberger, Michael Katze, Ralph Baric and 
Ramon Felciano discussed virulence; and Sean Eddy, Jonathan Eisen, Elliot 
Lefkowitz, John Moult and Ian Lipkin addressed gaps, challenges and potential 
milestones in predicting pathogenicity from sequence information. In addition, 
Carol Linden, Arturo Casadevall, David Relman, Mary Groesch, Jacqueline 
Corrigan-Curay and James Blaine all met personally with our committee and 
joined in our discussions. We sincerely thank all those who took time from 
their busy schedules to meet with us, answer our questions, and guide us in 
our deliberations.
Early in our discussions, it became apparent that the criteria historically 
used to designate a pathogen as a Select Agent included characteristics that can-
not be determined by sequence alone and therefore cannot be predicted with 
the degree of certainty required for regulatory purposes. We soon concluded 
that a sequence-based prediction system for oversight of Select Agents is not 
now possible, nor is it likely to be feasible in the foreseeable future. We did, 
however, recognize that a sequence-based classification system for Select Agents 
focused on consideration of sequences of concern could be developed and 
might help to clarify taxonomic distinctions among recognized Select Agents. 
By focusing on “sequences of concern” and coupling that with a cautionary 
alert (a “yellow flag system”), one might effectively address both biosecurity 
and biosafety goals. Near-term milestone and long-term research objectives 
were defined and are discussed in our report. Throughout our deliberations, 
we continually tried to balance the need for safety and security, while recogniz-
ing the challenges of potential dual-use applications that arise as the scientific 
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community improves its understanding of the genomic basis that leads one 
organism to be pathogenic, while its near neighbor is not. We were also con-
cerned about the potential burden that such an oversight program might have 
on the day-to-day conduct of science and the biotechnology business sector, 
and about the opportunities that might be missed. We concluded that a gene 
sequence-based classification system could be developed. We did not, however, 
address whether such as system should be developed or whether the additional 
administrative structure needed to maintain such a system would be justified. 
Therefore, we do not specifically recommend that either the classification or 
yellow flag system be implemented. Rather, we provide information about what 
is technologically feasible, and emphasize that the potential benefits of such a 
system should be considered and weighed against the cost and complexity of 
implementation.
The Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg was quoted in Richard Preston’s 
1998 article on bioweaponeers in The New Yorker as saying: “There is no 
technical solution to the problem of biological weapons. It needs an ethical, 
human, and moral solution if it’s going to happen at all. Don’t ask me what the 
odds are for an ethical solution, but there is no other solution. But would an 
ethical solution appeal to a sociopath? (Preston 1998)” We find ourselves today, 
more than a decade later, still searching for a technical solution to a challenge 
that has grown beyond biological warfare and now encompasses the threat of 
bioterrorism as well; a challenge that is ever more complex and threatening as 
biotechnology advances and access to it expands. We can attempt to harness 
technology to lessen risks, but we would be wise to heed Lederberg’s advice to 
couple this with efforts toward an “ethical, human and moral solution.”
The committee wishes to express its sincere thanks and appreciation to 
India Hook-Barnard, our study director and program officer, for her leadership, 
guidance and expertise, coupled with good nature and charming personality. 
We benefited greatly from her dedication and creativity throughout the study. 
She was ably assisted by Carl-Gustav Anderson, senior program assistant, who 
ensured that our every need was met during our meetings and conference calls 
and worked diligently to coordinate schedules in what must have been a nearly 
impossible task. Our project was expertly guided by Fran Sharples as the direc-
tor of the Board on Life Sciences.
Finally, on a personal note, I would like to express my sincere apprecia-
tion to the members of the committee, who generously donated their time and 
knowledge to make this project both extremely productive and very enjoyable. 
Our discussions were frank, open, and honest, and they benefited greatly from 
the diversity of our backgrounds and our complementary experiences. We were 
indeed more than the sum of our own individual contributions. It has been my 
pleasure and privilege to work with each of you.
James W. Le Duc, Chair
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Summary
In 2006, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) 
released a report, Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to the Synthesis of 
Select Agents (NSABB 2006), which considered the effects of synthetic biology 
and DNA synthesis technology on biosecurity and the current Select Agent 
Regulations. The principal concerns that it addressed were that
• DNA synthesis technology is rapidly diminishing barriers to acquisi-
tion of pathogens, because an increasing variety of organisms may be 
instantiated by whole genome synthesis, rather than by transfer of 
samples of existing organism stocks or cultures;
• Natural variation and intentional genetic modification blur the bound-
aries around any discrete list based on taxonomic names
• Synthetic biology may enable the accidental or deliberate creation of 
entirely novel pathogens unrelated to current ones.
One of the NSABB recommendations proposed that
a group of experts from the scientific community be assembled to determine 
if an alternative framework based on predicted features and properties en-
coded by nucleic acids, such as virulence or pathogenicity, can be developed 
and utilized in lieu of the current finite list of specific agents and taxonomic 
definitions. (NSABB 2006)
Thus, the present study was initiated with the title “Scientific Milestones 
for the Development of a Gene Sequence-Based Classification System for Over-
sight of Select Agents” on the basis of this recommendation. The committee 
was specifically charged with identifying:
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 SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION FOR SELECT AGENTS
the scientific advances that would be necessary to permit serious consideration 
of developing and implementing an oversight system for Select Agents that is 
based on predicted features and properties encoded by nucleic acids rather 
than a relatively static list of specific agents and taxonomic definitions. (Ap-
pendix A)
It is implicit in the charge that a “predictive oversight” system is not now 
feasible. It is also implicit that “gene sequence-based classification,” is synony-
mous with “predict[ing] features and properties encoded by nucleic acids.” 
However, it soon became clear that the committee was confronted by two quite 
different tasks, one of which is feasible and one is not. It is possible to classify 
a new sequence as belonging within a group of known sequences; it is not fea-
sible to predict the function(s) that sequence encodes. Thus, it is essential to 
distinguish sequence-based classification from sequence-based prediction 
of biological function.
A sequence-based prediction system for oersight of Select Agents is not pos-
sible now and will not be possible in the usefully near future.
• Select Agent is not a biological term; rather it is a regulatory designa-
tion. Some properties historically considered in assigning an organism 
to the Select Agent list are not biological properties, and therefore, can 
never be determined from the organism’s genome sequence.
• High-level biological phenotypes—such as pathogenicity, transmissi-
bility, and environmental stability—cannot plausibly be predicted with 
the degree of certainty required for regulatory purposes, either now or 
in the foreseeable future.
• Reliable prediction of the hazardous properties of pathogens from 
their genome sequence alone will require an extraordinarily detailed 
understanding of host, pathogen, and environment interactions inte-
grated at the systems, organism, population, and ecosystem levels. It 
is a prediction problem of the greatest complexity.
• Biology is not binary. Microorganisms are not either “potential weap-
ons of mass destruction” or “of no concern.” No single characteristic 
makes a microorganism a pathogen, and no clear-cut boundaries that 
separate a pathogen from a non-pathogen. Pathogenic microorganisms 
are not defined by taxonomy; it is common for a given microbial spe-
cies to have both pathogenic and non-pathogenic representatives. An 
agent has multiple biological attributes, and the degree to which these 
are expressed fall along a spectrum for each biological characteristic;1 
consequently, agents present varying degrees of risk.
1 For example, one microorganism may be highly virulent, but poorly transmissible from person 
to person, whereas another agent may spread easily, but produce only mild illness.
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• For the foreseeable future, the only reliable predictor of the hazard 
posed by a biological agent will be actual experience with that agent.
Synthetic genomics and the natural complexity of biology increasingly pres-
ent challenges to biosecurity and biosafety that need to be addressed well before 
prediction of biological function will be feasible.
• There is a need to provide increased clarity—for investigators, bio-
hobbyists, synthesis companies, and law enforcement officials—about 
which DNA sequences are subject to the Select Agent Regulations and 
which are not.
   Currently, the boundaries around the taxonomic names of Select 
Agents on the list are unclear. How similar should two sequences 
be for them to be given the same name?
   It is also unclear how much (which parts) of an agent must be 
present for it to be considered a Select Agent. When should a 
sequence be regarded as a non-functional “genomic fragment” 
as opposed to a “complete” agent subject to the Select Agent 
Regulations?
• It might also be desirable to provide information and oversight for 
“sequences of concern” that are not themselves Select Agents, but 
potentially could be used to produce a threat.
   To make it harder for people with nefarious intent to develop 
pathogens or toxins as weapons or as tools for bioterror without 
detection.
   To avoid the accidental, inadvertent, or ill-advised production of 
hazardous constructs by well-meaning investigators.
A gene sequence-based classification system for Select Agents and a yellow 
flag biosafety system for “sequences of concern” could be deeloped with current 
technologies.2
• A classification system could provide much needed clarification re-
garding application of the Select Agent Regulations.
   For the purposes of regulation, a discrete taxonomic list of Select 
Agents, augmented by sequence-based classification to better cir-
cumscribe taxonomic distinctions blurred by natural and synthetic 
variation and modification, is a reasonable strategy to maintain for 
the foreseeable future.
   Sequence-based classification is strictly operational—a set of tools 
for drawing decision boundaries around known sequences that do 
or do not belong to a desired classification. Those tools are used 
2 As noted throughout this report, the classification and “yellow flag” system are presented as 
proposals for consideration; they should not be read as recommendations.
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now for robust and automatic classification of gene sequences into 
usefully annotated sequence families.
   An operational definition of a complete Select Agent would 
not predict whether a sequence encodes a functional pathogen. 
Sequence-based classification strategies would more sharply de-
fine the Select Agent Regulations to deal with issues raised by 
DNA synthesis and natural variation, and would thus establish a 
“brighter line”: an unambiguous procedure for deciding when a 
genome sequence is assigned one of the taxonomic names on the 
Select Agent list.
   The problem of classifying a sequence as a complete Select Agent 
genome (subject to the Select Agent Regulations) has two dimen-
sions: (a) content 3—how much sequence (how many parts) must 
be present to distinguish a potentially complete “infectious form” 
of an agent from a non-covered “genomic fragment” or “non-
infectious component”; and (b) distance—how similar must the 
sequences of each of those parts be to an actual Select Agent se-
quence for the same Select Agent taxonomic name to be assigned 
to the synthetic organism.
   For each Select Agent, given a minimal parts list (content) and 
a profile-based classification system for each part (distance), the 
classification system could be tested, benchmarked, and chal-
lenged against known genome sequences. Once developed, the 
system could be updated to reflect the state of the art of biology 
and computation and to be correctly harmonized with the Select 
Agent list.
• A “yellow flag” biosafety system could provide a means of guidance 
and oversight for “sequences of concern.”
   The yellow flag system would function as an extension of bio-
safety; however, because it is not regulatory, it could also provide 
information relevant to biosecurity in a more dynamic and timely 
fashion than the Select Agent Regulations.
   The best way to deal with the unquantifiable threat of novel syn-
thetic pathogens is through enhancements to the laboratory and 
clinical biosafety measures already established for dealing with the 
threat of emerging natural pathogens.
   The yellow flag system would comprise four main elements; a cen-
tralized biosafety sequence database, annotation of the sequences 
as empirical evidence of the function of the genes encoded by the 
sequences is acquired, a process for review and assessment of the 
3 As discussed in Chapter 3, content could be defined by a single gene, such as in the case of a 
regulated toxin.
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evidence to determine the disposition of sequence of concern, and 
a yellow flag for sequences that are deemed “of concern.”
The sequence-based classification presented by the committee is techno-
logically feasible and may improve the current system; however, such a system 
does have limitations and potential adverse consequences. Therefore, we do 
not specifically recommend that it be implemented. Rather, we make two 
recommendations:
• The sequence space around each discrete taxonomic name on the 
Select Agent list needs to be clearly defined, so that Select Agent sta-
tus can be unambiguously determined from a genome sequence (for 
example, by a DNA synthesis company).
  The sequence space should be broad enough to include the 
plausible modifications and chimeras that experts reasonably believe 
probably also act as Select Agents, without encompassing existing 
non-Select Agents.
• A sequence-based classification system could address this problem, 
and should be considered and weighed against the cost and complex-
ity of implementing this technological augmentation to the current 
Select Agent Regulations.
The committee identified specific milestones or focus areas that would aid 
in developing and implementing a sequence-based classification system and 
could yield information to improve prediction of function from sequence and 
to enhance understanding of infectious disease.
• Near-term milestones include:
   A sequence database with a Select Agent focus. A necessary pre-
condition of a classification system is to have a number of rep-
resentative sequences that belong to each desired classification, 
and a number of the most closely related sequences that do not 
belong. A comprehensive sequence database would thoroughly 
cover naturally occurring genetic variation based on geographic 
distribution, ecological or laboratory adaptations, and those as-
sociated with clinical severity or attenuation. The database would 
include not only Select Agent sequences, but also a representative 
set of near-neighbors for each Select Agent.
   An expanding sequence database of all biology. There are massive 
gaps in our knowledge of the genetic characteristics of much of 
the biological world. Such a sequence database could be used to 
help to identify “sequences of concern” that may be appropriate 
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to monitor in the yellow flag system, in the interests of biosafety 
or biosecurity.
   Stratification of the Select Agent list. Several recent advisory panels 
have recommended stratification or reduction of the Select Agent 
list, to “focus the highest scrutiny on those agents that are indeed 
of greatest concern” and we are in agreement with that recommen-
dation. Prioritizing the Select Agent list on the basis of risk would 
make any sequence-based approach to oversight more feasible.
• Long-term areas of research include:
   Protein structure and function;
   Gene expression and regulation;
   Pathogenic mechanisms
   Animal models of disease
   Data and information management for systems biology
   Synthetic biology
   Metagenomics and phylogenomic, including the human 
microbiome
The near-term milestones and long-term research aim either to expand the 
general frontiers of biological knowledge or to apply existing knowledge to 
the Select Agent Regulations. Our committee was deeply uncomfortable with 
research programs that would seek to expand knowledge solely for the purpose 
of improving the Select Agent Regulations.
Developing the ability to predict Select Agent pathogenicity from genome 
sequence raises serious dual-use concerns, because prediction and design go 
hand in hand. Accurate computational prediction of Select Agent character-
istics from genome sequences enables computational design and optimization 
of bioweapon genome sequences. Predicting phenotype from genotype and 
improving public health by increasing our understanding of pathogenicity are 
two major goals of biology. It does not seem wise to make special plans for an 
effort in predicting the characteristics of Select Agents, in advance of other 
important frontiers of biological knowledge.
It is more prudent to base the Select Agent Regulations on the current state 
of biological knowledge, as an applied problem, not a basic research problem. 
Predictive successes in the general biology research community should be pas-
sively monitored. Once biology in general approaches the goal of determining 
pathogenicity from sequence, then it would be appropriate to consider putting 
in place a predictive oversight system to identify Select Agent properties from 
a novel genome sequence. That time may not come for decades, and may be 
more than a century away.
In the meantime, the technology and knowledge base for sequence-based 
classification exist now. Even a classification system can present dual-use issues, 
because implementing the system usefully requires that the information be 
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shared. Listing the “parts” of a Select Agent and identifying other “sequences 
of concern” entirely on the basis of their potential to be dangerous when incor-
porated into a synthetic construct disseminates knowledge that could theoreti-
cally facilitate the design of a synthetic pathogen by a “bad actor.” However, 
inasmuch as the knowledge would be based on the current published state of 
the art (and on pathogen sequences that are already widely available in Gen-
bank), any additional dual-use concerns are not nearly as grave.
The Select Agent Regulations strive to balance a need for regulating access 
to the most dangerous pathogens with the need to minimize the regulatory bur-
den on basic biological research aimed at monitoring, understanding, treating, 
and preventing disease. If the Select Agent Regulations are too burdensome, 
they may diminish long-term safety. Our report stops short of recommending 
the implementation of any specific sequence-based system for defining Select 
Agents; it was not in our charge, and we were not properly constituted to 
estimate the costs, benefits, or risks associated with any specific implementa-
tion program. We do find that the sequence-based classification system and 
yellow flag system are technologically feasible, but we have not carefully exam-
ined their cost or their effects on basic research or national security. We have 
made no argument that the positive aspects of using such systems to clarify a 
sequence-based definition of the discrete taxonomic names on the Select Agent 
list would outweigh any negative aspects of adding layers of complexity in the 
regulatory framework. Our principal finding is that sequence-based predic-
tion of Select Agent properties is not feasible, now or in the foreseeable 
future; any dedicated research effort solely for this purpose is likely to have 
only negative consequences.
When the committee’s report was in the final stages of completion, the 
White House issued on July 2, 2010, a new Executive Order, “Optimizing 
the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States.” 
Although the committee did not have time to consider fully the implications 
of this Executive Order, it notes that several issues are particularly relevant 
to this report; these are briefly discussed in Box 1.2.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html

1
The Select Agent Regulations
CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE
In 2006, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) 
released a report, Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to the Synthesis of 
Select Agents (NSABB 2006),” which considered the impact of synthetic biol-
ogy and DNA synthesis technology on biosecurity and the current Select Agents 
Regulations (SAR). The principal concerns it addressed were that:
• DNA synthesis technology is rapidly diminishing barriers to acquisi-
tion of pathogens, because an increasing variety of organisms may be 
instantiated by whole genome synthesis, rather than by transfer of 
samples of existing organism stocks or cultures;
• Natural variation and intentional genetic modification blurs the bound-
aries around any discrete list based on taxonomic names; and
• Synthetic biology may enable the accidental or deliberate creation of 
entirely novel pathogens unrelated to current ones.
The NSABB made four recommendations: (1) that the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) clarify and harmonize guidance to investigators and synthetic DNA 
companies regarding genetic elements and nucleic acids subject to the Select 
Agent Regulations; (2) Synthetic DNA companies establish uniform and stan-
dardized policies to screen orders; (3) repeal 18 U.S.C. 175c, because current 
scientific insight precludes meaningful definition of an agent based solely on 
sequence homology; and (4) that two further studies be initiated. The first study 
would focus on reconciling the current Select Agent controls with advances in 
synthetic genomics (i.e., a new synthetic means of pathogen accessibility, other 
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than by transfer of existing stocks or wild isolates). The second proposed study 
became the origin of our committee. This recommendation proposed that:
. . . a group of experts from the scientific community be assembled to deter-
mine if an alternative framework based on predicted features and properties 
encoded by nucleic acids, such as virulence or pathogenicity, can be developed 
and utilized in lieu of the current finite list of specific agents and taxonomic 
definitions . . . (NSABB 2006).
Thus, this study was initiated with the title of “Scientific Milestones for the 
Development of a Gene Sequence-Based Classification System for Oversight 
of Select Agents” on the basis of this recommendation. The committee was 
specifically charged with identifying:
. . . the scientific advances that would be necessary to permit serious consid-
eration of developing and implementing an oversight system for Select Agents 
that is based on predicted features and properties encoded by nucleic acids 
rather than a relatively static list of specific agents and taxonomic definitions 
(see Box 1.1 or Appendix A).
BOX 1.1 
Scientific Milestones for the Development 
of a Gene Sequence-Based Classification System 
for Oversight of Select Agents
Statement of Task
NIH has requested the National Research Council to convene an ad hoc commit-
tee to identify the scientific advances that would be necessary to permit serious 
consideration of developing and implementing an oversight system for Select 
Agents that is based on predicted features and properties encoded by nucleic 
acids rather than a relatively static list of specific agents and taxonomic defini-
tions. The committee is asked to address several questions:
 •  What would be the key scientific attributes of a predictive oversight 
system?
 •  What are the challenges in attempting to predict biological characteristics 
from sequence?
 •  Does the current state of the science of predicting function from sequence 
support a predictive oversight system at this time?
 •  If not, what are the scientific milestones that would need to be realized 
before a predictive oversight system might be feasible?
 •  In qualitative terms, what level of certainty would be needed about the 
ability to predict biological characteristics from sequence data in order to 
have confidence in a predictive oversight system?
 •  In what time frame might these milestones be realized? What kinds of 
studies are needed to achieve these milestones?
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ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
In order to think about what an alternative framework for Select Agents 
might look like in an era of genomics and DNA synthesis, Chapter 1 starts by 
presenting the rationale for and status of the current system. This chapter also 
discusses the consequences of the Select Agent Regulations on the gene synthe-
sis industry and the research community, and the criteria that are considered 
when Select Agent status is determined. (Appendices for this chapter provide 
information regarding the Select Agent Regulations and related guidelines.)
Chapter 2 presents the complexity of biology, the challenges in predicting 
function from sequence, and the special case of synthetic biology. (Appendi-
ces for this chapter contain detailed information regarding the challenges in 
predicting pathogenicity from sequence, and include examples of “virulence 
factors” from known pathogens.)
Chapter 3 explains how prediction differs from classification, outlines three 
threat scenarios presented by synthetic genomics, and describes how—with 
current technologies—a sequence based classification system might be created 
to address the challenges that synthetic biology and natural variation present 
to biosecurity.
Chapter 4 summarizes key findings and conclusions, and provides near 
term milestones and long term areas of research that would enable a sequence 
based classification framework for biosecurity and biosafety. (Appendix L for 
this chapter presents additional milestones and issues for consideration regard-
ing the development of a gene sequence based classification system.)
CONTEXT OF THE SELECT AGENT REGULATIONS
During the committee’s deliberations, the issues of biological weapons, 
biosecurity, and biosafety were each considered relevant to addressing the 
charge. The Select Agent Regulations, the NIH Guidelines, and the implement-
ing legislation for the BWC define conditions for the legitimate, safe, and secure 
use of biological agents that have the potential to be used for great harm. It is 
important that research be conducted on microbes including those that may 
cause disease; biosafety rules are needed to protect the environment and the 
health of clinicians, researchers and the public and are therefore a necessity—
even in the absence of terrorism or other security threats. As will be discussed, 
the biosafety system that has been in place for decades provides a framework 
of oversight for legitimate use of pathogenic microorganisms. The BWC, and 
implementing legislation,1 is concerned with illegitimate use of biological agents 
(i.e., as weapons). The Select Agent Regulations identify agents most likely 
1 The 1989 Biological Weapons Act is the implementing legislation for the BWC. Title 18 US, 
Chapter 10, §175 established criminal penalties related to the development, manufacture, transfer 
or possession of a biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon; the BWC has 
never attempted to list BW agents.
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BOX 1.2 
Presidential Executive Order
When the committee’s report was in the final stages of completion, the 
White House issued on July 2, 2010, a new Executive Order, “Optimizing 
the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States” 
(see Appendix M). Although the committee did not have time to consider 
fully the implications of this Executive Order, it notes that several issues 
are particularly relevant to this report:
1)  Sec. 4. Risk-based Tiering of the Select Agent List.
  “Tiering and potential reduction of the Select Agent List: HHS and USDA will, 
through their current biennial process of reviewing the Select Agent List, tier 
the existing list based upon the risk posed by the pathogen or toxin in enabling 
a mass casualty incident through deliberate misuse. For those pathogens and 
toxins in the highest risk tier, HHS and USDA will evaluate options for the 
targeted application of physical security and personnel reliability measures in 
a manner commensurate to risk. HHS and USDA will also consider reducing 
the number of agents and toxins on the Select Agent List.”
This is in good agreement with near-term milestone d (see Chapter 4), which 
discusses stratification or reduction of the Select Agent list. Prioritizing the 
Select Agent list based on risk would make any sequence-based approach 
to oversight more feasible.
2)  Sec. 7. Implementation. (a) Establishment, Operation, and Functions of the 
Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel. “A panel of Federal security and 
scientific experts will serve as the principal security advisory body to the SAP. 
The Panel will advise the SAP on a range of topics, including considerations 
in the tiering and/or reduction of the Select Agent List, best practices regard-
ing physical security and personnel reliability that should be considered in 
the revision of the SAR and related Rules and guidance, and other topics as 
determined by HHS and USDA. The Department of Homeland Security will 
chair a sub-Group of the Panel that will advise the SAP on recommended 
physical security practices for high-risk pathogens and toxins. In addition, the 
EO directs the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to serve as a 
source for external advice and input on SAP/SAR policies and practices.”
As discussed in the present report, (Chapter 3; Appendix L, near-term mile-
stone f) a classification or yellow flag system would depend on the techni-
cal expertise of Scientific Workgroups and Advisory Panels. The Federal 
Experts Security Advisory Panel described in the EO could, if appropriately 
staffed with knowledgeable experts, be compatible with such scientific 
workgroups and advisory panels. For instance, the DHS sub-group is con-
sistent with “Security Advisors” presented in Fig 4.1, 2b. It appears that the 
Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel could also include a sub group 
of “Scientific Advisors” as presented in Fig 4.1, 3b. (However, the FESAP 
may not be appropriate to perform the function of the yellow flag “Scientific 
Advisors,” shown in Fig 4.1, 9b.)
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to be used illegitimately, as weapons, restrict access to these microorganisms 
and their toxins to certain individuals, and specify conditions under which 
legitimate research use may occur. (See Appendix F for relevant legislation, 
regulation and guidelines.)
Biological Weapons
Pathogens have a long history of being investigated as potential offensive 
weapons for military purposes. It is well documented that the United States, 
the former Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Germany and other countries 
maintained offensive biological warfare programs until signing of the Biological 
Weapons Convention of 1972.2 In at least one case, that of the former Soviet 
Union, clandestine research and development continued well beyond this date 
and it was only in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, that Rus-
sia fully renounced biological weapons and opened some of its facilities to 
inspection by the international community. Other clandestine research is still 
the subject of considerable speculation but not unequivocally documented 
(Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation 
and Terrorism 2008).
Nations party to the BWC agreed to destroy or divert to peaceful pur-
poses any existing weaponized biological agents or delivery systems within nine 
months of signing the convention. Violation of the terms of the treaty are not 
directly actionable by any oversight force; rather signatories are responsible 
for implementation through national means, which are disclosed on a regular 
basis.3
2 The earliest global prohibition against the use of biological weapons is the 1925 Geneva Proto-
col. This treaty was augmented via the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc-
tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 
(BWC), which was signed at London, Moscow, and Washington on 10 April, 1972, and entered 
into force on 26 March, 1975. Article I of the BWC states that:
 “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, 
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
 (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, 
of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes;
 (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict.”
3 “The United States Congress passed the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public 
Law 101-298, May 22, 1990), which established penalties for violating the Convention’s prohibi-
tions, unless “(1) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system is for a prophylactic, protective, 
or other peaceful purpose; and (2) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system, is of a type 
and quantity reasonable for that purpose.” In keeping with the treaty, the legislation focused on 
the purpose for which agents or toxins were possessed, rather than the agents themselves. The law 
authorizes the government to apply for a warrant to seize any biological agent, toxin, or delivery 
system that has no apparent justification for peaceful purposes, but prosecution under the law 
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Nevertheless, concern about the use of biological weapons persists, as 
noted by the Commission on the Preention of WMD Proliferation and Ter-
rorism co-chaired by former Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent. The 2008 
report, The World at Risk (Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 2008),4 stated that “Unless the world 
community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that 
a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the 
world by the end of 2013.”5 More recently, the White House National Security 
Council issued “The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (Na-
tional Security Council 2009)” at the December 2009 BWC meeting in Geneva. 
This report again addresses concerns that the life sciences might be misused.
Biosafety (and Categorization of Microorganisms)
In the United States, the Select Agent Regulations and other current legal 
mechanisms to control development, stockpiling, access, and use of specific 
biological agents had their roots in public health laboratory practices. In 1974, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) sought to limit the 
occurrence of laboratory-acquired infections by issuing guidance in the form 
of lists of microorganisms entitled, “Classification of Etiologic Agents on the 
Basis of Hazard” (CDC 1974). While adherence to safe practices was strongly 
encouraged, no federal requirements were imposed. However, these guidelines 
played an essential role in the development of the original National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) Guidelines for Research Inoling Recombinant DNA Molecules 
issued in 19766 (NIH 1976). The same concerns for public health and safety led 
to promulgation of rules governing the packaging, labeling and transport of in-
fectious agents shipped in interstate commerce (DHHS 1979). First published 
in 1984 by the CDC and National Institutes of Health (NIH), the document, 
“Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories” (BMBL) defines 
the principles of biosafety for research and clinical laboratories around the 
globe. The BMBL describes safe handling practices and identifies four levels 
would require the government to prove that an individual did not have peaceful intentions (Atlas 
1999)” (NRC 2009b).
4 See also, The Clock is Ticking: A Progress Report on America’s Preparedness (Commission on the 
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 2009).
5 The validity of this statement is much debated. See for instance, “Does Threat Reduction Re-
quire Threat Inflation?” by Micheal Krepon and “Biological threats: A matter of balance,” from 
the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
6 The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) advised the NIH in the development of the 
NIH Guidelines for Research Inoling Recombinant DNA Molecules, which have become the stan-
dard of safe scientific practice in the use of recombinant DNA. Institutional Biosafety Committees 
(IBCs), which are mandated by the NIH Guidelines, are charged with reviewing research involving 
recombinant DNA, although many IBCs have chosen to review other forms of research that involve 
potential biohazards—including research involving Biological Select Agent and Toxins (BSATs). 
Institutions are required to register their IBCs with NIH’s Office of Biotechnology Activities.
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BOX 1.3 
The Nuclear Paradigm
Although biological materials have the potential for misuse and could be devel-
oped and employed as Weapons of Mass Destruction, it should not be assumed 
that biological agents are similar to nuclear WMD threats. Biological agents have 
unique attributes that are considered in order to develop an effective oversight 
strategy.
Characteristics of Fissile Materials and Pathogens
Fissile Materials Pathogenic Microorganisms
• Do not exist in nature in readily 
concentrated form appropriate for 
weapons
• Generally found in nature and often 
widely distributed globally
• Non-living • Living, replicative
• Difficult and costly to produce • Easy and cheap to produce
• Not diverse: plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium are the only fissile 
materials used in nuclear weapons.
• Highly diverse
• Can be inventoried and tracked in a 
quantitative manner
• Vials containing pathogen cultures 
may be inventoried and tracked, 
however, because pathogens repro-
duce, exact pathogen quantification 
is unreliable.
• Can be detected at a distance from 
the emission of ionizing radiation
• Cannot be detected at a distance 
with available technologies
• Weapons-grade fissile materials are 
stored at a limited number of military 
sites
• Pathogens are present in many 
types of facilities (e.g. hospitals and 
schools) and at multiple locations 
within a facility
• Few non-military applications (such 
as research reactors, thermoelec-
tric generators and production of 
radioisotopes).
• Many legitimate applications in bio-
medical research and the pharma-
ceutical biotechnology industry.
(Modified from Tucker 2003)
of containment based on risk criteria of infectivity, transmissibility, severity of 
illness, and the nature of work being performed. As a guideline, the BMBL 
maintains the flexibility needed to evolve along with the pathogens it describes. 
Though not a regulation, many choose to follow the BMBL’s recommendations. 
Moreover, Select Agent Regulations part 73.12(c)(1) requires such consider-
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ation as a result of a contractual requirement or best practices; thus in this case, 
the BMBL can be interpreted as having the force of law.
The BMBL, like the NIH Guidelines, stipulates four biosafety levels (BSL-
1, -2, -3, -4) (Box 1.5). Increasingly stringent safety and containment criteria 
govern each biosafety level so that the pathogens with high mortality rates and 
no known treatment or prevention are designated BSL-4 agents. All BSL-4 
agents have been designated as Select Agents; however, not all Select Agents 
require BSL-4 containment.7
The CDC conducted an assessment of the potential for biological agents 
to impact public health (Rotz, Khan et al. 2002). Criteria for classification 
included potential impact on public health, dissemination potential, public 
7 Anthrax, considered among the greatest security threats, requires only BSL-2/3 containment for 
biosafety, according to the BMBL.
BOX 1.4 
NIH Guidelines—Risk Groups
Although not specifically targeted to Select Agents, the NIH Guidelines for Re-
search Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (NIH Guidelines) specify bio-
safety and containment practices for constructing and handling recombinant DNA. 
Agents are classified into four risk groups (RG) based upon their potential hazard. 
Select Agents are found in categorizes RG2, RG3, or RG4.
Risk Group 1 (RG1): Agents that are not associated with disease in healthy 
adult humans.
Risk Group 2 (RG2): Agents that are associated with human disease which is 
rarely serious and for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are often 
available.
Risk Group 3 (RG3): Agents that are associated with serious or lethal human 
disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions may be available (high 
individual risk but low community risk)
Risk Group 4 (RG4): Agents that are likely to cause serious or lethal human 
disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are not usually available 
(high individual risk and high community risk)
The NIH Guidelines are normally enforced locally by Institutional Biosafety Com-
mittees (IBC), and each institution performing research with Select Agents usually 
have a dedicated Biosafety Officer who is responsible for ensuring regulatory 
compliance, reporting problems to the IBC, and serving as a technical resource for 
questions regarding biosafety. If Select Agents are present, the Biosafety Officer 
often serves as the first line of oversight in the management of research, transport 
and handling of Select Agents. A Responsible Official (RO) is designated for each 
entity holding Select Agents, and the Biosafety Officer may serve as the RO, or 
will work in close association with the RO.
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perception, and special public health preparedness needs such as stockpile 
requirements, enhanced surveillance or diagnostic needs required to mitigate 
harm or respond following an attack. Public perception in this case refers to the 
ability to engender widespread panic or concern about the safety of products 
including food, thus precipitating a major impact even if an event does not 
cause direct or significant harm to human health. Individual pathogens were 
classified as Category A, B, or C, with Category A agents having the greatest 
potential to cause widespread casualties and requiring the largest public health 
preparedness efforts. Category B agents were also deemed to have a potential 
for large-scale dissemination, although generally with documented lower rates 
of illness and death. Agents not currently recognized as significant bioterrorism 
risks, but with attributes that might enable their future weaponization, were 
classified as Category C agents (Box 1.6).
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Institute for Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has also developed a classification of pathogens 
using a Category A, B, and C system; however, this system is used to set research 
priorities and the criteria for classification was different. The NIH criteria 
stressed ease of dissemination, associated mortality rates following infection, 
potential for public health impact, social disruption, and required special action 
BOX 1.5 
BMBL Biosafety Levels
Biosafety 
Level 1
“BSL-1 is suitable for work involving well-characterized agents not 
known to consistently cause disease in immunocompetent adult hu-
mans, and present minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel 
and the environment.”
Biosafety 
Level 2
“BSL-2 is suitable for work involving agents that pose moderate 
hazards to personnel and the environment.”
Biosafety 
Level 3
“BSL-3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or 
productions facilities where work is performed with indigenous or 
exotic agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease 
through inhalation route exposure.”
Biosafety 
Level 4
“BSL-4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that 
pose a high individual risk of life-threatening disease, aerosol trans-
mission, or related agent with unknown risk of transmission. Agents 
with a close or identical antigenic relationship to agents requiring 
BSL-4 containment must be handled at this level until sufficient data 
are obtained either to confirm continued work at this level or re-
designate the level.”
(CDC/NIH 2007)
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BOX 1.6 
CDC Bioterrorism Agents / Diseases by Category
Criteria Category A Category B Category Ca
Ease of 
dissemination
Easily Moderately easy Variablea
Mortality rates High Low Variablea
Morbidity rates Variable Moderate Variablea
Potential for social 
disruption
Possible Variable Variablea
Action for 
public health 
preparedness
Requires special 
actions
Specific enhancements 
of CDC’s diagnostic 
capacity and enhanced 
disease surveillance
Variablea
 aCategory C considers emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dis-
semination in the future because of availability, ease of production and dissemination, and 
potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact.
SOURCE: Modified from Rotz, Khan et al. 2002).
for public health preparedness. A larger universe of pathogens was included in 
the NIH assessment such that some agents appear on the NIH list that were 
not captured on either the CDC classification or Select Agents list.
Biosecurity and the Select Agent Regulations
Biosafety and biosecurity8 are related and complementary concepts; how-
ever, there are important distinctions. The fifth edition of the BMBL defines 
8 As discussed in NRC report 2009, “[i]t should be noted that the use of the term “biosecurity” 
presents a number of difficulties. At its most basic, the term does not exist in some languages, or 
is identical with “biosafety”; French, German, Russian, and Chinese are all examples of this im-
mediate practical problem. Even more serious, the term is already used to refer to several other 
major international issues. For example, to many “biosecurity” refers to the obligations undertaken 
by states adhering to the Convention on Biodiversity and particularly the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, which is intended to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed by living 
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. (Further information on the Conven-
tion may be found at <http://www.cbd.int/convention/> and on the Protocol at <http://www.cbd.
int/biosafety/>.) “Biosecurity” has also been narrowly applied to efforts to increase the security of 
dangerous pathogens, either in the laboratory or in dedicated collections; guidelines from both the 
World Health Organization (WHO 2004) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD 2007) use this more restricted meaning of the term. In an agricultural context, the 
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biosafety programs as those that “reduce or eliminate exposure of individuals 
and the environment to potentially hazardous biological agents,” while the 
“objective of biosecurity is to prevent loss, theft or misuse of microorganisms, 
biological materials, and research-related information” (CDC/NIH 2007). Bi-
osecurity rose to public prominence in 1995, when three vials of an inactivated 
form of the organism that causes plague (Yersinia pestis) were illegally obtained 
by an alleged white supremacist (NRC 2009b). The perpetrator was charged 
with mail fraud as it was not a crime to possess these materials. This incident 
highlighted the need for a fundamental change in regulation of biological 
agents, which stimulated congressional interest culminating in the passage 
of legislation entitled “The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996” (P.L. 104-132). This Act made it a federal crime to use or threaten to use 
a weapon of mass destruction including biological weapons and “directs the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations identifying 
biological agents that pose a potential threat to public health and safety and 
governing their intentional or inadvertent transfer.” Accordingly, CDC promul-
gated regulations for facilities transferring or receiving select infectious agents 
and toxins as defined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
However, it wasn’t until Bacillus anthracis was sent through the U.S. Postal 
Service in October 2001, resulting in five deaths, that a broader system of 
controls on the possession, use and transfer of Select Agents was established, 
carrying with it severe criminal penalties, including imprisonment and fines. 
The National Select Agents Registry Program (Select Agent Program) was 
formally established to execute provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 regarding biological agents. Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) 
are defined by DHHS and the USDA as pathogens or biological toxins that 
have the “potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.”9
The USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56) made it an offense for a 
person to knowingly possess any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of 
a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified 
by prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose. The 
Act also prohibited the possession or transfer of Select Agents by “restricted 
persons.” A restricted person is defined by the Act (18 U.S.C. 175b) as an 
individual who:
• is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding 1 year;
term refers to efforts to exclude the introduction of plant or animal pathogens. (See NRC 2009a:8-9 
for a discussion of this and other issues related to terminology.) Earlier NRC reports (2004ab, 2006, 
2009ab) confine the use of “biosecurity” to policies and practices to reduce the risk that the knowl-
edge, tools, and techniques resulting from research would be used for malevolent purposes.”
9 Both the 1996 and the 2002 legislation mandated a list of regulated agents, subject to biennial 
review and revision, or as needed.
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• has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding 1 year;
• is a fugitive from justice;
• is an unlawful user of any controlled substance as defined in section 
102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802);
• is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
• has been adjudicated as a mental defective or committed to any mental 
institution;
• is an alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence) who is a national of a country that has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism; or
• has been discharged from the Armed Services of the United States 
under dishonorable conditions.
By prohibiting certain individuals from having access to Select Agents 
based upon criteria such as having committed a felony, convicted of illegal 
drug use, engaged in terrorist activities, or a history of mental illness, the 
Act addresses concepts related to the reliability of personnel in the research 
community.
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) requires the DHHS to regulate biological agents 
and toxins that have the potential to cause a severe threat to public health and 
safety and the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate biological agents or 
toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to animal or plant health 
or animal or plant products. These rules put in place a system of safeguards that 
were intended to allow scientists to conduct research without undue burden, 
while reducing “the risk of illicit access to these dangerous human pathogens.” 
The statute (Part B of Section 511) directs the Secretaries of DHHS and USDA 
to establish and maintain lists of biological agents and toxins, to be reviewed 
at least every two years. It also specifies that in developing these lists, consid-
eration should be given to: (I) the effect on human health of exposure to the 
agent or toxin; (II) the degree of contagiousness of the agent or toxin and the 
methods by which the agent or toxin is transferred to humans; (III) the avail-
ability and effectiveness of pharmacotherapies and immunizations to treat and 
prevent any illness resulting from infection by the agent or toxin; and (IV) any 
other criteria, including the needs of children and other vulnerable popula-
tions, that the Secretary considers appropriate; and (ii) consult with appropri-
ate Federal departments and agencies and with scientific experts representing 
appropriate professional groups, including groups with pediatric expertise. 
The final rule implementing this legislation was published in 2005 and seeks to 
harmonize requirements of the two oversight bodies, the CDC acting on behalf 
of the Secretary of the DHHS and the Animal, Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), acting on behalf of the Secretary the USDA.
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The current list of approximately 80 Select Agents and Toxins is shown in 
Appendix C. At present, the Select Agent list does not prioritize those biologi-
cal agents based on security risk.10 The regulations require that the institution’s 
security plan, designed in accordance with site-specific risk assessment, provide 
graded protection in accordance with the risk of the Select Agent or Toxin, 
given its intended use. The CDC and APHIS administer the Select Agent 
Program, which ensures that those registered to possess, use or transfer Select 
Agents are in compliance with the Select Agent Regulations.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on No-
vember 25, 2002, by Congress under provisions of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002. It was intended to consolidate U.S. executive branch organizations 
related to “homeland security” into a single cabinet agency. The DHS conducts 
a biennial Biological Threat Risk Assessment (BTRA), the specifics of which 
are classified (The White House 2004). Assessments are currently based on 
lists of known pathogens, consideration of traditional scenarios and agents, 
and include specific traits such as antibiotic resistance. Techniques used for 
analysis in the BTRA continue to evolve; it is moving towards a systems biol-
ogy approach that would be applied to characterize risk-associated attributes 
based on the modern tools of molecular biology and to consider scenarios with 
constructed novel organisms with defined pathogenic characteristics (NBACC 
2009). The DHS believes a systems biology framework built upon a foundation 
of knowledge of the biological characteristics of traditional agents may provide 
a robust assessment of potential advanced threats (see also Box 1.7).
The U.S. government also created the National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity (NSABB) in 2005 based in the Office of Science Policy of the NIH, 
to provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of 
dual use research. Dual-use research in this context is defined as biological re-
search with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic 
threat to public health and/or national security.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE SELECT AGENT PROGRAM
The Select Agent Program—Beyond Biosafety
While there is considerable overlap in good laboratory practices directed 
toward both ends, the Select Agent list highlights the distinction between bio-
safety and biosecurity. Biosafety refers to mitigation of the risk of pathogens or 
toxins escaping containment and causing illness in laboratory workers or the 
10 Several groups have recently recommended prioritization of the Select Agents list, including 
the NRC BSAT committee, the Interagency Working Group on Strengthening Biosecurity, as well 
as legislation introduced by Senators Lieberman and Collins (S.1649-WMD Prevention and Pre-
paredness Act of 2009), which calls for a “tiered” approach.
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BOX 1.7 
Biological Threat Risk Assessment
The Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Threat Risk Assessment 
(BTRA) of 2006 is classified; the specific criteria used to perform the risk assess-
ment are therefore unavailable. BTRA methodology, however, does not allow for 
categorical criteria:
“DHS chose to assess threat by ranking bioagents because government stake-
holders had advised DHS that they “expected the primary assessments to be 
in the form of risk-prioritized groups of biological threat agents” (DHS 2006). 
Although a terrorist’s choice of agent is just one step in a sequence of events lead-
ing to a potential attack, for practical purposes the BTRA of 2006 evaluates each 
agent separately. A probability is computed for each scenario involving that agent. 
Risk is then calculated as the product of these probabilities and the associated 
consequences. The overall risk assocaited with each agent is the integrated risk 
distribution over all possible scenarios involving that agent (NRC 2008a).”
“The process that produced the estimates in the BTRA of 2006 consists of two 
loosely coupled analyses: (1) a probabilistic risk analysis event-tree evaluation 
and (2) a consequence analysis.” (NRC 2008)
The BTRA was updated in 2008 and 2010. Risk is evaluated on an agent-by-
agent basis with an objective to stratify the analysis by different elements such as 
exposure routes, biological agent targets, acquisition, production, method of dis-
semination, as well as likelihood of deployment (e.g. by specific terrorist groups). 
The model has multiple nodes aimed to maximize oppertunities to understand 
what is and isn’t known at varying degrees of granulatity (Pesenti 2009).
general public. Biosecurity is directed toward minimizing the possibility that 
such pathogens or toxins will be misused, stolen, diverted, or intentionally re-
leased (Working Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United States 
2009). Thus, the Select Agent Regulations are designed to prevent unauthorized 
access, theft, loss, or release of Select Agents and Toxins (Appendix C).
The Select Agent Regulations require entities to provide graded protec-
tion to Select Agents and Toxins including limiting access to Select Agents and 
Toxins according to a site-specific security plan required for each institution 
registered with CDC or APHIS as authorized to possess and use such biological 
materials.11 Entities using strictly plant or animal pathogens report to APHIS; 
entities using human or zoonotic pathogens report to CDC. Institutions must 
submit the names of individuals who will be allowed access to Select Agents 
for a background check—termed a security risk assessment (SRA)—that is con-
11 CDC and APHIS report that as of September 2009 there were 388 enteties authorized to work 
with Select Agents ad Toxins (NRC 2009b).
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ducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division every five years. Registered institutions must also provide a 
list of agents in use or intended for use, and must report when any changes in 
use take place. Perhaps the most controversial element of the reporting require-
ments is the need to keep a running inventory of stock, which is a challenge in 
the case of living, reproducing organisms.12 The Select Agent Regulations re-
quires registered entities to maintain records pertaining to Select Agent access, 
long term storage inventories, transfers, training, etc. for a period of three years. 
Entities are required to maintain current and accurate records, and implement 
a system that ensures that all records and data bases created under the rule are 
accurate, have controlled access, and that their authenticity may be verified.
In addition, entities must conduct annual inspections for each labora-
tory where Select Agents or Toxins are stored or used in order to determine 
compliance with the Select Agent Regulations, the results of which must be 
documented, and any deficiencies identified must be corrected. Failure to meet 
these requirements may result in criminal penalties of fines and up to ten years 
imprisonment. Thus, the Select Agent Regulations can be reasonably viewed as 
an instrument of law enforcement to facilitate attribution13 and prosecution in 
the event of domestic use or, deliberate or inadvertent possession of potential 
biological weapons.
The Select Agent Program—Focus on Known Biothreat Agents
The Select Agent Program was devised to establish controls for known 
biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to 
public health and safety. Newly emerging pathogens are not given Select Agent 
12 This issue was addressed in Recommendation 4 of the NRC report, Responsible Research with 
Biological Select Agents and Toxins. —“Because biological agents have an ability to replicate, 
accountability is best achieved by controlling access to archived stocks and working materials. 
Requirements for counting the number of vials or other such measures of the quantity of biologi-
cal Select Agents (other than when an agent is transported from one laboratory site to another) 
should not be employed because they are both unreliable and counter-productive, yielding a false 
sense of security. A registered entity should record the identity of all biological Select Agents and 
toxins within that entity, where such materials are stored, who has access and when that access is 
available, and the intended use(s) of the materials” (NRC 2009b).
13 Microbial forensics plays an important in attribution efforts. Microbial forensics, also biofo-
rensics, is a relatively new scientific discipline that draws from other science disciplines including, 
genomics, microbiology and plant pathology (Breeze, Budowle, et al., Eds. (2005). Microbial 
Forensics, Elsevier Academic Press. Microbial forensics is dedicated to analyzing microbial activity 
as evidence for attribution purposes and/or back tracking. Microbial forensics procedures support 
‘decision taking’ at biosecurity levels, follows strict chain of custody of specimens and demands 
a rigorous (accredited) and unbiased performance. Therefore, microbial forensics includes the 
complete range of forensic evidence analysis from microorganisms, to associated evidence materials 
found at the field of the suspected outbreak or crime scene (Breeze, Budowle, et al., Eds. (2005). 
Microbial Forensics, Elsevier Academic Press.
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status until they have been assessed.14 When a novel agent emerges, it is named. 
Research is initiated to study its mechanism of action, the potential threat it 
presents, and its susceptibility to countermeasures. After knowledge is gained, 
an agent may be added to the list. Pathogens and toxins may be considered for 
inclusion on the Select Agent list at the discretion of the Secretary of DHHS 
and often at the suggestion of the Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins 
Technical Advisory Committee (ISATTAC), which is charged with making 
such recommendations. This process requires consultation with appropriate 
federal agencies and with scientific experts representing appropriate profes-
sional groups.
Importantly, this model allows some ability to consider the impact that 
the Select Agent Regulations may have on legitimate research before an agent 
is added to the list. Significant constraints on research may have negative 
consequences for public health and security by impeding a vigorous research 
enterprise response, which provides the foundation for the creation of new diag-
nostics, vaccines and therapeutics. This paradox provided early justification for 
not including the causative agent of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-
Corona virus) on the Select Agent list in early 2004, leading to containment of 
the epidemic by unparalleled international communication and collaboration.
Therefore, it is the committee’s view that the Select Agent Regulations are 
necessarily backward-looking and based on a list of known agents. It is clear, 
however, that there are unforeseen natural threats, as well as the potential to 
develop novel pathogens that are not in the realm of contemporary classification. 
Such unknown, unnamed pathogens are not yet Select Agents; these novel agents 
present a particularly challenging issue of direct concern to this committee.
Although the Select Agent Regulations do not focus on novel agents, the 
Select Agent Program has, since its inception, attempted to address the possibil-
ity that genetic material derived from a Select Agent might be used to construct 
a biological threat agent. Language from the NIH Guidelines for Research 
Inoling Recombinant DNA Molecules was adopted in the Select Agent Rule 
to address this concern:
Select agent means a microorganism (virus, bacterium, fungus, rickettsia) or 
toxin listed in Appendix A of this part.
The term also includes:
  (1) Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements from organ-
isms on Appendix A of this part, shown to produce or encode for a factor 
associated with a disease, and
14 As will be discussd, the criteria for inclusion of any biological agent or toxin onto the Select 
Agent list is provided in Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002.
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  (2) Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain 
nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins on Appendix A of this 
part, or their toxic submits (DHHS 1996).
It is important to note that this language is absolute and refers to direct 
evidence or experimental knowledge of the ability of the proteins encoded by 
the nucleic acids to cause biological damage. The concept that nucleic acid 
sequence might serve as a predictor of function of the encoded product was 
not addressed. Contemporaneous versions of the NIH Guidelines attempted 
to deal with the possibility that partial genomes could confer pathogenicity or 
toxicity by inclusion of a proxy, stating that transfer of more than “two-thirds 
of the genome” of a eukaryotic virus would likely necessitate a higher level of 
containment.15,16
We currently live in a scientific environment in which constructing a 
known gene(s) or modifying a microorganism may be achieved largely through 
synthetic means (See Cello, Paul et al. 2002; Gibson, Glass et al. 2010). In 
this regard, the CDC has issued guidance on the “Applicability of the Select 
Agent Regulations to Issues of Synthetic Genomics” (see Appendix E). Again, 
this guidance deals with known microorganisms, already designated as Select 
Agents. Its purpose is to clarify that Select Agent Regulations apply, even if the 
Select Agent is produced by synthetic means or has been genetically modified. 
The guidance does not attempt to address novel organisms that are not already 
designated as Select Agents. While this highlights the focus of the Select Agent 
Regulations on known threats, it also indicates the difficulty in setting clear 
boundaries around diverse organisms.
Unclear Boundaries
There is no taxonomic foundation for designation of a pathogen as a 
 Select Agent. Even with the full genomic sequence of multiple strains of Select 
Agents, the genetic differences between a defined Select Agent and closely 
related non-Select Agents are sometimes blurred and may lead to questions 
and uncertainty by both the scientific community and those responsible for 
15 The NIH Guidelines are in the process of being amended to address this issue. The pro-
posed revision was published in the April 22, 2010 Federal Register (http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
RAC/2010-9258.pdf).
16 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has struggled with a similar question since the early 
90’s. Large-scale sequencing efforts resulted in an enormous number of patent applications on hu-
man gene sequences. In order to meet the legal criterion for proof of utility, applicants provided 
computer-generated comparisons demonstrating the similarity or homology of a claimed sequence 
to another published sequence of known function. There were heated discussions about the va-
lidity of using an algorithm to predict how the product of sequence might behave in a biological 
system.
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oversight of the Select Agent program (Casadevall and Relman 2010). A case 
in point is the stipulation in the 18 USC Part 1, Chapter 10, subsection 175 c. 
that established criminal penalties for the possession of biological material shar-
ing 85 percent or more of the genome of variola virus, the cause of smallpox. 
It is unclear what “85 percent of the gene sequence” means. Does this refer to 
a fragment of 85 percent or more of the full-length variola virus genome? Or 
does it mean a full-length genome of 85 percent or greater sequence identity 
to variola? Moreover, several orthopoxviruses share approximately 96 percent 
amino identity with variola. The language is sufficiently problematic that the 
NSABB has recommended the repeal of the requirement because it may in-
advertently criminalize work on other orthopoxviruses including vaccinia, the 
smallpox vaccine virus, which was surely not the intent of the legislation17,18 
(NSABB 2006). This example highlights the challenges faced in defining Select 
Agents based on sequences alone.
Gene Synthesis Industry
If genetic sequences do not suffice to define Select Agents, then a challenge 
arises in providing guidance to the approximately fifty companies worldwide 
that offer gene synthesis as a commercial service (Maurer, Fischer et al. 2009). 
With one exception,19 all of the gene synthesis companies are private and 
none publish their financial results. Several manufacturers market their services 
through more than one distributor. The fact that the market is largely privately 
held and highly dispersed makes it difficult to gauge its size with any accuracy, 
but estimates place its value between $50 and $80 million in 2008. This repre-
sents over 50 million bases pairs of synthetic DNA, or approximately 75,000 
genes. The cost of synthesis has declined rapidly, dropping by half every 18-24 
months over the last ten years and will likely continue to decline for at least the 
next few years. Each of the top gene synthesis companies is currently capable 
of providing 1-2 million base pairs of synthetic DNA per month, and most are 
planning for rapid growth.
17 In July 2008 the Department of Justice released a memorandum clarifying the scope of the 
definition of variola virus under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Sec-
tion 6906, making it a criminal offense to knowingly produce, engineer, synthesize, acquire transfer 
directly or indirectly receive, possess, import, export or use, or possess and threaten to use, variola 
virus. 18 USC 175c (a) (1) exempts work conducted by or under the authority of the Secretary of 
HHS. The Department of Justice stated that section 175c does not apply to all orthopoxviruses, 
but only to viruses that cause smallpox. However, the challenge remains—how can one tell from 
sequence if an orthopoxvirus will cause smallpox?
18 This is still active statute; however, S.1649-WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009, 
was amended in mark up to include an amendment which codifies the WHO recommendations for 
the distribution, handling and synthesis of Variola Virus DNA and mandates regulations governing 
the distribution, synthesis and handling of variola virus DNA.
19 GeneArt.
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While gene synthesis provides many benefits to biomedical research, it also 
provides an alternate route of access to toxins and pathogenic organisms. Cur-
rent government oversight of the DNA synthesis industry has not kept up with 
the pace of science in a number of important ways. First, existing regulations 
are difficult to interpret in the context of a series of DNA sequence orders. 
The Select Agent Regulations focus on species definitions of pathogens and do 
not define the boundaries between a pathogen and a similar sequence from a 
related species. (The Export Administration Regulations enforced by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce include phrases such as “. . . sequences associated 
with the pathogenicity of microorganisms . . .” that are vague and imprecise.) 
Second, the regulations do not address activities that have the potential to cause 
significant alarm in the public and the scientific community. For instance, two 
DNA fragments that comprise the genome of the Select Agent Omsk Hem-
orrhagic Fever virus are not covered by the Select Agent Regulations when 
separated, but would be covered if the two fragments are joined together using 
simple, widely available molecular tools.
Gene synthesis companies have been active in working with their respec-
tive governments to promote effective regulation of the technology. All gene 
synthesis companies must comply with their national laws regarding pathogen 
and toxin DNAs.20 Most of the companies have customers in more than one 
country and must also comply with regulations that govern export from their 
country, as well as the regulations governing importation and possession of the 
sequences at the customer’s location. Several different industry groups have 
formed to promote safe, effective regulation of gene synthesis technology.
Although the application of the Select Agent Regulations to cloned DNA 
could be interpreted in a number of different ways, the CDC has provided a 
guide to interpreting these rules for the gene synthesis companies (“Applica-
bility of the Select Agent Regulations to Issues of Synthetic Genomics,” see 
Appendix E). The guidance document defines the organisms whose genomes 
are covered and provides examples that clarify the application of these rules. 
The document does not define the species boundaries in terms of sequence 
similarity. The gene synthesis companies therefore pragmatically must define a 
number of critical screening parameters on their own. However, because they 
must rely on sequence alone, they are faced with significant questions: Which 
20 Gene synthesis companies based in the United States are affected by at least four regulations 
that cover the synthesis of pathogen and toxin genes; (1) the Select Agent Rules, (2) the Depart-
ment of Commerce Export regulations, (3) the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 
and (4) a specific statute relating to smallpox. In addition, the World Health Organization places 
significant limits on the possession and end use of small pox genes, including a prohibition against 
the synthesis of any fragment of more than 500 base pairs. Currently, each of the approximately 40 
companies worldwide that supply synthetic genes has developed an independent process to screen 
orders for sequences that might be covered by the laws and regulations of its own country and 
those of the customer’s country.
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genome should be used as a reference for the species? Is a sequence that is 99 
percent identical to the reference genome covered? 98 percent? 90 percent?
DHHS has recently issued a document “Screening Framework Guidance 
for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers,” which provides a more de-
tailed methodology by which companies can screen DNA synthesis orders. 
These draft guidelines have been published in the Federal Register, and are cur-
rently available for public comment prior to issuance of a final set of guidelines. 
The guidance requests that companies identify and follow up on sequences 
(greater than 200bp) with homology unique to a Select Agent sequence. Thus, 
the guidance aims to define the boundaries between a Select Agent and a simi-
lar sequence from a related species. The guidance also discusses concerns that 
virulence genes from non-Select Agents could be used to produce biological 
threats:
The U.S. Government acknowledges that there are synthetic nucleic acid 
sequences from non-Select Agents or Toxins that may pose a biosecurity 
concern. Synthetic nucleic acid providers may choose to investigate such 
sequences as part of their best practices. However, due to the complexity of 
determining pathogenicity and because research in this area is ongoing, a list of 
additional non-Select Agent or Toxin sequences or organisms to screen against 
would not be comprehensive and consequently are not provided by the U.S. 
Government in this guidance (DHHS 2009).
However, the guidance does encourage companies to “exercise their due dili-
gence in the investigation of screening hits against non-Select Agents and Toxins 
that may raise a biosecurity concern” (DHHS 2009). While the motivation for 
this portion of the guidance is clear, the ability to implement the suggestion is 
not. Companies may find it challenging to recognize a sequence that poses a 
biosecurity concern, readily identify virulence genes, or determine the usability 
of genomic sequences in predicting potentially dangerous sequences in naturally 
occurring, genetically modified, or synthetically derived microorganisms.21
Impact of Select Agent Regulations on Research
There is a clear recognition that research on infectious disease agents, 
including Select Agents, is vital to public health and national security. There is 
also an acknowledgement among researchers that Select Agents should be regu-
lated (NRC 2009b; Sutton 2009). However, for those scientists who choose to 
pursue this line of investigation, it is not always clear what organisms and which 
21 The draft DHHS screening guidelines were the topic of a January 11, 2010, meeting hosted by 
AAAS CSTSP. A summary of the “major themes of the meeting, including concerns and/or chal-
lenges highlighted, and recommendations proposed by individual attendees” is available online. 
Berger, K. M., W. Pinard, et al. (2009). Minimizing the Risks of Synthetic DNA: Scientists’ Views 
on the U.S. Government’s Guidance on Synthetic Genomics.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
THE SELECT AGENT REGULATIONS 
researchers must comply with the SAR. The regulations as currently written are 
open to interpretation, due to the unclear boundaries discussed above. For ex-
ample, SARS-CoV is not currently a Select Agent, but may soon be designated 
as such. If this agent is added to the list, researchers will be required to register 
their SARS-CoV strains. But what does this mean? A SARS-CoV researcher is 
likely to have scores of related or derivative viruses, whose genomes are not 
identical to the ‘original’ SARS-CoV genome sequence.22 The various strains 
may or may not be pathogenic, and may have been obtained from the wild 
or via genetic modification of the ‘parent’ virus. Keep in mind that a single 
nucleotide change may render the organism non-pathogenic, whereas multiple-
changes elsewhere could have no effect on pathogenicity.23 A researcher may 
need to register all of their various strains; or if none of the sequences match 
the ‘original’ SARS-CoV sequence, then the researcher may believe that reg-
istration is not required. This is a serious concern. A misinterpretation of the 
requirements could lead to a substantial burden in time and resources as an 
investigator complies with the Select Agent Regulations unnecessarily; on the 
other hand, non-compliance could lead to criminal prosecution. Thus, having 
a clear definition of what is and is not a Select Agent, is vitally important to the 
responsible scientist (See Sutton 2009 and Box 1.8).
The designation of certain infectious organisms and toxins as Select Agents 
with the potential to be used as bioweapons challenged both policy makers and 
the scientific community to understand better the pathogenic mechanisms of 
these microorganisms and toxins and to develop countermeasures to prevent, 
diagnose, and treat the effects of such agents. Paradoxically, the designation of 
these organisms and toxins as Select Agents put considerable burden on the 
scientific community to conduct this research while simultaneously adhering 
to costly and rigorous standards for security and accountability (Dias, Reyes-
Gonzalez et al. 2010).
The Select Agent Program was not designed to impede research but there 
is much concern in the scientific community that the requirements have resulted 
in unintended negative consequences (NRC 2009b; Dias, Reyes-Gonzalez et al. 
2010). Select Agent Program criteria would be most useful if based on genomic 
information and a rigorous biological foundation tempered by the realities of 
national and international security.
22 Moreover, no reference sequences are currently provided for agents on the Select Agent list. In 
this regard, the agents are defined based on taxonomy and “chain of custody.”
23 As discussed in the Chapter 2, the effect that these sequence changes have on pathogenicity 
isn’t known until experiments are done. It should also be noted that a nucleotide sequence may 
contain “silent” mutations, which alter the DNA sequence, without affecting the protein sequence. 
Therefore, there may be dissimilarity at the DNA sequence level and identity at the protein level.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
0 SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION FOR SELECT AGENTS
BOX 1.8 
Effect of Select Agent Regulations on Research
During deliberations, the committee noted that the Select Agent Regulations have 
potentially significant consequences for the scientists who work in this area and on 
the research that is done. The Select Agent Regulations are based in law and backed 
by criminal penalties. Implementation of the current Select Agent Regulations was 
therefore discussed in the context of what a “predictive oversight system” might look 
like and the “level of certainty” such a system would require. The committee was aware 
that several issues of concern have been noted by the scientific and security commu-
nities. Although the quantitative affect of the Select Agent Regulations on research is 
unknown, some of the concerns are briefly presented below:
•  Altered Research Direction—Scientists may have redirected their research to the 
study of attenuated strains that are not classified as Select Agents (e.g. Bacillus 
anthracis Sterne strain) (CDC 2005). “In our view, the most likely explanation for 
the 10-fold discrepancy in the number of toxin- and capsule-related papers is that 
capsule-related research must be carried out within the SATL-associated regula-
tions. If, in fact, these regulations are hindering capsule-related research, such 
hindrance has direct biodefense and preparedness implications, given that capsule 
components have been shown to be effective vaccines” (Casadevall and Relman 
2010).
•  Considerable costs—As noted by the NRC Responsible Research with Biological 
Select Agents and Toxins, “select agent laboratories have significant ongoing se-
curity and safety sustainment costs that far exceed the indirect costs that grantee 
institutions receive to cover the costs of facilities, maintenance, and operations.” 
Thus, in the absence of continued federal funding, the institution must be willing 
and able to commit funds to meet this additional financial burden or instead deny 
their investigators such Select Agent research pursuits (NRC 2009b).
•  Inefficiency—Funds awarded to principal investigators for Select Agent research do 
not go as far as they would be expected to in a non-Select Agent laboratory. This 
may be due to the additional manpower needed for intensive recordkeeping (lab 
access, equipment access, reagent use, etc.), and the extensive recurrent training 
necessary for Select Agent registration compliance. There is inherent down time 
during which individuals must wait to be cleared by the CDC and FBI to begin work 
in the Select Agent areas. As noted by Dias et al., “the most striking effect observed 
was not associated with individual authors or institutions; it was a loss of efficiency, 
with an approximate 2- to 5-fold increase in the cost of doing select agent research 
as measured by the number of research papers published per millions of U.S. 
research dollars awarded”(Dias, Reyes-Gonzalez et al. 2010).
•  Personnel Issues—As noted by the NSABB, “Certain research facilities (notably 
federal) have instituted formal Personnel Reliability Programs (PRPs) to provide 
additional measures to help ensure that individuals with access to select agents 
meet additional standards of reliability . . . . “The promulgation of additional reli-
ability measures could serve as a powerful disincentive to those who wish to and 
would responsibly conduct research on select agents because the most talented 
young researchers, those with many options for research paths, may be far more 
likely to enter fields with less onerous regulatory requirements. Thus, a burdensome 
national personnel reliability program may not only drive scientists from important 
select agent research, but also drive select agent research out of academia and 
potentially out of the U.S. into countries with less stringent regulations (NSABB 
2009).
•  Collaborations may be affected between Select Agent laboratories and non-Select 
Agent-certified collaborators and trade partners, especially overseas. The develop-
ment of diagnostics and vaccines may require the sharing of samples, recombinant 
DNA, or toxins in quantities above Select Agent limits. Commercial partners may 
view the requirement of being Select Agent-registered as a disincentive to collabo-
ration and development of essential biodefense-related preventives, therapeutics, 
and diagnostics. This concern has again been expressed in response to a proposal 
of adding SARS-CoV to the SA list, “The ASM believes the proposal to add the 
SARS-CoV virus to the HHS list of select agents and toxins deserves further de-
liberation . . . consider the impact on international collaboration and public health 
efforts.”
CRITERIA FOR SELECT AGENT DESIGNATION
How should a “Select Agent” be defined? The registry of Select Agents is a 
finite list that has grown in recent years as emerging pathogens are characterized 
and assessed. For example, public comments are now being requested as offi-
cials consider whether Severe, Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) coronavirus 
and a recently recognized arena virus, Chapare virus, should be added to the 
Select Agent list. In some instances naturally occurring or derived attenuated 
strains of Select Agents have been removed from the list; however, despite 
legislation requiring periodic review of the Select Agent list, it is currently chal-
lenging to subtract from the list because there are no precise biological or policy 
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Select Agents and Toxins, “select agent laboratories have significant ongoing se-
curity and safety sustainment costs that far exceed the indirect costs that grantee 
institutions receive to cover the costs of facilities, maintenance, and operations.” 
Thus, in the absence of continued federal funding, the institution must be willing 
and able to commit funds to meet this additional financial burden or instead deny 
their investigators such Select Agent research pursuits (NRC 2009b).
•  Inefficiency—Funds awarded to principal investigators for Select Agent research do 
not go as far as they would be expected to in a non-Select Agent laboratory. This 
may be due to the additional manpower needed for intensive recordkeeping (lab 
access, equipment access, reagent use, etc.), and the extensive recurrent training 
necessary for Select Agent registration compliance. There is inherent down time 
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was not associated with individual authors or institutions; it was a loss of efficiency, 
with an approximate 2- to 5-fold increase in the cost of doing select agent research 
as measured by the number of research papers published per millions of U.S. 
research dollars awarded”(Dias, Reyes-Gonzalez et al. 2010).
•  Personnel Issues—As noted by the NSABB, “Certain research facilities (notably 
federal) have instituted formal Personnel Reliability Programs (PRPs) to provide 
additional measures to help ensure that individuals with access to select agents 
meet additional standards of reliability . . . . “The promulgation of additional reli-
ability measures could serve as a powerful disincentive to those who wish to and 
would responsibly conduct research on select agents because the most talented 
young researchers, those with many options for research paths, may be far more 
likely to enter fields with less onerous regulatory requirements. Thus, a burdensome 
national personnel reliability program may not only drive scientists from important 
select agent research, but also drive select agent research out of academia and 
potentially out of the U.S. into countries with less stringent regulations (NSABB 
2009).
•  Collaborations may be affected between Select Agent laboratories and non-Select 
Agent-certified collaborators and trade partners, especially overseas. The develop-
ment of diagnostics and vaccines may require the sharing of samples, recombinant 
DNA, or toxins in quantities above Select Agent limits. Commercial partners may 
view the requirement of being Select Agent-registered as a disincentive to collabo-
ration and development of essential biodefense-related preventives, therapeutics, 
and diagnostics. This concern has again been expressed in response to a proposal 
of adding SARS-CoV to the SA list, “The ASM believes the proposal to add the 
SARS-CoV virus to the HHS list of select agents and toxins deserves further de-
liberation . . . consider the impact on international collaboration and public health 
efforts.”
criteria to do so. Nor are there precise, quantitative criteria for inclusion. Select 
Agent status has generally been conferred on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, using 
a combination of the following considerations.24
24 “[T]he Act requires the HHS Secretary to consider the following criteria in determining 
whether to list an agent or toxin: (1) The effect on human health of exposure to the agent or 
toxin; (2) the degree of contagiousness of the agent or toxin and the methods by which the agent 
or toxin is transferred to humans; (3) the availability and effectiveness of pharmacotherapies and 
immunizations to treat and prevent any illness resulting from infection by the agent or toxin; and 
(4) any other criteria, including the needs of children and other vulnerable populations, that the 
Secretary considers appropriate” (DHHS 2005).
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• Virulence, pathogenicity, or toxicity of the organism; its potential to 
cause death or serious disease.
• Availability of treatments such as vaccines or drugs to control the 
consequences of a release or epidemic.
• Transmissibility of the organism; its potential to cause an uncontrolled 
epidemic.
• Ease of preparing the organism in sufficient quantity and stability for 
use as a bioterrorism agent; for example, the ability to prepare large 
quantities of stable microbial spores.
• Ease of disseminating the organism in a bioterrorism event to cause 
mass casualties, for example by aerosolization.
• Public perception of the organism; its potential to cause societal dis-
ruption by mass panic.
• Known research and development efforts on the organism by national 
bioweapons programs.
Thus, there are multiple factors that are considered before adding an agent 
to the Select Agent list. Simply possessing the capability of causing a significant 
threat to public health and safety does not meet the threshold for designation 
as a Select Agent. For example, seasonal influenza causes an average of 35,000 
deaths annually in the United States, yet it is not considered a Select Agent 
(an effective vaccine is available). Historically, pathogens that were previously 
weaponized either by the United States or other countries are considered to be 
the greatest risk,25 even when subsequent scientific findings suggest otherwise. 
Potential biological weapons threats are uniformly discussed (See, for example, 
Kortepeter and Parker 1999), as possessing attributes that would enhance their 
appeal to terrorists as a weapon. Since the 1950s these attributes include the 
ability to incapacitate affected individuals or cause highly lethal infections in a 
short period of time, lack of availability of preventive or therapeutic measures, 
ease of production, stability as an aerosol, and ability to be dispersed as small 
particles, all characteristics that could lead to significant loss of life, overwhelm 
the healthcare system, and cause social disruption and panic. For example, 
variola (the virus that causes smallpox) is perhaps the clearest and least contro-
versial agent on the Select Agent list; smallpox virus has the potential to cause 
a catastrophic epidemic if it were released.
It also seems clear that the aim of the Select Agent Regulations is not to 
regulate all organisms that could be used by bioterrorists, even if the organism 
has already been used for bioterrorism. Salmonella typhimurium was the agent 
used in a 1984 incident in Oregon by followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, but 
25 Those pathogens most often considered as greatest threats included anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), 
botulinum toxin, tularemia (Francisella tularensis), plague (Yersinia pestis), and smallpox (variola 
virus), among others.
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the resulting cases of food poisoning were on a scale similar to many normally 
occurring food contamination events and readily handled by the normal public 
health system.
One useful source for understanding the rationale for the current Select 
Agents list is the commentary on 42 CFR Part 73, the DHHS implementation 
of provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 (DHHS 2002), describing some of the considerations 
that led to the Select Agents list that superseded the 1997 list in 42 CFR 72.6. 
For example, “viruses causing hantavirus pulmonary syndrome” were removed 
from the CFR 72.6 Select Agent list because they “are difficult to propagate and 
there is a lack of data establishing laboratory acquired infections.” Yellow fever 
virus was removed because “there is a safe and effective vaccine.” Histoplasma 
capsulatum and Blastomyces species were considered but not included because 
“they are difficult to cultivate and do not sporulate readily.” Aflatoxins were not 
included because “the acute toxicity is too low to pose a significant mass casu-
alty threat.” The published discussion in the Federal Register does not include 
any examples in which DHHS considered public perception of the organism or 
known bioweapons development programs in its decision making. It explicitly 
lists “effect on human health” (pathogenicity), “contagiousness,” “methods by 
which the agent or toxin is transferred to humans,” (dissemination) and “the 
availability of pharmacotherapies and immunizations” as criteria, and the dis-
cussion includes more than one example in which ease of preparation of large 
quantities of the organism was considered. All in all, the decision to include a 
microorganism or a microbial product as a Select Agent is based on a variety 
of factors, including past medical experience, partial laboratory evidence, and 
historical precedent.
From this perspective it is worth considering which properties (or general 
criteria) can be predicted from genome sequence now, which ones might be 
predicted in the future, and which ones will never be predictable from genome 
sequence because they are not biological properties.
Non-Biological Criteria
As mentioned, non-biological information is considered when determining 
if an agent should be designated as a Select Agent or Toxin. Factors such as 
trade policy, the availability of therapeutics, natural prevalence of the micro-
organism, and historical use of an agent as a bioweapon can all effect whether 
or not a microorganism poses a threat to national security (Table 1.1). Because 
such factors are not inherent biological properties, they can never be deter-
mined by a biological agent’s genome.
For example, USDA animal pathogens are included in the Select Agent list 
because the diseases they cause have significant economic and trade repercus-
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sions for U.S. Agriculture.26 A few years ago U.S. international trade in beef was 
halted for approximately two years at a cost of billions of dollars to U.S. farm-
ers due to the occurrence a single case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE)—commonly known as “mad-cow disease.” This response was the result 
of international trade rules—long supported by the U.S.—that mandate that 
all animal product exports being halted in the event of a single case of foot and 
mouth disease or BSE (or other transboundary livestock and poultry diseases 
listed by the World Animal Health Association27). The concept of “increased 
virulence” is thus intriguing in regard to these non-zoonotic animal Select 
Agents; if the catastrophic response is triggered, as for BSE, by even one case, 
then the biological characteristic of virulence is not an issue. What could pos-
sibly be made worse? Even a totally synthetic foot and mouth virus designed 
for enhanced virulence would have no increased impact from the point of view 
of international trade rules. Because it is not U.S. policy to vaccinate animals 
to control the disease, FMD is already the most infectious animal virus known 
(a single pig is estimated to produce 100 billion cattle infectious doses per day 
and there are approximately 24 million pigs in Iowa) and the international trade 
consequences would be the same as a natural FMD virus. Thus, these agents are 
designated as Select Agents not because they pose a threat to human health, or 
even animal health. Rather, these agents pose a threat to national security, and 
are designated as Select Agents because of potential economic consequences, 
international trade agreements, and vaccination policy.
Thus, criteria that are considered in designating a microorganism as a 
“Select Agent” include biological and non-biological data. While it is not cur-
26 The international trade rules for animal agriculture are set by the International Office of 
Epizootics in Paris (recently retitled the World Animal Health Association), an arm of the World 
Trade Organization.
27 Formerly called the International Office of Epizootics (OIE).
TABLE 1.1 Prospects for de Noo Prediction of “Select Agent-ness” from 
Sequence
Property
Predictable 
Now?
Foreseeable 
Future?
Maybe 
Someday? Never
Pathogenicity X
Transmissibility X
Available treatments X
Ease of preparation X
Ease of dissemination X
Public perception X
Historical bioweapon X
Economic impact X
Natural prevalence X
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rently feasible to predict the biological characteristics from sequence, it is not 
even theoretically possible to predict the non-biological considerations from 
sequence. Ultimately, designation of a microorganism as a “Select Agent” is a 
judgment call and a policy decision. “Select Agent-ness” is not a strictly bio-
logical property.
Biological Criteria
With the multiple non-biological factors that contribute to Select Agent 
designation, it is clear that “Select Agent” is a regulatory term, rather than a 
biological one. However, the central criteria for a Select Agent are biological 
attributes. At the time when the Select Agent list was devised by DHHS, some 
60 or so full bacterial genomes were known and annotated as well as a score of 
viruses.28 Hundreds of bacterial genome sequences are now available for com-
28 The first complete sequence of a bacterial genome was published in 1995.
BOX 1.9 
Non-Biological Factors for Select Agent 
Designation—Smallpox and Polio
Smallpox was declared eradicated by the World Health Assembly in 1980, a mo-
ment that is recognized as one of the most important achievements of humankind. 
Routine smallpox vaccination ceased in the United States in 1980, and earlier in 
some countries. Almost half the world’s population is currently immunologically 
naïve to the disease. At the same time, the rise of diseases such as HIV/AIDS 
that weaken the immune system, as well as the prevalence of atopic dermatitis 
(the vaccine is contraindicated for individuals with atopic dermatitis), would make 
resumption of routine vaccination difficult. There are today no licensed therapeu-
tics for the treatment of smallpox, and currently licensed vaccines, while effective, 
are contraindicated for immunocompromised individuals. Historical anecdotes, 
while not confirmed, suggest that contaminated materials could be used to spread 
smallpox in target populations. Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
have engaged in research aimed at weaponizing smallpox (NRC 2009b). While 
variola’s virulence makes it a threat to public health, these other non-biological 
factors make smallpox an obvious candidate for use as a bioweapon. Thus, both 
biological and non-biological factors contribute to this once endemic pathogen 
being designated a Select Agent. In contrast, polio is not a Select Agent despite 
its ability to cause crippling disease and death. Polio virus is endemic in some 
countries, and is therefore difficult to restrict. Moreover, the availability of effective 
vaccines reduce the threat posed by this virus. However, if vaccination were to 
cease, this virus could be viewed as a potential bioweapon and designated as a 
Select Agent. Clearly, the non-biological context can never be predicted from the 
viral sequence.
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parative genomics. Genomic information was not employed in the initial defini-
tion of Select Agents. However, from the outset it was asked, to what degree 
can genomic sequences be used to detect Select Agents now and, for the future, 
to what degree can genomic sequences be used to predict potentially danger-
ous sequences in naturally occurring, genetically manipulated or synthetically 
derived microorganisms? These questions are the focus of this committee.
In examining the sequences from several hundred bacterial genomes, it is 
impressive just how much diversity is seen—even in different genomes from 
the same bacterial species. If one considers the general biological criteria used 
to designate a microorganism as a Select Agent and then asks, to what degree 
could these attributes be deduced from sequence, the answer is quite clear. 
Prediction of pathogenicity, transmissibility, ease of preparation, and ease of 
dissemination is not possible now or in the foreseeable future (see Table 1.1). 
In part, this is because we lack the basic biological information, and in part it 
is because our current predictive algorithms are not sufficiently robust.
Infection of a susceptible host by a Select Agent may lead to morbidity and 
mortality by many different mechanisms, be it “hemorrhagic fever” due to some 
viral infections or neurological disease following exposure to a bacterial toxin. 
With the exception of some toxins, the genetic basis for the disease or death 
that may follow infection with or intoxication by a Select Agent is, however, not 
well defined. Pathogenicity seen in a susceptible host is the result of a complex 
interaction between a pathogen and a host defense system, as well as an envi-
ronmental context (e.g. age, sex, nutrition, health, immune status, and others). 
As will be discussed subsequently, pathogenicity of an organism may be the 
result of a specific sequence and gene, or more frequently the result of interac-
tions between several genes, various sequences, structural characteristics, and 
host characteristics. There are too many variables involved on the host side 
alone to be able to accurately predict whether any given nucleic acid change 
in the pathogen will involve greater or lesser pathogenicity. The complexity 
of these systems argues against a simple gene-sequence basis for “predictive 
oversight of Select Agents” without substantial new information.
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, there is no current way in which a 
complex biological factor such as pathogenicity can be predicted from genome 
sequence. Predicting the function of an individual protein, or single microor-
ganism is daunting. Moreover, the nature of infectious disease is such that ac-
curate prediction of microbial pathogenicity is not possible without information 
concerning the host and the environmental context.
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2
Challenges of Predicting 
Pathogenicity from Sequence
INTRODUCTION
Our committee was asked to “identify the scientific advances that would 
be necessary to permit serious consideration of developing and implementing 
an oversight system for Select Agents that is based on predicted features and 
properties encoded by nucleic acids rather than a relatively static list of specific 
agents and taxonomic definitions.” It is true that the microorganisms and toxins 
that currently make up the Select Agent list are defined by taxonomy and by 
their perceived importance to public health and security. They are (or are prod-
ucts of) pathogens, that is, microorganisms capable of causing disease. Most 
Select Agents are not typical of the common pathogenic microorganisms seen 
in human or animal medicine, or in agricultural practice. But Select Agents and 
more commonly encountered pathogenic microorganisms do share a number of 
biological properties. It is essential to understand that pathogenic microorgan-
isms are not defined by “taxonomy”; it is very common for a given microbial 
species to have pathogenic and non-pathogenic members. Escherichia coli is 
found in the colon of virtually all humans and animals and is part of their in-
digenous flora. They are typically harmless. However, a genetically defined, and 
more recently sequence-defined, subgroup of E. coli is the most common cause 
of urinary tract infection in humans and dogs. From a taxonomic standpoint 
the microorganisms are unequivocally called Escherichia coli; from a genetic and 
sequence homology standpoint they are distinct categories of E. coli. Similarly, 
the taxonomic genus Yersinia includes Y. pestis, the causative agent of plague, 
and other Yersinia species that are certainly enteric pathogens but are not 
Select Agents, and other Yersinia species that are not known to be pathogens. 
The pathogens and the non-pathogens are not distinguished by taxonomy but 
can now be distinguished reasonably well with genetic and molecular analysis.
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Is there a potential for developing and implementing an oversight system 
for Select Agents that is based on features and properties encoded by nucleic 
acids? The general answer to this question is yes. The committee believes, how-
ever, that the entire concept of “predictive” oversight is flawed in that (1) the 
current Select Agent list has a non-biological as well as a biological basis for ex-
istence and (2) functional “prediction” alone cannot provide a level of certainty 
sufficient to designate a microorganism as a Select Agent, whose possession is 
legally restricted. Nevertheless, oversight of novel pathogens, whether natural 
or synthetic, is clearly seen by policy makers and legal experts to be a necessary 
component of a comprehensive biosecurity strategy. We propose to discuss here 
only the biological factors relevant to establishing a sequence-based oversight 
system that is focused on identifying genes and gene products that are likely to 
be involved in survival and persistence of a microorganism and its interaction 
with a host. That would include genes of Select Agents, but would also include 
a far greater number of genes that are associated with pathogenicity (the ability 
to cause disease) and virulence (the degree of pathogenicity encoded by a given 
gene or group of genes). Understanding the basis of such an oversight system 
requires some understanding of the biology of pathogenicity and of the current 
limitations of genomic analysis.
THE ART OF SEQUENCE-BASED PREDICTION
It is clear that we are immersed in an age of genomics. As of December 27, 
2009, the Web site Genomesonline.org (Genomesonline 2009) reported that 
3,606 bacterial genomes were being sequenced and that complete DNA se-
quences of at least 712 distinct bacterial strains were in the public domain. The 
completed sequences include all the bacterial Select Agents and most common 
pathogens of humans, animals, and plants. Entrez Genomes contained 3,498 
reference sequences for 2,374 viral genomes, including all of the Select Agents 
and common plant and animal viral pathogens.
The genomes of prokaryotes possess specific and relatively well-understood 
promoter sequences (signals), such as transcription factor binding sites, that are 
relatively easy to identify. The gene sequences that code for a protein occur as 
one contiguous open reading frame (ORF), which is typically many hundreds 
or thousands of base pairs long. The nucleotide compositions and frequency of 
use of stop codons (the punctuation between genes) are well known. Further-
more, protein-coding DNA has periodicities of occurrence and other statistical 
properties. Therefore, recognizing genes in prokaryotic systems is relatively 
straightforward, and there are well-designed algorithms to do it with high levels 
of accuracy.
However, identifying a gene and understanding its function are altogether 
different matters. At least one-fourth of genes that are identified in bacterial 
genomes, whether large or small, whether from pathogen or non-pathogen, 
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are “hypothetical” or of unknown function. Considering the long history of 
biochemical and genetic examination of microorganisms, it is daunting that so 
much of the “equipment” of microorganisms is still unknown. The hypothetical 
genes are in two categories: ones that are found in a variety of organisms, and 
ones that are peculiar to particular lineages. For many genome sequences, the 
only annotation that will be available for the foreseeable future will be based 
on computational predictions and comparisons with known functional elements 
in related microorganisms. Despite the hypothetical genes, it has been pointed 
out that much of the whole-genome sequence of many microorganisms, when 
viewed against a backdrop of 100 years or more of biochemistry and microbi-
ology, is not at all a total surprise in that much that has been found was fully 
expected (Doolittle 1981). Moreover, the full genome itself is a tremendously 
valuable asset because for a given organism, it provides all the details: The entire 
“parts list” is on the table—even if we do not know where some of them go or 
what they do. Seeing an assemblage of parts should not be mistaken for under-
standing how the parts function. From the standpoint of the present report, 
for important pathogens, comparisons between strains can pinpoint differences 
between the virulent and the avirulent microorganisms, and comparisons be-
tween species can be informative about host or tissue specificity. Comparisons 
have become even more useful as we have factored in the complete genomes of 
the human and other animals that serve as microbial hosts. At the genetic level, 
genome comparisons begin to reveal the fundamental divergences of microbial 
life and their evolutionary origins. We have also begun to understand how 
pathogens got to where they are and, we know to some extent what to look for 
if we are trying to design a pathogenic microorganism.
The objective of a “predictive oversight” system would be to forecast with 
a high degree of certainty the pathogenic potential of sequences of
• Single or small numbers of genes related to Select Agent toxins.
• Genomes or genomic regions that are closely related to Select Agent 
pathogens.
• Genomes or genomic regions of newly identified natural pathogens.
• Novel genomic sequences that are designed and assembled by syn-
thetic biology.
Sequence prediction in biology is a hierarchy of increasing difficulty that 
reflects the complexity of the particular system under analysis. The simplest of 
such predictions would probably be that of a protein, such as a toxin.1 Next 
1 This is by no means easy. For instance, Yoshida et al. have shown that three amino acid changes 
can turn the E. coli major chaperone GroEL, into an insect toxin. That co-option of function pres-
ents a major problem for predictive systems, even at this level. Yoshida, N., K. Oeda, et al. (2001). 
”Protein function: Chaperonin turned insect toxin.” Nature 411(6833): 44.
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in order of predictive difficulty would be a genetic pathway (a group of co-
regulated multiple proteins interacting in concert). The third most problematic 
set of sequences to evaluate as a means of forecasting function would be those 
of whole organisms alone in a controlled environment (with multiple pathways 
interacting in concert). The final and most difficult predictive situation would 
be one in which two or more organisms interact in their natural environment.2 
It is this last level of complexity that gives rise to the key biological attributes 
of pathogenicity and transmissibility, factors that contribute to the criteria that 
form the basis of inclusion of an organism on the Select Agent list.
Predicting pathogenicity or transmissibility of a microorganism requires 
a detailed understanding of multiple attributes of both the pathogen and its 
host. It is a prediction problem of the greatest complexity. Using a single ge-
nomic sequence to predict the potential consequences of the interaction of a 
microorganism, or a microbial virulence determinant, with a host clearly is not 
within the bounds of contemporary biology. Current sequence prognostication 
methods are at best at the level of foretelling the function of an individual pro-
tein on the basis of its deduced amino acid sequence. Even with the availability 
of a high-resolution protein structure, projecting the activity of closely related 
molecules accurately is not straightforward. There is as yet little work that even 
attempts to make predictions at the next level, that of genetic or biochemical 
pathways.
Predicting Biological Function from Sequence
The integration of experimental and computational information suggests 
that the human genome encodes about 20,000 protein-coding genes and an 
unknown number of functional RNA molecules; the Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) 
genome encodes about 6,000 proteins; a large virus, such as the smallpox vi-
rus, encodes about 200 proteins; and small positive-strand or negative-strand 
viruses, such as coronaviruses and influenza viruses, encode 10-30 proteins. As 
noted above, although these expressed RNAs and proteins can be identified us-
ing computational approaches with relative certainty, assignment of function is 
problematic. Biological experiments are still needed to confirm computational 
predictions.
The dominant method of function “prediction” uses sequence homology 
software. The underlying principle of such an approach is that proteins are 
reused or modified for applications in similar functional systems in different 
species far more often than entirely new ones are introduced. Most proteins 
generally fall into a relatively small number of homologous protein families 
of related structure and usually of at least somewhat related function. For 
2 Consider the enormous number of gene sequences at play and which must be choreographed as 
a microorganism leaves the salivary gland of a biting insect and is injected into human tissues.
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 example, the Pfam protein family database contains about 10,000 protein fami-
lies that account for about 75 percent of all known proteins. Two proteins that 
diverged through evolution from a common ancestral sequence (“homologous” 
sequences) tend to have structural and functional characteristics in common. 
The sequence that governs the mechanism of action of a particular protein 
evolves slowly, whereas the sequence that affects how a protein interacts with a 
binding partner, such as a cellular receptor, evolves rapidly.3 If the function of 
one protein is known, some aspects of the functional annotation can be inferred 
for other homologous proteins. Computer programs for sequence-database 
homology search (such as BLAST, HMMER, and FASTA) are widely used to 
discern whether a newly annotated protein or RNA sequence is homologous 
to an already known sequence or sequence family.
Homology offers only a “low-resolution” prediction of function. Sequence-
homology analysis can often determine what a protein is likely to do (such 
as, protein kinase, metalloprotease, or oxidoreductase) but generally will 
not reveal the biochemical pathway to which its proteins partner(s) belong 
or the particular residue(s) that will be the target or substrate for it. There 
are less well-developed computational prediction methods that may occasion-
ally offer clues to help to answer the more detailed questions but, generally, 
such queries must be addressed directly with controlled laboratory experi-
ments. For example, if a novel influenza-like genome were obtained, sequence 
analysis would certainly and immediately recognize the homologous parts: the 
genes that encode hemagglutinin (HA) (Pfam protein family database code 
PF00509), neuraminidase (NA) (PF00064), nucleoprotein (PF00506), the ma-
trix proteins M1 (PF00598) and M2 (PF00599), the proteins NS1 (PF00600) 
and NS2 (PF00601), and the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase components 
PA (PF00603), PB1 (PF00602), and PB2 (PF00604). These families have tens 
of thousands of examples of sequences; on the basis of the known diversity, 
the statistical models used in sequence-homology analyses are often capable of 
recognizing sequences that are separated by hundreds of millions or even bil-
lions of years of evolution. The computational approaches would identify the 
general kinds of “parts” in a genome and would be able to determine whether 
an expected part were present, missing, or unexpectedly quite different from a 
currently known virus sequence component. We can recognize some molecular 
signatures that may be essential for maintaining effective pathogen-host inter-
3 For example, a particular enzyme cleaves DNA and recognizes a specific sequence defined cleav-
age site; the enzyme structure that allows it to cleave DNA may evolve slowly (related enzymes also 
cut DNA), whereas the portion of the enzyme that recognizes the specific DNA sequence cleavage 
site might evolve rapidly (related enzymes cut different DNA sequences).
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action,4 replication efficiency and pathogenesis outcomes in natural, but not 
necessarily, alternative hosts. The identification of genera or species of patho-
genic bacteria or viruses is likewise easily accomplished with DNA homology 
approaches. Those methods are used every day in clinical laboratories all over 
the world.
What could not be readily foretold from the sequence-homology analy-
ses described above is whether the influenza-like virus is highly pathogenic 
for humans and other mammals, or whether a particular vaccine will protect 
against it. Those traits depend on a small number of genetic changes that evolve 
rapidly in ways that are not well understood; even subtle changes may have a 
profound biological effect. Those features change so rapidly, they do not cor-
relate well with evolutionary history. Thus, sequence-homology analysis is less 
informative for such viral characteristics than for simply identifying genome 
parts components of an influenza or related virus. For example, there is a strong 
correlation between high pathogenicity and trypsin-independent cleavage of the 
influenza virus hemagglutinin. This is not a perfect means of prediction, how-
ever, inasmuch as the 1918 influenza virus, which was associated with 50 million 
deaths worldwide, has a cleavage site that appears from sequence analysis to 
be associated with low pathogenic potential (Box 2.1). Such poor predictive 
power from sequence analysis is likely to be common for many if not most, 
microbial virulence determinants because virulence is typically mutifactorial 
and is affected by details of molecular interactions between a microorganism 
and a specific target in a specific host. (See also Appendix G)
Protein Structure Prediction
Another possible route to prediction of function from sequence is to pre-
dict the folded 3D structure of a protein from its sequence and then use fea-
tures of that structure (which evolve much more slowly than sequence) to infer 
catalysis, binding partners, or other functional properties. Function prediction 
based on structure has been one of the “Grand Challenge” problems in science 
for the last 50 years, since Anfinsen showed that the information to determine 
protein 3D structure is encoded in the linear amino-acid sequence (Haber and 
Anfinsen 1962).
Pure de noo structure prediction was essentially impossible until recently 
and is only occasionally successful even now. Progress has come mostly from 
the growing database of experimentally determined structures (the Protein 
4 Methods such as CorrMut and CRASP identify functional domains within proteins that are 
co-evolving in response to one or more unknown selective pressures (Afonnikov, D. A. and N. A. 
Kolchanov (2004). “CRASP: a program for analysis of coordinated substitutions in multiple align-
ments of protein sequences.” Nucl. Acids Res. 32(suppl_2): W64-68, Fleishman, S. J., O. Yifrach, 
et al. (2004). “An evolutionarily conserved network of amino acids mediates gating in voltage-
dependent potassium channels.” Journal of Molecular Biology 340(2): 307-318.
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Data Bank contains over 60,000; http://www.rcsb.org/pdb), which enable 
the modeling of new sequences on the basis of homology to known, related 
structures. Recent achievements have been impressive, as demonstrated by 
the Critical Assessment of protein Structure Prediction (CASP) competitions 
(Moult 2005). Two rather distinct current approaches achieve good predictions 
fairly often: One is inspired by protein evolution and can recognize and piece 
together distant sequence relationships (Zhang, Wang et al.), and the other is 
inspired by protein folding and uses a combination of physics and empirical 
data to construct a model (Raman, Vernon et al. 2009). Homology models are 
usually approximately correct (Keedy, Williams et al. 2009), and even de noo 
predictions sometimes succeed (Box 2.2).
Further prediction of binding or catalytic sites from successfully modeled 
3D structures (López, Ezkurdia et al. 2009) or prediction of protein/protein 
binding modes by docking known components, as in the CAPRI (Critical 
Assessment of PRedicted Interaction) competition (Janin 2005), are also still 
successful only sometimes and only partially. Approximately correct homology 
models can enhance the power of purely sequence-based comparisons consid-
erably, especially when they show that known functional residues are brought 
together into the right 3D relationships. Often, however, the critical biological 
details hinge on structural details that confer a difference in specificity or in 
regulation and that are exactly the most difficult places to achieve accurate 
prediction.
BOX 2.1 
Influenza—Hemagglutinin Cleavage
One of the most important sequence features of influenza virus A pathogenesis 
is a protease cleavage site in hemagglutinin (HA). Cleavage is required for HA 
to catalyze membrane fusion, a necessary step for viral infectivity. In viruses of 
low pathogenicity, this essential cleavage step tends to be catalyzed by a host-
encoded protease (trypsin, in the human respiratory tract), so viral infectivity is 
limited by tissue distribution of the host protease. Conversely, an essential feature 
of highly pathogenic influenza viruses is the presence of mutations in the gene 
for HA that leads to trypsin-independent cleavage of the protein; such mutations 
enable the virus to infect a broader range of tissues. The HA protease cleavage 
site is a sequence of only about seven to 10 residues, and the sites that contain 
small insertions of a few basic residues (lysine and arginine) tend to be associated 
with trypsin independence. With such changes, HA becomes cleavable by widely 
distributed subtilisin-like proteases that have a consensus recognition sequence. 
Yet, the correlation of high pathogenicity and trypsin independent cleavage of 
HA is not perfect; the 1918 influenza virus, which was associated with 50 million 
deaths worldwide, has a cleavage site that appears from sequence analysis to 
be of the low pathogenic.
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BOX 2.2 
Critical Assessment of Protein Structure 
Prediction (CASP) Competition
Last year’s Critical Assessment of protein Structure Prediction (CASP8) re-
sults for free modeling (that is, when no clear template is available in the Protein 
Data Bank) included at least one good model for 5 of the 13 targets (Ben-David, 
Noivirt-Brik et al. 2009). Some predicted models have been shown to be accurate 
enough for the demanding application of molecular replacement for solving the 
crystallographic phase problem (Qian, Raman et al. 2007).
Figure Box 2-2
Bitmapped image
CASP8 included a cautionary example of extreme structure-prediction difficulty in 
the form of two targets that had only three different residues out of 56 (as shown 
in the figure); the pair had been designed and selected for maximum sequence 
match but to fold into entirely different 3D structures (He, Yeh et al. 2005). A purely 
sequence-based predictive method could not recognize the consequences of this 
tiny difference, and it seems that the predictor groups who got both targets right 
knew about the earlier stages of this tour-de-force design (He, Yeh et al. 2005). 
The example is analogous to the issue of the vaccine strain of a pathogen; in 
both cases, a very small, “linchpin” change in sequence causes a reversal of 
the large-scale relevant property: In this pair the protein fold, and for the vac-
cine strain, its pathogenicity. Pure prediction is therefore chancy at best here, 
and correct classification depends on expert outside knowledge of such unusual 
near-neighbor cases.
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Overall, this route of prediction based on 3D structure is well worth 
encouraging for both practical and intellectual benefits, but its utility in a ro-
bust system of predicting Select Agents (for legal oversight) is still extremely 
far off.
Gene Regulation
If an organism’s virulence depends on specialized gene products, it must be 
able to use them when they are needed but not squander its metabolic energy 
in producing them aimlessly or risk having them detected and prematurely neu-
tralized by host defenses. Consequently, regulating the expression of virulence 
factors is an additional essential complication of a pathogenic microorganism’s 
life. The host presents an array of conditions strikingly distinct from those 
BOX 2.3 
Ricin
 Ricin is a plant toxin isolated from the seeds of the castor bean plant, Ricinus 
communis. It inhibits protein synthesis in affected cells by modifying the ribosome; 
this leads to ribotoxic stress and eventually cell death. Ricin represents a family 
of toxins known as Ribosome Inactivating Proteins (RIPs) that are found through-
out the plant and bacterial kingdoms. Despite their very different sequences and 
sometimes quite different structures, these toxins share three highly conserved 
amino acids that are responsible for their catalytic activity.
 One cautionary tale for the prediction of toxin activity from gene sequence 
comes from the work of Frankel and Robertus (Frankel, Welsh et al. 1990). They 
genetically mutated ricin amino acid glutamate-177 and predicted that the protein 
would be inactivated because this side chain is highly conserved and central to 
the catalytic activity of the toxin. Although more conservative mutations were inac-
tive, when the glutamate was mutated down to an alanine residue, the enzyme 
still retained about 5 percent of the activity of the wild-type sequence—enough to 
slow growth of yeast cells sensitive to the toxin. Based on the structure of ricin, the 
researchers predicted that the nearby glutamate residue at position 208 was able 
to move and substitute in the reaction. They produced an inactivated ricin A chain 
only after mutating both glutamates 177 and 208; a crystal structure of the Ala-
177 mutant showed that the carboxyl of Glu-208 did indeed move into the former 
position of catalytic Glu-177 (Kim, Misna et al. 1992).
 The genes encoding ricin (rtx genes) of the various castor bean cultivars have 
only one or two nucleotide differences in regions that do not affect protein struc-
ture or function. The R. communis genome would not be sequenced to determine 
the virulence of castor beans, but instead it would be assumed that unmodified 
beans contain active ricin toxin. Several research groups have genetically altered 
one or more of the conserved catalytic residues to produce inactive ricin A chain 
expressed recombinantly in E. coli in an attempt to produce a vaccine to protect 
against deliberate ricin poisoning (Munishkin and Wool 1995).
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of the outside environment, conditions that are not easily reproduced in the 
laboratory. In fact, laboratory culture conditions bias our understanding of 
microbial adaptation to natural environments. Vibrio cholerae, for example, is 
thought to persist without expression of virulence factors in brackish estuaries 
and other saline aquatic environments, sometimes in association with the chitin-
ous exoskeletons of various marine organisms. Transition from that milieu to 
the contrasting environment of the human small intestinal lumen is accompa-
nied by substantial genetic regulatory events.
The microbial cell is relatively simple, yet it possesses the means to detect, 
often simultaneously, changes in temperature, ionic conditions, oxygen con-
centration, pH, and calcium, iron, and other metal concentrations that might 
appear to be subtle signals but are essential for the precise mobilization of 
virulence determinants. Similarly, environmental regulatory signals prepare a 
microorganism for its transition from an extracellular to an intracellular state. 
For example, iron is a critical component of many cell metabolic processes; 
therefore, it is not surprising that animals rely on high-affinity iron-binding 
and iron-storage proteins to deprive microorganisms access to this nutrient, 
especially at the mucosal surface. In turn, most pathogens sense iron availability 
and induce or repress various iron acquisition systems accordingly. Moreover, 
many microorganisms produce toxins that are regulated by iron in such a way 
that low iron concentrations trigger toxin biosynthesis. Reversible regulation 
of the expression of virulence genes by temperature is common to many patho-
gens. Thus, a microorganism like E. coli that may be deposited in feces and live 
for long periods under conditions of nutrient depletion and low temperature, 
mobilizes its colonization-specific genes when it is returned to the warm mam-
malian body. The regulatory machinery used to accomplish that is an important 
feature of many pathogens, including Y. pestis and B. anthracis.
The number of well-characterized virulence regulatory systems is rapidly 
increasing, in part because of the development of rapid methods for screening 
gene expression on a genome-wide basis (for example, with the use of DNA mi-
croarrays). But, relatively little is known about either the specific environmental 
signals to which these systems respond and or the exact role of the responses in 
the course of human infection. One common mechanism of bacterial transduc-
tion of environmental signals involves two-component regulatory systems that 
act on gene expression, usually at the transcriptional level. Such systems make 
use of similar pairs of proteins: one protein of the pair spans the cytoplasmic 
membrane, contains a transmitter domain, and may act as a sensor of environ-
mental stimuli; the other is a cytoplasmic protein (a “response regulator”) with 
a receiver domain and regulates responsive genes or proteins. Those regulatory 
systems are common both in pathogens and non-pathogens, so their detection 
by sequence analysis cannot be used as a reliable predictor of whether a micro-
organism is pathogenic.
The coordinated control of pathogenicity incorporates a regulon; a group 
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of operons or individual genes controlled by a common regulator, usually a 
protein activator or repressor. A regulon provides a means by which many 
genes can respond in concert to a particular stimulus. At other times, the same 
genes may respond to other signals independently. Global regulatory networks 
are a common feature of microbial virulence and basic microbial physiology, 
so their sequences, although often essential for a pathogen, are not reliable 
predictors of virulence. The apparent complexity of virulence regulation in a 
single microbial pathogen is magnified by the coexistence of multiple interact-
ing (“cross-talking”) systems and by regulons within regulons.
Thus, the inherent pathogenicity of a microorganism can be greatly altered 
through regulation of virulence genes. It is extremely difficult to predict how 
even a single nucleotide change will affect regulation and thereby alter patho-
genesis or the viability of the microorganism. (Additional detailed examples 
of the important role of regulation in allowing pathogens to respond to the 
environment of the human host are given in Appendix J.)
THE NATURE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND THE 
ART OF PREDICTING PATHOGENICITY
The preceding sections have shown that several computational approaches 
have promise for predicting biological function from sequence. Can they be ap-
plied effectively to predict pathogenicity? If not, what is required to develop a 
predictive method that would suffice? To address this issue, we will first discuss 
the nature of infectious disease.
Infectious diseases affect all living things, from the smallest amoeba to 
insects, plants, and the largest mammals. The co-existence and co-evolution 
of microorganisms with their hosts is a dynamic equilibrium ranging from one 
extreme of mutualism in which both partners benefit from the interaction (for 
example, bacterial production of organic nitrogen for plants or of vitamin K for 
the human), to a relationship of commensalism in which one organism benefits 
but the other is unaffected, to another extreme of parasitism that benefits one 
partner to the detriment of the other.
Microorganisms are constant companions of plants and animals. Humans 
carry a vast indigenous microbial flora from shortly after birth until death, and 
the role of this human microbiome in human health and disease is the subject 
of considerable interest and recent investigation. Although it is biologically 
correct to say that most microorganisms that inhabit this planet are harmless 
to humans or may even benefit humankind, it is also true that humans have a 
prejudicial view of microorganisms and direct their focus to microorganisms 
as agents of disease. The biological reality is that most microbial infections are 
relatively benign and that symptoms of disease are sometimes the result of the 
human immune system’s response to infection rather than the product of the 
infecting microorganism (Box 2.4).
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BOX 2.4 
Categories of Microorganisms
For humans, and to a lesser extent other animal and plant hosts, interactions 
with microorganisms are complex and are governed by the health status of the 
host and by the environment. On the basis of differences in such interactions, 
microorganisms can be categorized as follows:
 •  Transients. Microorganisms encountered daily in food or in the environ-
ment. Generally, these microorganisms are just “passing through” and are 
of no consequence.
 •  Commensals (derived from the Latin meaning to eat from the same table). 
The vast community of microorganisms (which make up the microbiome) 
that normally inhabits the host. These are generally harmless. In fact, 
there are about 10 bacterial cells for every human cell in the body. Re-
cent studies suggest that the human microbiome may be as distinct as a 
fingerprint, although the general microbial components are similar among 
individuals.
 •  Pathogens (derived from Greek words meaning the birth of pain). Patho-
gens may or may not be members of the commensal flora, but they are 
notable because they regularly can cause disease in apparently healthy 
individuals.
 •  Opportunistic pathogens. Microorganisms that only cause disease in 
human hosts that are in some way compromised in their normal immune 
defense mechanisms. Host defense may be compromised as a result of: 
pregnancy; age (young and old); an underlying disease (such as, diabetes 
or malignancy); therapies for malignancy or organ transplantation; or trau-
matic injury or burns. The nature of the immunodeficiency will dictate the 
particular types of microbial infections.
 •  Accidental pathogens. Microorganisms that are encountered in acciden-
tal contact with other animals, insects, or the environment. Many of these 
microorganisms are among the most deadly for humans and are dispro-
portionately represented on the Select Agent list of potential bioterrorism 
agents. Generally speaking, these microorganisms are distinguished from 
human-specific pathogens in not being directly or readily transmissible 
from one human host to another. A human host is in essence a biological 
“dead end” or incidental host. Nonetheless, many of the general classes of 
virulence factors found in accidental pathogens are also found in human-
adapted pathogens.
Recognition of an organism as a pathogen is not always simple, because 
the interplay between genetic expression of the microorganism and the host is 
ever-changing. However, in the biological sense, pathogens possess the ability to 
cross anatomic barriers or breach other host defenses that limit the survival or 
replication of other microorganisms. The more complicated and relevant ques-
tion, however, is why some microorganisms are pathogenic to humans or other 
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animals, yet other closely related microorganisms are not. That question can be 
approached from the point of view of the host or the microorganism:
• What specific defense mechanisms of the host allow it to effectively 
suppress infection (entry, attachment, invasion, and replication) by 
certain microbes and not others?
• What are the differences between microbial agents that cause disease 
and those that do not?
Pathogenicity depends on the biological context, so pathogenic traits (viru-
lence factors) need to be defined in terms of their potential to be associated with 
infection and disease in a particular host. For example, the human gastrointesti-
nal epithelium is exquisitely susceptible to cholera toxin when delivered during 
infection by Vibrio cholerae. Although the gut epithelium of most animals is 
also susceptible to the action of the toxin, the disease cholera is seen only in 
humans: This finding suggests that additional host-specific virulence factors are 
involved. The vulnerabilities of the mammalian immune defense mechanisms to 
factors used by microorganisms to exploit or overcome a specific host defense 
strategy are of critical importance in defining what is and what is not a microbial 
virulence factor. To restate the point simply, the nature of microbial virulence 
factors cannot be understood unless the factors are evaluated in the context 
of the biology of the host.
Most genes encoded by a pathogen are necessary for its replication and for 
“general housekeeping”5 and genes are in general shared by most microorgan-
isms. Virulence genes can be considered to be specialized genes essential for 
survival of a particular organism in a particular environment, usually on or in 
a host. Even by that limited operational definition, most pathogenic and non-
pathogenic bacteria and large viruses that inhabit animals and plants have large 
numbers of virulence genes. For example, the variola virus (smallpox virus) 
virulence gene family consists of 64 genes (of a genomic total of 193); however, 
the presence of a large number of virulence genes does not a priori guarantee 
pathogenicity. Camelpox and taterapox viruses are the closest orthopoxvirus 
relatives of variola virus and have similar number of virulence genes, but nei-
ther virus causes human disease. Cowpox virus has a larger genome than does 
variola virus and encodes a greater number of virulence genes, but it causes 
only a localized lesion in humans and was used by Jenner in the late 1700s to 
vaccinate against variola virus. Those observations illustrate that variola virus 
5 In addition to the immune defense system, pathogenic microorganisms face both unique and 
common obstacles during infection of human, animal, and plant hosts. The genes important during 
the natural life cycle of the pathogen include those for: (a) entering a host; (b) finding a unique 
niche within the host; (c) interacting intimately with host tissue or cellular factors; (d) avoiding host 
defense mechanisms; (e) replicating or persisting within a host; (f) synthesizing toxins and other 
virulence factors; and (g) exiting and disseminating from the host.
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pathogenicity is a complex trait, possibly due in part to subtle activity differ-
ences between the virulence genes of viruses that are pathogenic for humans 
and the genes of viruses that are not pathogenic for humans. Some host specific 
pathogenicity can result even from the loss of function (see Appendix J). In the 
case of bacteria, the picture is a little clearer inasmuch as bacterial pathogens 
usually have virulence genes that are not present in their non-pathogenic rela-
tives, and this distribution suggests that bacteria evolve to become pathogens by 
acquiring virulence determinants. For example, Salmonella and E. coli evolved 
from a common ancestor, but Salmonella acquired genes distinct from those 
of E. coli that permitted it to cross the mucosal barrier of the gastrointestinal 
tract. In contrast, Yersinia pestis adapted to life in a flea and in rodents and has 
retained most of the genes contributed by its most recent ancestor Y. pseudo-
tuberculosis, which is an enteric pathogen. Some of the Y. pseudotuberculosis 
genes have been inactivated; they are not necessary for Y. pestis survival or they 
interfered with its new “lifestyle.” In parallel, microbe–host interactions play 
a critical role in regulating disease severity and distribution in human, animal, 
and plant populations. It is now generally accepted that pathogenic microor-
ganisms have shaped the genetic population structure of humans and vice versa 
(see Appendix H).
What Is the Origin of Bacterial Pathogenicity? What Makes a Pathogen?
Microbial evolution continues to challenge the state of human health 
in part because of the size of the microbial universe; macroscale changes in 
human, animal, and plant interactions; and the dynamic nature of genomic 
alterations that result from active gene flow between microorganisms. The net 
effect of evolution on an organism is a balance between selective pressure in 
the environment of that organism and the generation of relevant changes 
in the microorganism through mutation, gene duplication, and horizontal 
gene transfer.
Most medically important microorganisms have pathogenic and non-
 pathogenic strains, and virulence factors were well known and characterized 
long before the advent of the genome projects. However, what we have learned 
about pathogenicity from the examination of microbial chromosomes has been 
surprising and useful. One of the most important findings both from the per-
spective of understanding the biology of pathogenicity and from the standpoint 
this committee’s task, is that pathogenic bacteria often contain clusters of 
genes, called pathogenicity islands (PAIs), that are not present in related non-
pathogenic bacteria. Those acquired genes have several features (for example, 
the G+C content of their DNA and other molecular signatures) that indicate 
that they were once associated with mobile genetic elements, such as bacterial 
plasmids or bacteriophage (viruses that infect bacteria). Thus, it is clear that 
although Salmonella and E. coli evolved from a common ancestor, Salmonella 
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has acquired genes distinct from E. coli that permit it to invade gut epithelial 
cells. As noted, E. coli strains vary greatly in that some commonly cause disease 
whereas the majority of E. coli strains are universally restricted to the com-
mensal flora and never cause harm in an immunocompetent host. However, E. 
coli that “routinely” cause infections, such as urinary tract infections, and the 
notorious E. coli O157, have genes, indeed large clusters of genes, that are as-
sociated with their pathogenicity and are not found in non-pathogens. We now 
understand that uropathogenic, enterohemorrhagic, and extraintestinal types 
of E. coli all display mosaic genome structure, with hundreds of gene islands 
distinct to each type, that makes up as much as 40 percent of the overall gene 
content in each of these strains. Pathotypes are as distinct from one other as 
each is distinct from a nonpathogenic laboratory strain of E. coli. E. coli has an 
“open” pan-genome: with every new genome sequence, a new set of about 300 
unique genes is discovered; this suggests continuing evolution of this species 
by gene acquisition. The O157 case is a good example of how pathogenicity 
requires biological context; this microorganism is asymptomatically carried by 
animals, but it can cause diseases ranging from simple, barely noticeable diar-
rhea to devastating colitis and death in humans.
In contrast, B. anthracis and other pathogens that have restricted environ-
mental habitats display a “closed” pan-genome and a much greater fraction of 
shared genes. Nevertheless, B. anthracis contains two large plasmids, one of 
which has a 44.5-kb pathogenicity island that contains genes for (among other 
things) the toxin that can be lethal to humans. It also contains a sequence sig-
nature that suggests a history of gene shuffling and exchange. It is therefore not 
too surprising to learn that the sequence of the main chromosome of B. anthra-
cis is remarkably similar to those of B. cereus and B. thuringiensis, which also 
inhabit the soil. B. cereus strains carrying part of the pathogenicity apparatus 
of B. anthracis are occasionally encountered and present a problem for those 
attempting to draw a line separating Select Agents from non-Select Agents. Al-
though it may be tempting to think of microorganisms in a clear-cut pathogen 
and non-pathogen manner, the biological reality is much more complex. Far 
from black and white, microbial genomes are better described as a multicolor 
patchwork of sequences, see Figure 2.1 (Read, Peterson et al. 2003). It is also 
instructive to see that B. thuringiensis produces a toxin fatal to lepidopteran 
caterpillars; thus, there is a biological theme at play that involves microorgan-
isms, their hosts, and the common mechanisms that microorganisms use to 
ensure their survival. The distinction of B. anthracis from related soil microor-
ganisms, such as B. thuringiensis and B. cereus, is not always clear in a sequence 
homology context, whereas the sequence information makes good sense in a 
biological context. For a more in-depth discussion of pathogenic mechanisms 
and virulence genes with examples of Select Agents, see Appendix I.
It is perhaps difficult for non-specialists to appreciate that the smallest 
free-living organisms on the planet engage in a kind of primitive “sex life” that 
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Figure 2-1
FIGURE 2.1 The genome sequence of Bacillus anthracis Ames and comparison to 
closely related bacteria. Outer circle, predicted coding regions on the plus strand 
colour-coded by role categories. Circle 2, predicted coding regions on the minus 
strand colour-coded by role categories. Circle 3, atypical nucleotide composition curve. 
Salmon colour, phage regions; yellow, other unique regions located around positions 
2.0 and 4.3 Mb. Circle 4, genes not represented on the array. Circle 5, genes present 
on the array. Genes were classified into three groups: genes present in the query strain 
(shown yellow), genes absent in the query strain (red), and diverged genes (blue). Miss-
ing data are in grey. B. cereus group strains are displayed following the phylogeny of 
Fig. 2.1 (circle number, strain number): 6, B.c. 874; 7, B.c. 535; 8, B.c. 612; 9, B.w. 1143; 
10, B.t. 248; 11, B.t. 442; 12, B.c. 14579; 13, B.t. 775; 14, B.c. 259; 15, B.t. 1031; 16, 
B.t. 251; 17, B.c. 607; 18, B.c. ATCC 10987; 19, B.c. 812; 20, B.c. 819; 21, B.c. 831; 22, 
B.t. 840; 23, B.c. 1123; 24, B.c. 816. Here we use B.c, B.t. and B.w to indicate B. cereus, 
B. thuringiensis and Bacillus weihenstephanensis, respectively (Read, Peterson, et al. 
2003).
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involves a rather promiscuous exchange of genetic information called lateral 
(or horizontal) gene transfer (see Box 2.5). The public is already aware that the 
emergence of antibiotic resistance in microorganisms is a serious health issue, 
and the mass media have reported that this emergence of resistance is effected 
by gene exchange among bacteria in which resistance is “donated” to previ-
ously susceptible microorganisms. The same is true of pathogenicity, although 
the transfer of genes associated with pathogenicity is not a single event. Rather, 
the genomic analysis of pathogenic microorganisms reveals that there have been 
multiple such events over a long period and that many other genetic selection 
events have occurred to finely hone only a relatively few microorganisms to 
emerge as “pathogens.”
A discussion of the current understanding of the emergence of pathogens 
based on the study of their genomes is beyond the scope of this report, although 
it can be readily found elsewhere by an interested reader. For present purposes, 
BOX 2.5 
Acquisition of Virulence Factors—Horizontal Gene Transfer
Horizontal (or lateral) gene transfer is any transfer, exchange or acquisition of 
genetic material that differs from the normal mode of transmission from parents 
to offspring (vertical transmission). Lateral gene transfer can occur by several 
mechanisms:
• Transformation: acquisition of DNA molecules.
• Transduction: gene transfer mediated by a virus.
• Conjugation: DNA transfer by direct cell-to-cell contact.
Figure Box 2-5
Bitmapped
These mechanisms cause the transfer or acquisition of genes among members of 
the same species or related species or between members of different taxa.
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it is sufficient to state that it is sometimes possible to recognize genes that arose 
by lateral gene transfer by simply examining genome sequences. The evolution 
of pathogenicity is a continuing process that has in some cases been aided 
by unintentional changes caused by human activity. Moreover, what we have 
viewed as progress in medicine and agriculture has provided new opportuni-
ties for microorganisms to adapt to humans and other organisms and to cause 
substantial morbidity and mortality (for example, overuse of antimicrobials 
leads to the selection and transfer of resistance).
A fundamental evolutionary push to bacterial pathogenicity results from 
gene acquisition. That is not simply a mechanism whereby microorganisms 
become pathogenic but a general strategy for specialization and success in 
some environmental niches that are highly competitive. What is the origin of 
the inherited genes that go on to be important for pathogenicity? The answer is 
not clear; microorganisms do not leave a fossil trail. However, what is important 
to our task is that to some extent their history can be read in their sequences. 
Bacterial adaption of the tactic of horizontal gene transfer to maximize diver-
sity and to increase the opportunity for continuing evolution is most likely a 
reflection of their haploid state; that is, bacteria and viruses have only a single 
chromosome, so any genetic change, either beneficial or detrimental, is im-
mediately apparent. Microorganisms have a difficult balancing act. They have 
the need to conserve fundamental characteristics while being able to try new 
combinations of genes. The sharing of genes among seemingly disparate mi-
croorganisms that occupy the same niche provides these microorganisms with 
an endless number of combinations of genes for evolutionary experimentation. 
If we trace the kinds of genes that appear to be peculiar to pathogens, we see 
that similar kinds of genes encode toxins or invasins found in organisms that 
infect plants, people and organisms in between. To some extent, we find that 
virulence genes evolved to prevent predation. For example, there are similari-
ties between a microorganism being devoured by a free-living amoeba, which 
may have happened early in evolution, and being devoured by a macrophage 
in the alveolus of a mammalian lung, which evolved much later. In both cases, 
some organisms’ formation of capsules on their surfaces prevented this event; 
indeed, the complete genome sequences of many pathogens reveal that clusters 
of genes in the pneumocococcus, the meningococcus, and some SA are needed 
for capsule synthesis. That does not mean that capsular genes in all bacteria 
are suspect, but contemporary sequence analysis can tell us whether the cap-
sular genes come from a pathogen or a non-pathogen. We can also trace how 
microorganisms evolved to be able to live within phagocytic cells. Legionella 
pneumophila prefers to parasitize and live in amoebae in nature but, under the 
right circumstances, can survive and replicate in the phagocytic cells of a hu-
man lung. Mycobacterium tuberculosis parasitizes human alveolar macrophages 
preferentially and can live and persist in these cells for a human lifetime. Yet, 
Legionella and mycobacteria utilize recognizably similar general mechanisms 
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for survival in the lung; these mechanisms are revealed in part in the genome 
sequences of the two organisms. Similarly, we find that many other genetically 
controlled characteristics can confer virulence on bacteria, including factors 
that enable the bacteria to attach to and disrupt host cells.
Genomic analysis also led to the discovery that many pathogenic bacteria 
use similar machinery for injecting proteins into the cytoplasm of the host’s 
cells. That common feature of pathogens of plants and humans follows, in a 
sense, the same kind of features found in viruses. While the nature of the pro-
teins injected into animal and plant cells (effector proteins) may vary, there is 
often surprising homology among injection apparati across diverse pathogenic 
species. Perhaps even more striking was the finding that the sophisticated ap-
paratus, which is akin to an assembled bacterial hypodermic syringe, is often 
found as part of a pathogenicity island in various bacterial pathogens in phylo-
genetically distinct taxa. For example, the type III secretion system, has been 
identified in a variety of fully sequenced bacteria ranging from the obligate in-
tracellular parasite Chlamydia trachomatis to the plague bacillus Y. pestis. Again, 
not all type III secretory apparatus genes are associated with pathogenicity, 
but the combination of a type III secretion system (or similar distinct secretory 
machinery) and the signature for effector proteins provides an immediate clue 
that one may be dealing with a pathogen. For more discussion and examples of 
how microorganisms become pathogens, see Appendix J.
Thus, bacteria have evolved a kind of biological network to exchange their 
genetic knowledge. That is as important for the evolution of the organisms that 
we call pathogens as it is for the organisms that fix nitrogen in the soil. The 
specialization of bacteria to live at the expense of other, more highly evolved or-
ganisms is a reflection of shared experiences. Genomic sequencing has revealed 
that human DNA contains traces of similar kinds of gene exchanges mediated 
by viruses and other mobile genetic elements. The novelty of this biology is im-
pressive and shows that the road to bacterial, viral and parasitic specialization 
has ancient roots. The commonality that is still present in microbial sequences 
makes the goal of finding unique predictive sequences difficult. But it consti-
tutes the most practical means of identifying pathogenic potential today, and 
it probably will lead to a much greater predictive capacity in the future.
The Evolution of Bacterial Host Specificity
If the acquisition of genes by horizontal gene transfer seems to be a driv-
ing force for bacterial pathogenicity, one might assume that gene loss plays 
only a minor role in pathogenicity. However, that is not always the case. The 
fine tuning of pathogenicity, especially with respect to host specificity, appears 
often to involve gene loss or gene rearrangement (see section on “Gene Loss” 
in Apendix J). Gene loss can occur by simple mutation (change or deletion 
of a single or a few nucleotides), which is often reversible. Irreversible gene 
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BOX 2.6
•  Bacterial genomes are small and densely packed with genes.
•  Pathogenic bacteria often contain clusters of genes (pathogenicity is-
lands, PAIs) that are not present in related non-pathogenic bacteria.
•  Many of these virulence determinants were acquired by horizontal gene 
transfer.
•  Acquired genes have several features (such as G+C contents, associa-
tion with plasmids or phage, and sporadic distributions) that denote their 
ancestry.
•  It is sometimes possible to recognize genes that arose by lateral gene 
transfer by simply examining genome sequences.
•  The amount of acquired DNA in many bacterial genomes can be 
substantial.
loss—the permanent loss of a part of, all of, or many of the genes from the 
chromosome—is common. For example, as noted above, Salmonella spp. have a 
number of pathogenicity islands that were acquired by horizontal gene transfer. 
The Salmonella group of pathogens is notable for its division into specific types 
that have a preference for a particular host (animal, bird or reptile). A core of 
identical genes are found in all salmonellae. However, genome comparisons of 
host-restricted or host-adapted Salmonella spp. (and indeed of other pathogens 
such as poxviruses) indicate that loss of gene function may be a common evolu-
tionary mechanism through which host adaptation occurs. Gene loss appears to 
restrict the potential pathogenicity in the host to a more limited or specialized 
set of interactions, often through specific targeting to particular cell types or 
organs. For example, long term asymptomatic carriage of Salmonella, which 
are shed periodically and act as a reservoir of infection for susceptible hosts, 
occurs because the organisms establish a niche in the gall bladder, an organ 
that is immunologically protected. S. enterica serovar Typhimurium causes gas-
troenteritis in humans (typically food poisoning) but causes a chronic infection 
of mice where the organism can be carried and shed for the life of the animal. 
Conversely, S. enterica serovar Typhi infects humans exclusively, targets the cells 
of the reticuloendothelial system, and likewise can be shed asymptomatically 
for a lifetime (as in the case of “typhoid Mary”). The comparison of S. enterica 
Typhimurium with S. enterica Typhi shows that Typhi (and other host-restricted 
Salmonella) harbors a significantly higher proportion of genetic events that are 
associated with the loss of functional genetic sequences. Modification or loss of 
some effector proteins can affect whether a Salmonella strain will preferentially 
be successful in infecting and persisting in a human, a chicken, or a rodent.
In addition, genomic analysis has revealed that gene loss suffered by host-
adapted pathogens is often reflected by the appearance of pseudogenes, which 
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are sequences of bases in the DNA that clearly resemble the sequences of 
known genes but differ from them in some crucial respect and have no func-
tion. Pseudogenes generally do not regain their function except by extensive 
recombination and their reversion might not lead to a change in pathogenicity. 
As the pattern of gene gain through horizontal gene transfer and subsequent 
gene loss through adaptation has been analyzed, it appears that gene loss may 
be a mechanism of targeting the invading pathogen preferentially to particu-
lar tissues or host cells and avoiding the potential stimulation of non-specific 
inflammation. For example, in both Salmonella and Yersinia, gene loss may 
be involved in the adaptation from a gastrointestinal to a systemic “lifestyle.” 
Similarly, genomic analysis seems to refute the popular belief that M. tubercu-
losis evolved from M. bois through the adaptation of a bovine strain to the 
human host. In fact, M. tuberculosis contains chromosomal segments that have 
been deleted from M. bois, which raises the converse possibility that humans 
transmitted tubercle bacilli to animals and those bacilli subsequently evolved 
into M. bois.
This is not simply interesting basic science and evolutionary biology. As ge-
nomic analysis has been broadly applied to pathogenic microorganisms, analysis 
of irreversible genetic events—such as chromosomal deletions (large sequence 
polymorphisms), single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and direct repeat 
content (“spoligotype”) patterns—has permitted us to decipher the phylogeny 
that has occurred during the evolution of pathogenicity. On one hand, we have 
begun to uncover and understand the mechanism used by nature to “design” a 
pathogen; this mechanism becomes a blueprint that may be followed by those 
who would wish to design therapeutics, and by those with more sinister intent 
who would wish to design novel pathogens. The loss of genetic information, as 
well as the gain of genetic information, can be important, and this adds to the 
present uncertainty of predicting pathogenicity on the basis of sequence. On 
the other hand, as we learn more about pathogen evolution from our studies of 
nature, we also learn the rules for eventually detecting a pattern of sequences 
that could be used for monitoring organisms from the wild or those synthesized 
in the laboratory (see Box 2.7).
The Parallels in the Evolution of Pathogenicity in the Large Viruses
A virus’ genes are associated with its ability to replicate and persist in a 
specific host cell. However, viral pathogenicity is as dependent on the biologi-
cal context of the host as it is on the viral agent. Rabies can be carried in a bat 
harmlessly, but is almost always lethal for an untreated, infected human. An 
infected human is a biological dead end for both the virus and the host. The 
evolution of pathogenicity in bacteria, viruses, and eukaryotic pathogens in-
volved horizontal gene transfer. For example, the evolution of the large nuclear 
and cytoplasmic DNA viruses that gave rise to poxviruses was dominated by 
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expansion of paralogous gene families and acquisition—by horizontal gene 
transfer—of numerous genes from early eukaryotic hosts, other viruses and, 
rarely, bacteria. Comparative genomic studies of poxviruses support a mono-
phyletic origin from a distant ancestral virus on the basis of the presence of 
41 homologous genes common to 16 distantly related viruses that have with 
large DNA genomes (about 150 to 900-kbp predicted protein-coding genes) 
(Iyer, Balaji et al. 2006). Those 41 genes are a subset of 90 highly conserved 
core genes (about 100-kbp) common to all poxviruses, which are at the center 
of the genome, which encode proteins necessary for replication, transcrip-
tion, assembly of capsid and the acquisition of a membrane (Upton, Slack et 
al. 2003; Lefkowitz, Wang et al. 2006). The genes at the flanks of the genome 
(about 60-100 genes) evolve at a rate distinct from that of the essential genes of 
the central core, and are more often involved with the mitigation or modula-
tion of cellular processes and whole organism responses to infection, (such as 
apoptosis, ubiquitin signaling, and cytokine signaling) (Moss 2007). Although 
the progenitor of poxviruses evolved by gene gain from an ancestor common to 
large nuclear and cytoplasmic DNA viruses, poxvirus species adapted to new 
hosts through gene loss, keeping the genes that were necessary to parasitize one 
particular environmental niche successfully (Upton, Slack et al. 2003; Odom, 
Curtis Hendrickson et al. 2009). In the case of poxvirus pathogens, variola and 
molluscum contagiosum viruses, this resulted in a narrowing of the host to 
only humans. As noted above, evolution through gene loss is also carried out 
by free-living or facultatively parasitic bacteria that adapt to a more dependent 
association with a host. One study suggests that variola virus diverged from an 
ancestral poxvirus of African rodents either about 16,000 or 68,000 years ago, 
depending on the historical record used to calibrate the molecular clock (Li, 
BOX 2.7
•  Homolog. A gene related to a second gene by descent from a common an-
cestral DNA sequence.
•  Ortholog. A gene related to a second gene by descent from a common ances-
tral sequence and located in different species. Often retain the same function. 
Genes in different species that evolved from a common ancestral gene by 
speciation. Often, orthologs retain the same function in the course of evolution. 
Identification of orthologs is critical for reliable prediction of gene function in 
newly sequenced genomes.
•  Paralog. Genes related to a second gene by duplication within a genome. May 
or may not retain the ancestral function. (Paralogs may acquire new functions 
in the course of evolution, even if they are related to the original one, whereas 
orthologs often retain the same function.)
•  Speciation. The origin of a new species. As part of this process the new spe-
cies acquires some barrier to genetic exchange with the parent species.
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Carroll et al. 2007). During that process, the genome maintained its conserved, 
core gene complement but lost a unique pattern of virulence genes through 
accumulated mutations or gene deletions to reach its current size of about 186-
kbp (Esposito, Sammons et al. 2006). A similar process occurred in the other 
orthopoxviruses; each species differed in the number and types of virulence 
genes that were lost except for cowpox viruses (Lefkowitz, Wang et al. 2006). 
Of the known orthopoxviruses, cowpox virus has the largest genome (224-
kbp) and has orthologues of all other genes found in all other orthopoxvirus 
species (Gubser, Hue et al. 2004; Lefkowitz, Wang et al. 2006). An ancestral 
poxvirus, similar in size to cowpox virus, is hypothesized as the progenitor of 
orthopoxviruses (Gubser, Hue et al. 2004). Given that evolutionary history, it 
is not clear whether the loss of genetic information was a consequence of the 
lack of requirement of a gene for propagation in a new host, a necessary pre-
requisite for propagation in a new host, or both. However, we have available 
the gene sequences from this entire array of possibilities and we can identify 
those genes that are part of a common core of the poxviruses and those with 
more specificity for a particular host.
Nature provides an interesting lesson about the value of sequence identity 
for predicting pathogenicity. The poxviruses, molluscum contagiosum, and va-
riola, have evolved to become successful human pathogens, but in dramatically 
different ways. Variola virus is a respiratory pathogen that causes a systemic 
disease with high mortality rate in humans regardless of age or sex. Molluscum 
contagiosum (caused by Molluscipoxirus genera) is a common, benign infec-
tion of the skin of children and sexually active adults, but it can be a frequent 
and serious opportunistic infection of immunosupressed patients. [Molluscum 
contagiosum viruses are more highly restricted in its tissue tropism than variola 
 virus and replicates only in the human keratinocyte (Buller and Palumbo 1991).] 
Molluscum contagiosum and variola virus share a similar genome structure with 
a central, conserved core of orthologous genes, and a unique pattern of flanking 
genes. The evolution of two distinct poxvirus pathogens that cause dissimilar 
human disease from a common ancestor through gene loss suggests that there 
can be multiple genetic pathways to becoming a pathogen for the same host. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as the genomes of molluscum contagiosum and variola 
viruses are distantly related with 57 percent nucleotide identity (on the basis of 
DNA polymerase), the evolutionary path to a human poxvirus pathogen does 
not necessarily demand a high degree of genome sequence identity. Even with 
the closely related orthopoxviruses that share 96 percent nucleotide sequence 
identity, phylogenetic analysis cannot predict human pathogenic potential (see 
Box 2.8).
Evolution of Plant Pathogens in Human-Managed Ecosystems
In evolutionary terms, human-managed artificial agricultural ecosystems 
are a recent agricultural practice that is highly vulnerable to disease outbreaks. 
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Agricultural ecosystems are artificial and contain a high density of a genetically 
uniform plant population, which creates a local atmospheric zone where the 
climate differs from that of the surrounding area, and promotes a high rate 
of pathogen reproduction and dispersal (Stukenbrock and McDonald 2008). 
Such agricultural practice allows virulent pathogen genotypes to adapt to a 
particular host genotype and to increase rapidly, and thereby generates a degree 
of host specificity in a short period that rarely occurs in natural ecosystems 
(see Box 2.9). Examples highlighting the major evolutionary mechanisms by 
which plant pathogens have emerged as threats to agricultural ecosystems are 
provided in detail in Appendix K. Those mechanisms take place over varied 
time scales ranging from short to thousands of years.
Interactions of Infectious Agents with the Host
The interplay of expression of genomes of a host and a microorganism 
dictate the outcome of the interaction. Microbial and host interactions can be 
characterized as stable, dead-end, evolving, or resistant. The most common 
BOX 2.8
Evolutionary relationships, and therefore biological potential, may be inferred 
through the phylogenetic analysis of orthopoxvirus genomes because the ge-
nomic sequence is ultimately the primary genetic map of the species. Examination 
of phylogenetic predictions based on multiple nucleic acid sequence alignments of 
the conserved, core genomic regions of isolates of representative orthopoxvirus 
species found that monkeypox, ectromelia and cowpox viruses (strain Brighton 
Red) do not group closely with any other orthopoxvirus species, whereas variola, 
camelpox and taterapox viruses form a more closely related subgroup (Gubser, 
Hue et al. 2004; Esposito, Sammons et al. 2006). On the basis of that phylogenetic 
analysis, it would be predicted that if any orthopoxvirus shared biological proper-
ties with variola virus and caused human disease, it would be camelpox virus 
or taterapox virus. Instead, the more distantly related monkeypox virus causes 
severe human disease that is almost undistinguishable from smallpox, whereas 
taterapox and camelpox viruses have not been documented to cause any human 
disease (Damon 2007). Monkeypox and variola viruses together have at least 
33 orthopoxvirus virulence genes where a function has been determined for the 
actual gene or for an orthologue in another orthopoxvirus species. By sequence 
comparison, both viruses appear to have 21 functional genes in common; of the 
remaining 12 genes, variola virus lacks 9 and monkeypox lacks 3. Those data 
suggest that are at least two and probably more unique genetic backgrounds are 
capable of producing a poxvirus that is lethal for humans. The identity of additional 
human poxvirus pathogens will probably be an experiment of nature and not a 
result of phylogenetic genomic comparisons.
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interaction is the resistant host-microbe interaction that leads to no or minimal 
amplification of the infectious agent. An evolving microbe-host relationship 
characterizes the spread of a microorganism from the same or a closely related 
species (as in the West Nile virus introduction into the Americas in 1999). A 
stable microbe-host interaction results in survival of both the microorganism 
and host on a population basis (for example, variola virus, polio virus or M. 
tuberculosis in humans and plum pox virus in some stone fruit species). In such 
cases, the host species acts as a reservoir host and it is necessary and sufficient 
for completion of the natural life cycle of the infectious agent. The resulting 
disease can be of varied severity as long as transmissibility of the pathogen is 
ensured. In general, those interactions evolve toward a state of less pathoge-
nicity in the host, while preserving transmissibility. Stable interactions can also 
include infection of more than one host species with the same microorganism. 
For example, influenza A virus, Rift Valley fever virus, B. anthracis, tomato spot-
ted wilt virus, cucumber mosaic virus, and turnip mosaic virus are all capable 
of propagation in a variety of species, and some viruses, such as Rift Valley 
BOX 2.9 
Evolutionary Mechanism of Plant Pathogen Emergence
Host-tracking
Host-tracking refers to co-evolution of a pathogen with its host during the process 
of host domestication, which includes the formation of a specific agro-ecological 
system. It includes the selection and cultivation of desirable host genotypes, 
simultaneous selection for pathogen genotypes that are adapted to the selected 
individuals and for the agro-ecological conditions at the time of the process. The 
process takes about ten thousand years, and pathogen and host share the same 
center of origin.
Host jump
Host jump is a process through which a new pathogen emerges in a host species 
that is genetically distant from the original plant host (for example, from another 
class or order). The geographic origin of the host does not always correspond with 
the geographic origin of the pathogen as observed in host shift.
Host shift
Host shift is a process in which a new pathogen emerges by adaptation to a new 
host that is a close relative of the former host (for example, shifting from a wild 
crop to the new domesticated selection or variety of the crop). The process may 
take less than 500 years or as much as several thousand years and the pathogen 
and the host do not always originate in the same center of origin (Stukenbrock 
and McDonald 2008).
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fever virus, can replicate efficiently in insects as well as mammals. Dead-end 
interactions often result in severe, fulminant disease involving infections of an 
incidental host species that is not needed for maintenance of the natural life 
cycle of the pathogen (for example, B. anthracis, dengue virus, Nipah virus, 
and Ebola virus infections of humans, and citrus tristeza virus and Phytophthora 
infestans infections in citrus grafted onto sour orange and potatoes, respec-
tively). The infectious agents originate in other vertebrate species or are carried 
by arthropods that cycle between insects and vertebrates or between insects 
and plants. In some circumstances, a “dead-end” infection can give rise to an 
emerging infection as was the case for HIV, Rift Valley fever virus, and SARS-
CoV in humans and citrus tristeza virus and P. infectans infections mentioned 
above. The majority of the human pathogens found on the Select Agent list 
cause dead-end interactions.
The outcome of a microbe-host encounter is based on interactions at the 
molecular and cellular level that take place over time. For certain viruses, a pro-
ductive infection is determined by specific receptors that need to be engaged 
for virus binding and entry (for example, sialic acid and angiotensin-converting 
enzyme 2 for influenza A virus and SARS-CoV, respectively) the availability of 
intracellular complementing factors needed for efficient replication and the 
ability to manipulate intracellular antiviral signaling pathways (for example, 
interferon, pattern recognition receptors, apoptosis, and autophagy), and the 
adaptive immune response. In the case of Gram-negative bacteria, a produc-
tive infection may be initiated by adhesion through fimbriae (for example, 
enterotoxigenic E. coli); in the case of Gram-positive bacteria, it may be initi-
ated through cell wall-anchored proteins (for example, microbial surface com-
ponents recognizing adhesive matrix molecules). Additional virulence factors 
are needed to counter the innate and adaptive immune response. In the case 
of plant pathogens, a productive infection is determined in part by success in 
bridging the plant basal defense or innate immunity system though the expres-
sion of countermeasures.
Appendix K, presents examples of various factors that affect microbe-host 
interactions, and our lack of understanding of the basis of a pathogen’s ability 
to infect a host or multiple hosts even if we know the genomic sequence of the 
pathogen and, in the case of human infections, the host. A key factor in the 
outcome of the microbe-host interaction is the effectiveness of the host innate 
and adaptive immune response in the face of sophisticated and redundant mi-
crobial countermeasures, some of which are conserved in bacterial pathogens 
that infect plants and animals. Another important factor is selection pressure, 
which can be manifested in physiological, epigenetic and/or genetic changes in 
a pathogen in response to the innate or adaptive immune system, the absence 
of an adaptive immune response, or changes in the microbiome (Box 2.10).
We are just beginning to understand the significance of the microbiome 
for human health. Microbial interactions may determine whether a would-be 
pathogen acquires increased virulence or transmissibility, and whether an infec-
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tion will result in disease. Thus, the individual microorganism, microbe-host 
interactions, and the environmental context must be considered in assessing an 
organism or a gene sequence as a potential threat to human health.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Innovations in the chemical synthesis of DNA have led to dramatic im-
provements—the DNA can be longer, of higher quality, and less expensive per 
base pair—since the synthesis of the first copy of the 75-base pair tRNAAla in 
the early 1960s (Agarwal, Buchi et al. 1970). DNA synthesis on solid supports 
combined with phosphoramidite nucleosides allowed the synthesis of 2.7 kb 
plasmid DNA, an infectious 7.5 kb poliovirus genome, a 32 kb bat coronavirus 
(HKU3) that was the precursor to the SARS-CoV epidemic, and the first com-
plete synthesis of a 582 kb artificial bacterial genome. Most recently, a synthetic 
bacterial genome has been “booted”6 into an autonomous life-form, so the 
artificial bacterial genomes are self-perpetuating (Gibson, Glass et al. 2010). 
6 Synthetic biologists have adopted this terminology from computer science, in which it means 
“to start (a computer) by loading an operating system from a disk. ” In the present case it refers to 
starting an organism from a genome.
BOX 2.10 
Bacterial Super Infection Following Influenza A Virus Infection
Infection of the upper respiratory tract with such a virus as Influenza A virus predis-
poses the host to superinfection with bacterial pathogens, including Staphylococ-
cus aureus and Streptococcus pneumoniae. The massive host innate response 
to Influenza A is focused on elimination of the virus from the respiratory tract. The 
overwhelming inflammatory response directed against the intracellular viral patho-
gen provides a perfect opportunity for a member of the normal respiratory flora 
(such as S. aureus or S. pneumoniae) to establish itself deeper in the respiratory 
tract, where it can cause bronchitis and/or pneumonia. The signals in the bacteria 
that cause them to transition from commensal organism to pathogen are not en-
tirely known although the complex regulatory networks are slowly being identified 
and characterized. Once the bacteria migrate to their new niche, a plethora of 
virulence factors are produced. The host innate response to the bacteria is im-
paired because the overwhelming response to the virus depletes the neutrophils, 
macrophages, and dendritic cells and the antimicrobial factors produced by them. 
As a result, the secondary bacterial infection is often far more life-threatening than 
the initial viral infection. S. pneumoniae has emerged as the most common cause 
of secondary bacterial pneumonia in the current H1N1 Influenza A outbreak, al-
though S. aureus, both methicillin-resistant and methicillin-sensitive, is the second 
most commonly isolated organism in post-influenza bacterial pneumonia.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
 SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION FOR SELECT AGENTS
It is clear that the price of DNA synthesis has steadily decreased and a cur-
sory survey of commercial suppliers show a cost of about $0.39-0.50/base—a 
dramatic reduction from synthesis costs commonly seen in the early history, 
when industry costs of about $5-10.00/base in the early 2000s were common. 
New optical deprotection chemistries and microfluidic technologies that allow 
programmable synthesis of hundreds of thousands of oligomers in parallel with 
fairly high fidelity seem poised to revolutionize inexpensive synthesis. With 
those and current multiplex technologies, it seems likely that future costs will 
approach $0.03/base (commercial costs); additional costs will be associated 
with gene assembly, quality control and other manufacturing issues. In the near 
future, as gene synthesis approaches $0.10-0.20/base, synthesis will replace 
most traditional recombinant DNA methods and allow the ready design and 
synthesis of new gene circuits and biological processes.
The design and testing of artificial biological systems and understanding 
of functional interactions are key objectives of synthetic biology. The benefits 
and broad availability of affordable gene synthesis are expected to foster rapid 
response platform technologies for producing candidate vaccines and thera-
peutics to address biothreat agents and newly emerging infectious diseases. 
It will allow more effective diagnostic platform design and basic inquiry into 
fundamental biological mechanisms, including pathogenesis and pathogen-
host interactions. Gene synthesis will assist in designing and testing complex 
biological systems to fulfill specific purposes ranging from biofuel and pet-
rochemical production, to genetically engineered foods, virus batteries, solar 
cells and energy systems, and the manufacture of new medicines. Thus, when 
considering steps that aim to prevent the misuse of the technology, we should 
also recognize the dramatic impact and potential that synthetic biology offers 
to the future economic growth, competitiveness and viability of the U.S. bio-
technology industry.
In general, the discipline uses either natural cellular components and sys-
tems to construct new biological processes (the top-down approach) or the gen-
eration of unique biological and/or chemical systems that have novel properties 
and are designed to mimic living systems (the bottom-up approach). Most in-
vestigators have used the former approach because foundational understanding 
for de noo biological design (for example, protein structure, protein-protein 
interaction, genetic regulation) is in complete. One controversy is that unan-
ticipated outcomes may occur when engineered organisms reproduce, evolve, 
and interact with the environment. Another concern is the deliberate misuse of 
the technology to design and construct new pathogens, either by engineering in 
components that resist current vaccine or therapeutic interventions, or by alter-
ing pathogenesis by blending in virulence genes from alterative pathogens, or 
by the de noo design of new pathogens. Understanding of the complex genetic 
and protein networks that regulate replication and disease is substantially lim-
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ited, so for the near future, synthesis can for the most part only copy, emulate, 
or recreate existing gene sets that have been designed by nature.
Top-Down Approach
Since 1980, a standard set of recombinant DNA techniques has been de-
veloped that allows the cloning of full length DNA copies of most DNA and 
RNA virus genomes. In parallel, highly efficient strategies have been developed 
for “booting” infectivity from the DNA genomes and then recover infectious 
virus, including recombinant viruses that contain design modifications (for ex-
ample, mutations, new regulatory networks, and gene insertions or deletions). 
There are proven strategies exist for reconstituting most of the viral Select 
Agent and category A-C biodefense pathogens from full-length DNA genomes; 
however, infectious clones have not been constructed for many Select Agent 
viruses on these lists. Developing infectious full-length DNAs is traditionally a 
time-consuming and uncertain process; single nucleotide changes can destroy 
genome infectivity. In general, genome size is directly proportional to the dif-
ficulty of generating an infectious molecular clone because of issues associated 
with genome and vector stability, sequence accuracy, and technical challenges 
in manipulating and recovering large genomes. For example, substantial techni-
cal sophistication, targeted expertise, and practice are required to reproducibly 
“boot” genome infectivity of large RNA genomes (for example, coronavirus, 
Ebola virus and influenza virus), DNA genomes (such as poxvirus) and bacte-
rial genomes. In contrast, small RNA and DNA genomes are much easier to 
manipulate and recover. The number of people capable of working with these 
systems is increasing on a daily basis. For example, students at Johns Hopkins 
University recently worked collaboratively and designed, synthesized and re-
covered a 280 kb yeast chromosome (Dymond, Scheifele et al. 2009).
Synthetic biology will alter the standard approaches for reconstructing full 
length infectious DNA genomes of most viruses and computer based genome 
design will probably become the norm in the near future. It is clear that gene 
and genome synthesis will allow for synthetic reconstruction of many highly 
pathogenic human, animal and plant virus genomes, and thereby, removing 
one major limit to biological warfare and terrorism: availability. There are 
similar concerns regarding synthetic bacterial genomes, which are on a longer 
time horizon. Assuming that a cost of $0.10/base is achievable in the near fu-
ture, the synthesis of the genomes of most “agents of concern” will be readily 
affordable (RNA genome: about 7.32kb for $700.00-3200.00; DNA genome: 
about 150-300kb for $15,000-20,000), while half a million base pair bacterial 
genomes will cost about $50,000 U.S. dollars. Not only is the instrumentation 
affordable, highly portable, and globally available, but there are commercial 
vendors on every continent, so it would be difficult or impossible to track and 
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police nefarious intent. Thus, it is possible that no virus (or microorganism) 
can ever be considered extinct (for example, poliovirus, 1918 influenza, small-
pox, reconstructed extinct retroviruses, wooly mammoth viruses, etc.) as long 
as basic sequence information is available to support its synthetic reconstruc-
tion. The considerable concern surrounding synthetic DNA technology for 
“dual-use” potential is understandable (NRC 2004).
In general, dual-use concerns include the use of synthetic biology to de-
liberately host-shift pathogenic microorganisms, to engineer drug or vaccine 
resistance, or to alter virulence potentials. As noted throughout this chapter, the 
list of “virulence genes” that have defined biological properties is growing at a 
considerable rate, and this fuels concerns that virulence is a readily malleable 
trait. Limited research has focused on the potential of synthetic genome design 
to enhance viral pathogenesis. With an existing genome as a chassis (from either 
a pathogenic or a nonpathogenic virus), it is certain that virulence genes from 
DNA and RNA viruses can easily be introduced into recombinant genomes in 
an attempt to alter the pathogenic potential of the chassis genome. The capabil-
ity of using standard recombinant DNA techniques for that purpose on a more 
limited scale has existed for about 30 years. Moreover, we can imagine synthetic 
killer viruses that destroy civilization or that cause significant morbidity and 
mortality—a common topic in cinema.
We know how to synthesize such imaginary “doomsday scenario viruses,” 
but how well the blended genomes will perform in human populations is 
unknown. For example, expressing the influenza virus NS1 type 1 interferon 
antagonist gene in SARS-CoV is simple with a top-down engineering approach, 
but the pathogenic properties of the chimera is difficult to predict. That is 
because SARS-CoV encodes at least six other interferon antagonist genes, and 
this raises the question of the ability of NS1 to offer considerable improve-
ments in the pathogenic and innate immune antagonism capacity of the coro-
navirus. Moreover, most viral proteins form complex interaction networks that 
are essential for regulating efficient virus growth and virulence. Removing or 
introducing new potential interaction partners will most likely adversely affect 
virus-virus and virus-host interaction networks and thus influence pathogenesis 
outcomes in unanticipated ways. In addition, dramatically altering the genome 
content of most RNA viruses by inserting genes could easily attenuate virulence, 
probably by affecting global gene expression or by altering basic RNA structure 
and genome packaging and release. In spite of those limitations, insertion of the 
IL-4 gene (cloned from mus musculus domesticus, the common mouse) into 
murine poxviruses (such as ectromelia virus) or insertion of the SARS-CoV 
ORF6 gene into mouse hepatitis virus enhanced pathogenesis in mice, and 
the influenza virus NS1 gene enhanced Newcastle Disease virus replication in 
human cells. It is also clear that synthetically designed chimeric viruses would 
elicit fear in exposed populations, regardless of the actual pathogenic outcomes 
associated with its intentional release. It might be prudent to shift the focus 
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away from preventing dual-use proliferation to preparing for it by developing 
new platforms for rapid vaccine and therapeutic design and stockpiling these 
reagents against future bioterrorist attacks.
It is important to note that many “non-Select Agent” human viruses and 
microorganisms are extremely pathogenic and encode virulence determinants 
that could be blended into other genome chassis or enhanced by introducing 
new virulence determinants. Thus, one danger in creating lists is that it focuses 
resources on a select subset of human pathogens and ignores the broader in-
novation in genome design and gene function that exists throughout the larger 
microbial world (see Figure 2.2).
All Biology 
Pathogens and 
Pathogenic Products
Infectious Disease
CDC Category  
Agents
Select Agents 
BTRA
Figure 2-2
FIGURE 2.2 The universe of potential genes and sequences that could be drawn upon 
to create a biological weapon involves all biology. From “All Biology,” some pathogens 
and pathogenic products such as toxins, venoms, and others may be known to cause 
disease or death in humans, animals or plants. In the context of human health, some are 
recognized as causes of infectious diseases and are reasonably well characterized. Among 
all infectious diseases, some are further classified as Category A, B, or C pathogens 
by CDC or NIH, and they may or may not be assigned a biosafety level of laboratory 
containment (BSL-1, -2, -3, or -4) in the BMBL. Of these, some are designated Select 
Agents, and a few are prioritized under the DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment.
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Bottom-Up Approach
The most commonly cited concern is that synthetic biology will allow the 
de noo design and creation of new life forms, such as synthetically designed 
killer viruses and microorganisms, either from scratch (which is extremely un-
likely) or through the combination of existing gene sets from multiple viruses 
(which is more likely). Humans are surrounded by large numbers of intention-
ally genetically modified organisms (for example, domesticated corn from small 
grass teosinte and domesticated microorganisms used in beer, wine, cheese, 
and yogurt production) that were generated by breeding, artificial selection or, 
most recently, direct genetic engineering. In fact, 30 years of genetic manipula-
tion with recombinant DNA technology in thousands of laboratories around 
the world has not resulted in any human-targeted super virus or microorgan-
ism. Although that does not preclude it in the future, it raises the question of 
whether the degree of concern is exaggerated. Will synthetic designer genomes 
be more dangerous to society than other highly pathogenic microorganisms 
that already exist in nature, such as measles (about 150,000 deaths per year), 
HIV (about 2 million deaths per year), influenza and RSV, respiratory syncytial 
virus, (about 0.5-1 million excess deaths per year), organisms that cause diar-
rheal diseases (more than 2 million deaths per year), or malaria (more than 1 
million deaths per year)?
The scientific community does not have sufficient knowledge to create 
a novel, viable life form, even a virus, from the bottom up. Designing an 
infectious viral genome de noo by sequence requires the accurate prediction 
of protein structure and function, the design of protein-protein interactions 
and protein machines, all of which must produce progeny virions efficiently in 
an order of magnitude more complex host cell. If we cannot predict protein 
structure and function on the basis of sequences with any accuracy, how can 
we design and synthesize novel viruses that will replicate, regardless of their 
disease potential?
Alternatively, de noo design could focus on existing gene sets by emulat-
ing or copying known functions. That is also exceptionally difficult. First, entry 
requires specific interaction between viral and cellular components, including 
the deliberate orchestration of a series of sequential conformational changes 
that mediate docking and entry of the virus genome (particle) into the cell. 
Regulation of entry often involves co-receptors and other host factors like 
proteases to regulate the entry process. While the process is clear, the ability 
to design these highly regulated systems de noo is in its infancy. Second, a 
functional replication complex is needed to replicate the viral genome. Replica-
tion complexes are complex multicomponent protein machines (such as, viral 
and perhaps cellular proteins) that specifically engage and replicate nucleic 
acid. The formation of a replication complex includes tailored protein-protein 
and protein-nucleic acid interaction networks that are not known and cannot 
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be predicted or engineered with existing technology. Pathogenesis involves a 
regulated set of virus-host interaction networks that influences host responses 
that antagonize or potentiate disease; these networks are poorly understood and 
cannot be designed de noo. Virulence genes work together, and the levels of 
expression that permit virus persistence or spread and transmission, depend-
ing on the replication mechanism, are highly regulated. Finally, efficient virus 
egress from the cell usually involves discrete cellular and viral constituents. The 
protein-protein interactions, the regulation of the components involved in ef-
ficient release, and the design of de noo systems are beyond the capacity of the 
scientific community. The level of abstraction required to piece together a new 
life from defined parts is difficult enough—it is a misconception that a viable 
de novo microorganism can be designed today directly from sequences and a 
pool of uncoupled gene parts—it would be even more difficult to predict the 
virulence of such a microorganism if it were assembled and recovered.
Synthetic Biology—Summary
Synthetic biology offers considerable opportunity to improve human health 
and solve planetary problems in energy, food production, medicine, and public 
health. However, dual-use applications are of legitimate concern; new synthetic 
DNA technology alters the old paradigms that regulate pathogen bioavail-
ability, but it is the traditional top-down approaches7 that present the greatest 
threat to altering virus virulence and pathogenesis. Bottom-up approaches 
remain extraordinarily complex, and it seems unlikely that sufficient vision and 
understanding exist to design and recover a true human pathogen using this 
approach. The time frame for the realization of the synthetic biology revolution 
is impossible to predict and will depend on whether it remains unfettered and 
on the support that it receives; undoubtedly, however, it will be a reality within 
the lifetime of most who read this document.
WHAT CAN CURRENTLY BE PREDICTED FROM SEQUENCE 
ABOUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF PATHOGENIC 
MICROORGANISMS, INCLUDING SELECT AGENTS?
It is abundantly clear that the use of sequence alone to predict a naturally 
occurring or synthetic pathogenic microorganism accurately is infeasible—se-
quence cannot provide biological context. Whether synthetic or natural, a 
sequence by itself has no biological properties. However, a remarkable amount 
of information can be deduced from a sequence of genes or proteins. To begin 
with, it is clear that all the microorganisms that we deal with can be divided 
into relatively well-defined general groups. For example, among the groups of 
7 See Chapter 3 for more discussion of the relative threats presented by these approaches.
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bacteria, viruses, and eukaryotic pathogens a core of conserved genes of known 
and hypothetical function make up the unique set of properties that permit a 
specific group of microorganisms to occupy, persist, and replicate in a particular 
biological niche, perform certain metabolic functions, and interact with other 
living things. That core of genes, which generally constitute about three-fourths 
of the genes specific to a microbial group, is the basis of much of contemporary 
taxonomy. A remaining set of genes is concerned with specialization. For our 
purposes, the specialization is pathogenicity and virulence. We can confidently 
“predict” the sequence of most of the important microbial toxins or at least 
suspect, on the basis of the structure of a protein or the deduced catalytic site 
decoded from a nucleic acid sequence, that a toxin might be encoded therein.
The common features and themes of many bacterial virulence genes are 
known. Just as we can tell from the sequence of “core” genes that we are deal-
ing with a bacterium of the genus Yersinia or a poxvirus, we can accurately 
say whether there is a precise sequence of a known virulence gene associated 
with the plague bacillus or with smallpox. It might be difficult to identify the 
precise origin of a microbial sequence to a specific Select Agent, but it is surely 
less difficult to say with some accuracy that a particular sequence is related to 
a known virulence determinant and to a class of virulence genes with known 
function. The fact is that the availability of complete microbial genomes, as 
well as the genomes of their hosts, has made it possible to combine genetic 
and molecular methods not only to identify microbial genes that are expressed 
only in certain animal hosts, including humans, but also to determine genes that 
are essential for pathogenicity using global screening methods. The methods 
themselves depend on gene sequencing technology. Such lists of genes exist 
today for Salmonella, Mycobacteria, Yersinia, and the pneumococcus; we believe 
that they probably exist for most Select Agents in at least a surrogate animal 
model. Where such lists do not exist, it is relatively easy to determine them 
experimentally.
The utility of sequence information depends on a number of factors. In 
some circumstances, the quality of a sequence may be a factor, for example, 
if it comes from a small sample from an infected individual. The length of a 
sequence is, of course, also a factor. If a sequence is relatively short, it may be of 
no immediate consequence unless it can be shown to be part of a much larger 
assembly of genes. What would be required to determine that a sequence came 
from a known Select Agent? On the one hand, if the sequence were from a 
known virulence gene or from a specific (as opposed to core) region of the ge-
nome, one could say with a good deal of confidence that it was from that organ-
ism. On the other hand, if the sequence is from a core common to pathogenic 
and non-pathogenic microorganisms, as is common for enteric bacteria (and 
others), the information is less useful, although it is of value from a surveillance 
standpoint to eliminate suspicion. Difficulty would arise if a sequence were 
from a common set of core genes—let us say a core common to the Bacillus 
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group—and there were sequences that resembled the plasmid-mediated toxin 
of B. anthracis but they were clearly distinct from the known anthrax virulence 
determinant. That might heighten the suspicion. However, the level of concern 
would depend on the biological context. If the sequence were derived from a 
patient who had sepsis, one would be appropriately alarmed. If the sample were 
from the soil, the level of suspicion would be far less because soil is a natural 
habitat for members of the genus Bacillus and they are harmless bacteria that 
have plasmids encoding related toxin molecules. If the sample were submit-
ted to a DNA synthesis company, there would be cause to learn more about 
its source and about the reason the DNA was being synthesized.8 There is no 
fool-proof method for predicting whether a sequence will have the biological 
properties of a Select Agent (such as pathogenicity), but the common sense 
use of the considerable amount of sequence data we now have, combined 
with advances in understanding of microbe-host interactions, does provide 
for a mechanism that is practical and sufficiently flexible to provide guidance 
about the potential biological consequences of a DNA sequence from nature 
or from the biochemist’s bench.
None of this is meant to trivialize the difficulty of understanding the bio-
logical importance and function of microbial determinants of pathogenicity or 
the complexity of microbe-host interactions. Although we have the complete 
sequence of many of the most feared microbial pathogens and of their host 
animals or plants, our attempts to devise novel vaccines or therapeutic agents 
have been difficult at best. If genomics has taught us anything at all about 
microbe-host interaction, it is just how intimate and intertwined the biology 
of the two participants may be. That is not always obvious if one thinks about 
the ravages of the black death of the 14th century or the horror of Ebola infec-
tion. Those are the nightmare of those who deal with bioterror, but the most 
efficient killers of the world are still infectious agents that have a longer-lasting 
intimate association with humanity. It is not easy to develop antiviral drugs 
when the interactions of the viral components and the human host are so closely 
intertwined that inhibiting the invader may mean poisoning the host. Nor is it 
easy to develop vaccines against many bacterial pathogens that have evolved to 
interact in subtle specific ways with the biology of the human immune system. 
Continued investment in genomics, bioinformatics and basic research on infec-
tious diseases of humans, animals and plants, will help us develop new ways to 
control diseases that plague our planet.
Nevertheless, it is our judgment that the sequence information now avail-
able, when combined with that being obtained on a daily basis and deposited in 
public data banks, can be effectively used to provide a new approach to identi-
fying and monitoring microorganisms of interest much more effectively than the 
8 A common question in this regard is, who should carry the burden—those submitting the 
sequence for synthesis, the synthesis companies, or government?
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construction of rigid lists that reflect biological reality poorly and therefore can 
provide only limited utility for national security. Thus, in Chapter 3 we discuss 
how the Select Agent list might be clarified by sequence-based classification to 
better circumscribe the taxonomic distinctions blurred by natural and synthetic 
variation and modification. Moreover, we present a “yellow flag” biosafety 
system; this approach is not regulatory and therefore could provide sequence 
information relevant to biosecurity in a more dynamic and timely manner than 
the Select Agent Regulations.
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3
A Proposal for Consideration: Sequence-
Based Classification of Select Agents
The previous chapter concluded that the primary answer to our charge 
is no—prediction of Select Agent status by genome sequence analysis is not 
feasible.
First, in Chapter 1, the committee found that prediction of Select Agent 
status is not possible, because Select Agent status involves economic, histori-
cal, and policy considerations beyond the biological properties of the organism 
encoded in its genome.
Second, the committee finds that even if it were possible to assign Select 
Agent status solely on the basis of genome-encoded biological properties, the 
answer would remain no. Chapter 2 described why accurate prediction of an 
organism’s pathogenicity from its genome sequence is not possible now, and 
will not be feasible in the foreseeable future—certainly not at the level of ac-
curacy appropriate for statutory regulations. Reliable prediction of the hazard-
ous properties of pathogens from their genome sequence alone will require an 
extraordinarily detailed understanding of host, pathogen, and environment 
interactions integrated at the systems, organism, population, and ecosystem 
levels. For the foreseeable future, the only reliable predictor of the hazard 
posed by a biological agent is actual experience with that agent.
The committee was charged to identify, supposing that the answer to these 
questions would be no, “the scientific advances that would be necessary to 
permit serious consideration” of such a predictive framework. The committee 
believes that we are so far from the goal of a predictive framework that it is 
premature to plan specific steps towards a Select Agent regulatory system based 
on predictie genome sequence analysis.
As described in Chapter 2, it is a major goal of all biology to understand 
how DNA sequence determines the properties of biological systems, ranging 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
 SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION FOR SELECT AGENTS
in complexity from single macromolecules to pathways, organisms, popula-
tions, and ecosystems. Successes in prediction and design at each subsequent 
level of complexity in biology as a whole are the relevant milestones to watch 
for, before we will be able to predict confidently from genome sequence analysis 
how a designed organism would replicate, interact with a host, evade a host 
immune system, and spread in a population to cause disease.
The committee’s view is that for the specific purposes of the Select Agent 
Regulations, those general biological milestones should be passively monitored, 
not actively sought. A narrow focus on such milestones for the sole purpose 
of being able to predict what makes Select Agents dangerous may be a distor-
tion of priorities in biology, and may also raise concerns about dual use. The 
ability to predict pathogenicity from genome sequence automatically confers 
the ability to design genome sequences of pathogens.
However, the committee is not satisfied with answering its charge narrowly 
and in the negative. The rapidly expanding capabilities of automated gene syn-
thethesis and of synthetic genomics to synthesize and “boot” complete Select 
Agent genomes means that the Select Agent Regulations do need to be defined 
in terms of genome sequence analysis, not by the phenotypic properties of an 
encoded agent. A Select Agent genome is covered by the Select Agent Regula-
tions whether or not it is ever “booted” into a living agent whose phenotype 
can be assayed. A DNA synthesis company needs to be able to tell, unambigu-
ously and by sequence alone, if it is being asked by a customer to synthesize 
the genome of a Select Agent.
That determination would not be a problem if each Select Agent had a 
unique genome sequence. However, discrete taxonomic nomenclature in biol-
ogy is already challenged by the great diversity and continuum of organisms 
observed in natural wild isolates, and the rapidly expanding ability of synthetic 
biology to create highly modified variants and chimeras of naturally occurring 
genomes poses an even greater challenge to taxonomic naming systems. Select 
Agent pathogens, like any biological organism, are not defined by a single DNA 
sequence. Given natural wild variation and the conceivable range of tolerable 
synthetic variation, a “cloud” of related sequences of similar biological proper-
ties are all assigned the same taxonomic name. There may be sequences that are 
just as closely related but are not Select Agents, including vaccine strains and 
attenuated research strains that the U.S. government want explicitly to avoid 
encumbering with the Select Agent Regulations.
In its deliberations, the committee found that it was useful and impor-
tant to distinguish sequence-based prediction of biological properties from 
sequence-based classification. A regulatory system based on prediction must 
be able to recognize that an entirely novel genome sequence (unrelated to any 
known sequence) encodes a pathogen that should be assigned Select Agent 
status. A regulatory system based on classification “merely” tries to decide 
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whether a sequence is sufficiently similar to that of an already-known, already-
named Select Agent to be assigned the same taxonomic name and status. The 
two concepts are easily confused and sometimes conflated because the state 
of the art of prediction from biological sequence is generally not based on a 
physics-based prediction of the molecular structure and function of the parts 
encoded by a genome, but rather on sequence comparison and classification: 
If one sequence is similar to another known sequence, it is assumed that they 
share evolutionary ancestry and have similar biological functions.
This chapter explores the conceptual difference between predictive systems 
and classification systems and considers the ramifications of using sequence-
based classification for the Select Agent Regulations. In a narrow sense, the 
committee has addressed its charge by explaining that prediction-based systems 
are not feasible. However, the committee interprets its charge more broadly and 
in this chapter moves beyond infeasible predictive systems to consider a feasible 
sequence-based classification system. The reader may want to view this chapter 
as a proposal for consideration, rather than as a recommendation. However, 
in the sense that sequence-based classification is conflated with rough and 
limited prediction in biology, this chapter is the committee’s positive and con-
structive answer to its charge. We discuss how a sequence-based classification 
system might be used to encompass what we believe are the most technically 
feasible and likely scenarios whereby synthetic genomics and synthetic biology 
could be used to construct a hazardous agent with Select Agent properties. A 
sequence-based classification system would still be based on a discrete list of 
Select Agents, but could be used to create a pragmatic “brighter line” for decid-
ing whether a new genome sequence should be regarded as one of the existing 
Select Agents or not.
NOVEL AGENTS: SYNTHETIC GENOMICS AND 
THE SELECT AGENT REGULATIONS
We need to examine what we mean by a “novel” synthetic agent. This 
chapter flows from the strong premise that for the foreseeable future, synthetic 
pathogens (at least those regulated by the Select Agent Regulations) will be 
composed largely or entirely of genes derived from existing pathogens. That 
premise requires careful consideration. We want to outline the most likely 
threat scenarios that might be created with synthetic genomics, and we want to 
consider what we should regulate at the level of possession and transfer of spe-
cific agents with regulations like the Select Agents Regulations, as opposed to 
overarching statutory prohibition of use and development of offensive biologi-
cal weapons under the Biological Weapons Convention, or as opposed to pru-
dent laboratory biosafety guidelines for handling of any pathogenic organism.
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Synthetic genomics poses three main threat scenarios that would allow a 
“bad actor”1 to obtain a pathogenic organism suited for use as a weapon:
• The bad actor orders a synthetic DNA (or RNA) genome of a known 
Select Agent. The exact sequence may be modified, either in an at-
tempt to alter the phenotype of the agent (perhaps to introduce drug 
resistance, increase pathogeneticity, or alter host range) or in an at-
tempt to circumvent the Select Agent Regulations themselves (by 
making genetic changes intended to have little or no effect on patho-
genicity, but to create ambiguity about the taxonomic classification 
of the organism). The bad actor then “boots” the synthetic genome 
into a full organism. We will call such an organism a “modified Select 
Agent” and we will describe its creation as “modification” of an exist-
ing organism.
• The bad actor “assembles” a synthetic pathogen by combining parts 
(genes and regulatory sequences) of known organisms, for example 
by creating a chimera of two or more viruses, or by attempting to 
express genes that encode a toxin or mechanism of pathogenesis in an 
otherwise innocuous “chassis” of a non-Select Agent host, such as any 
of several commonly used viral vectors. This would include cases in 
which no individual part originates in a Select Agent.2 We will call the 
organism created by this scenario a “chimera,” and we will describe its 
creation as “assembly” of existing parts.
• The bad actor “designs” a synthetic pathogen by creating entirely new 
gene sequences—dissimilar to any known pathogen gene sequences in 
nature. We will call the organism created by such a process a “de noo” 
novel agent, and we will describe its creation as “design” (although 
sequences may be selected from randomized pools by high-throughput 
in vitro evolution or selection rather than actually designed).
Obviously, there is a continuum among these three scenarios. As more 
new genes are moved into an existing organism, the line between modification 
and assembly blurs. Only part of an organism may be designed, and the rest 
assembled or modified. The important distinction is between genetic modifica-
tion of an existing organism in essentially its original order, assembly of parts of 
1 “Bad actor” is used to mean “an individual or group with nefarious intent.” “Individual” or 
“person” does not convey the full meaning; “terrorist” was viewed as too strong or specific a term. 
In addition, a “bad actor” may be either an individual or a group.
2 For example, experiments unexpectedly found that inserting a mouse interleukin-4 (IL-4) gene 
into ectromelia virus (mousepox) created a highly pathogenic virus against mice. Based on these 
results, there is concern that a related human virus like vaccinia, engineered to express human IL-4, 
could become highly pathogenic for humans, though neither vaccinia (the smallpox vaccine virus) 
nor the IL-4 gene by themselves are Select Agents.
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known organisms in new combinations in new orders, and creation of entirely 
new gene sequences dissimilar to any known pathogen genes.
The three scenarios are ordered by increasing technical difficulty and 
therefore by decreasing likelihood (see Table 3.1). We want to be sure that we 
are dealing with the more likely scenarios before worrying inordinately about 
less likely ones.
The first scenario is the simplest, easiest, and most likely to work in the 
absence of an expensive research and development program; therefore, it is the 
most dangerous. Most Select Agent viruses can now be booted from synthetic 
DNA, some relatively easily (such as small positive-stranded RNA viruses) and 
some with great difficulty (such as large DNA viruses like variola). As the scope 
of DNA synthesis increases and the technology becomes commoditized, an 
increasing number of Select Agents can be reconstituted with a modest level of 
skill in molecular biology. Synthetic genomes identical to complete Select Agent 
TABLE 3.1
“Modified Select 
Agent” “Chimeric Select Agent”
“de novo Select 
Agent”
Three threat 
scenarios posed 
by synthetic 
genomics:
Created by 
“modification” of an 
existing organism.
Created by “assembly” of 
existing parts.
Created by “design” 
(or by high-
throughput in vitro 
evolution or selection)
Feasibility of 
scenario given 
the state of the 
art:
Feasible
Modification is routine 
genetic engineering
Possible
Assembly is a frequent 
molecular biology 
technique as an extension 
of “modification.” 
Assembly of a radically 
novel agent is beyond the 
state of the art.
Improbable
Beyond current 
capabilities; if possible 
at all, likely to require 
extensive experimental 
selection, refinement, 
and testing in 
susceptible hosts.
Potential 
solution:
Sequence-based 
classification.
Anchored around a 
taxonomic name and a 
full genome reference 
sequence, this would 
define the “space” 
around each select 
agent—essentially 
translating the 
regulatory language into 
an operational definition 
that accommodates the 
biological complexity.
Gene-sequence-based 
classification.
This would identify 
individual “parts” of 
genomes (beginning with 
select agents), define 
“space” around each part, 
and determine which 
“parts,” when assembled, 
are operationally 
considered a “complete” 
genome for the purpose 
of the Select Agent 
Regulations
Sequence-based 
function prediction.
Neither design, nor 
prediction is currently 
possible.
Attempting to 
design and create 
a bioweapon is 
prohibited by BWC 
and USC Title 18 
Section 175(b), among 
others.
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genomes are already clearly covered by the Select Agent Regulations. Whether 
a modified sequence is still called a Select Agent or not (the question of when 
the magnitude of modification requires a new discrete name) is a gray area in 
the current Select Agent Regulations.
The second scenario is plausible, but unlikely to work without an extensive 
research and development effort. Chimeric assemblies are the leading edge of 
early successes in “synthetic biology.” There are efforts to create standardized 
“parts”—genes or combinations of genes that have functions that are readily 
transferable into an organism “chassis” that provides basic biochemical, struc-
tural, and replication functions (Kwok 2010). The simplest chimeric pathogens 
would express a toxin gene in a chassis, but the most dangerous toxin genes 
are already covered by the Select Agent Regulations regardless of what organ-
ism they are in. Chimeric pathogen weapons that evade the current Select 
Agent Regulations would require the assembly of less obvious pathogenesis 
mechanisms than expression of known Select Agent toxins. The more such an 
assembly deviates from a known organism, the less likely it is to work, for all 
the same reasons that prediction of pathogenicity and other phenotypes from 
genome sequence is not possible. It is not possible with the current state of 
knowledge to predict and foresee all detailed interactions of gene products 
that determine an organism’s overall phenotype. It would require experimental 
characterization in suitable hosts to be sure that a chimeric weapon worked as 
intended. For some Select Agents, there are no surrogate experimental hosts 
for characterizing virulence, and the only suitable host for a human pathogen 
may be a human. Those considerations raise the research and development 
bar substantially, and expose such a program to existing legal prohibitions 
other than the Select Agent Regulations. Thus novel chimeric constructions 
are unlikely as terror weapons,3 although they are alleged to have been used in 
national offensive bioweapons research programs.
The third scenario is beyond the capabilities of current biology. There is no 
example of a designed organism or even of a designed genetic pathway, let alone 
a designed pathogen. Designing a self-replicating organism that has only to in-
teract with simple molecules in a test tube is one thing, and it is hard enough; 
designing a pathogen that has to interact with a complicated host, evade its 
immune system, and be transmissible in the natural environment adds daunting 
layers of biological complexity. There are very few examples of single protein 
sequences that have been designed to fold in a particular novel way (Kuhlman, 
Dantas et al. 2003). These first few modest successes in de noo design of single 
proteins constitute the current state of the art. Design and prediction go hand 
3 Or at least as functionally dangerous pathogens. A release of a chimeric construct of suitably 
scary-sounding parts could cause societal damage from fear and panic even if it were utterly inef-
fective as an organism. The number of such imaginable scenarios is enormous—probably beyond 
the scope of the Select Agent Regulations to regulate effectively without overly impeding beneficial 
biomedical research. The best countermeasure against “mock” chimeric weapons is likely to be a 
resilient public health emergency response and communication system.
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in hand; our lack of predictive ability in biology means that we cannot now 
design genomes.4
Synthetic biology’s use of metaphors like “booting” a genome into a living 
organism or use of a well-known organism, such as Escherichia coli as a “chas-
sis” for hosting synthetic constructs (Lee, Chou et al. 2008) may be mislead-
ing about the likelihood of de noo design. Among synthetic biologists, this 
metaphorical language emphasizes the long-term goal of making biological 
systems as engineerable as computers or machines; but the language also tends 
to trivialize the complexity of biological systems and the enormous gaps in our 
understanding of them by making it seem (perhaps especially to non-biologists) 
that we can already engineer biological systems easily. There are examples in 
which synthetic genomes have been “booted” into living viruses (Cello et al. 
2002) and now even cells (Lartigue et al. 2009; Gibson et al. 2010), but it must 
be remembered that these experiments have “only” synthesized minor variants 
of known natural genome sequences. An E. coli “chassis” has been used to 
express genes for a complex synthetic function, such as the engineering of E. 
coli to produce pharmaceutically important natural plant products, such as the 
antimalarial drug arteminisin (Chang et al. 2007), or bulk chemicals, such as 
1,3-propanediol (Bio-PDO, Dupont), a starting point for synthesis of plastics 
(patent WO/2004/101479), but these efforts have required massive multiyear 
iterative bioengineering and development processes “just” to move known 
genes from other organisms into the E. coli system and get them to work as de-
sired. All existing (and reasonably foreseeable) uses of synthetic biology involve 
modification or rearrangement of existing biological components. The entirely 
de noo design of genomes and organisms remains science fiction.
We have distinguished three kinds of novel synthetic organisms because 
we believe that there is a tendency to imagine nightmare scenarios in which 
a de noo unnamed pathogen, dissimilar to any known pathogen and thus 
unrecognizable by any sequence comparison protocol, is created deliberately 
or accidentally with synthetic genomics. Clearly, a regulatory system like the 
Select Agent Regulations based on a list of known agents and their genome se-
quences is not effective for regulating entirely de novo agents. Such a concern 
seems to have been behind the charge to our committee. If one were worried 
about prohibiting possession and transfer of de noo agents at the point of their 
4 An important exception to the concept that design and prediction go hand in hand is that it 
is feasible to select de noo sequences for particular functions by high-throughput in vitro evolu-
tion or selection, and thus make it possible to arrive at functional sequences without designing 
or understanding them. Although selection and directed evolution have been widely applied at 
the level of individual RNAs or proteins, no novel genome sequences have been created this way. 
Given the complexity of the problem (the number of possible DNA sequences rises in proportion 
to 4N for a sequence of length N), it is extremely unlikely that complete de noo genomes could 
be selected in a small number of iterations by such procedures. If it were done, it would require a 
long effort of iterative artificial evolution—expensive and complicated work beyond any current 
research program in biology.
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creation, one would need to develop a forward-looking system that predicts 
the Select Agent status of a de noo genome sequence, rather than a backward-
looking system based on a taxonomy of known Select Agents. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, such a prediction based system is not feasible.
We instead take the view that not only is the creation of de noo agents 
the most unlikely scenario, but also that it is not and can not be the purpose 
of the Select Agent Regulations to regulate de noo agents any more than it is 
their purpose to regulate access to novel emerging diseases in nature. The Select 
Agent Regulations should not aim to prevent access to all possible pathogens. 
There is no way to anticipate all possible novel pathogens. The Select Agent 
Regulations should aim to impede access to the most dangerous known patho-
gens. The best defense against the unquantifiable threat of novel synthetic 
pathogens is not the Select Agent Regulations, but continued enhancements 
of the laboratory and clinical biosafety measures that we already have to deal 
with the real and measurable threat of emerging natural pathogens. When a 
novel agent emerges, research is initiated to study its mechanism of action, the 
potential threat that it presents, and its susceptibility to countermeasures. When 
the novel agent has been shown to meet the criteria for Select Agent regula-
tion—with respect to not only its genome-encoded biological properties, but 
other medical and policy considerations—its name can be added to the Select 
Agent list so that future access to it can be regulated.
It is our view that the main biosecurity threat scenarios start with acces-
sibility of proven known pathogens, so it is reasonable for the Select Agent 
Regulations to be backward-looking and based on a list of known agents. These 
regulations protect us by restricting the availability of agents that we know from 
experience to be extraordinarily dangerous and that have a high potential for 
biowarfare or bioterror.
The foregoing establishes the premise for the remainder of this chapter. 
Modified Select Agents, made facile by the commoditization of synthetic ge-
nomics, constitute the most important and pressing practical issue related to 
the Select Agent Regulations. The taxonomic nomenclature of microorganisms 
is designed for wild isolates of actual organisms that have observable growth 
phenotypes, not for non-natural modified sequences that exist only as genomic 
DNA. A system based on (natural) taxonomic nomenclature does not establish 
a bright line that is sufficient for clear statutory regulation of possession and 
transfer of synthetic genomic DNA sequences.
As a specific working example, consider the situation of a DNA synthesis 
company. A DNA synthesis company is capable of synthesizing complete ge-
nomes, and the company (if unregistered) formally violates the Select Agent 
Regulations if it possesses or transfers a synthetic Select Agent genome.5 Who 
5 Although we use synthetic genome orders as an illustrative example, we must recognize that 
from the standpoint of impeding bioterror scenarios, there will be myriad ways to get around any 
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judges whether a DNA sequence constructed by the company is considered to 
be a Select Agent? How similar to a Select Agent reference sequence does a 
DNA sequence have to be to still be deemed a Select Agent? Currently, each 
gene sequence company must define for itself the sequence boundaries around 
each Select Agent, with only minimal guidance from regulators (DHHS 2009). 
The companies understandably want increased clarity about what sequences 
are and are not covered by the Select Agent Regulations. By addressing this 
issue as an example, we would also deal with a number of other scenarios in 
which synthetic genomics might be used to create modified Select Agents. And 
we will also be able to deal with some of the most obvious and likely ways that 
chimeric agents might be assembled with synthetic biology.
As discussed in the next section, we take the view that the most pressing 
issues can be treated as a sequence classification problem more than a sequence-
based prediction problem.
CLASSIFICATION IS DISTINCT FROM PREDICTION
Whereas sequence-based prediction of the properties of Select Agents will 
not be feasible in the foreseeable future, sequence-based classification can be 
addressed with current technology. At least at the level of individual gene se-
quences, there is an extensive literature on methods for automated classification 
of sequences into operationally defined taxonomies. Cellular organisms are rou-
tinely classified taxonomically by using small subunit ribosomal RNA sequence 
comparisons. Everyday examples of assigning protein sequences into annotated 
families include databases such as Pfam, Interpro, and TIGRfams. The existing 
literature does not quite suffice for the problem of sequence-based classification 
of complete Select Agent genomes. Viruses lack ribosomal RNA, for one thing; 
for another, we need to think about distinguishing a complete genome from a 
partial one; and we need to worry about artificially modified and chimeric con-
structs that would not be constrained to follow the patterns of natural sequence 
screening procedure used by DNA synthesis companies, ranging from splitting an order into appar-
ently innocuous pieces among multiple companies to using offshore companies that do not adhere 
to U.S. regulations, to simply not using a DNA synthesis company at all. The technology of DNA 
synthesis is rapidly being commoditized, and DNA oligonucleotide synthesis machines can already 
be purchased cheaply from eBay. An ebay.com search on “oligo synthesizer” on 10 October 2009 
found a used Applied Biosystems 394 DNA/RNA oligo synthesizer on sale for $8,900 (plus $106.16 
shipping within 3-8 business days to a committee member’s home in Northern Virginia). With great 
difficulty and specialized technical skills, genes and even whole genomes can be assembled from 
individual short oligonucleotides. In much the same vein, a determined bioterrorist can obtain 
isolates of a Select Agent from the wild. The Select Agent Regulations can only raise the difficulty 
bar for acquiring cultures of proven highly virulent agents and provide law enforcement with tools 
to prosecute for possession of variants of such agents; because natural biological organisms are 
widely available, readily engineered, and increasingly easy to create, it is unrealistic to try to design 
the Select Agent Regulations to preclude acquisition completely.
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evolution. However, the adaptations needed to define complete Select Agent 
genomes operationally are fairly obvious, as we will discuss.
The computational sequence analysis technologies used for sequence-based 
classification define “sequence spaces” that circumscribe the known variation of 
sequences that are considered to belong to a useful name, while excluding the 
known variation of sequences that are considered to be attached to different 
names. Therefore, a necessary precondition is to have a number of representa-
tive sequences that belong to the desired classification and a number of the 
most closely related sequences that do not belong.
An important principle of automated classification (also known as “super-
ised learning” methods, in statistical inference) is that given the known se-
quences of things that we want to label as Select Agents and things that we do 
not want to label as Select Agents, there is always a classification scheme that 
can achieve the desired labeling of known sequences with 100 percent accuracy. 
The important concern is not that a classification system would misclassify a 
known sequence, but rather how well a classification system generalizes to cor-
rectly classify new sequences that it has not seen before. The existing methods 
for sequence-based classification of protein and DNA sequences provide a 
flexible set of software tools for human experts to use to define appropriately 
generalized sequence spaces on a case-by-case basis using expert knowledge. 
The methods enable 100 percent classification accuracy on known sequences 
(essentially by definition—the classification system is defined on the known 
sequences already labeled with a set of known labels), can be expected to per-
form reasonably well on new sequences, and are readily updated if and when 
erroneous classifications occur.
The basic principle of sequence-based classification is simple (Figure 3.1). 
A sequence is assigned the name of the known group that it is “closest” to, as 
long as it is also within the range of known variation accepted for that group. 
If it falls outside the range of known variation of any known named groups, it 
is operationally declared a “novel” sequence, possibly within some larger and 
more broadly defined sequence family. The key is the definition of close, that is 
of what distance means in comparing sequences; various automated computa-
tional procedures differ in the details of their approach.
Sequence-based classification is related to taxonomic (species-level, evolu-
tionary) classification, but the two do not always coincide. They coincide when 
the desired sequence classification corresponds to slowly evolving traits that are 
shared amongst a “clade” of evolutionarily related organisms to the exclusion 
of more distantly related organisms. For example, all variola (smallpox) virus 
isolates have sequences that are more similar to one another than are variola 
virus and the most related non-Select Agent orthopoxvirus. Sequence-based 
classification may differ from evolutionary classification for rapidly or recently 
evolved traits, particularly if only a small number of crucial changes are in-
volved and the same sequence changes and phenotypes have evolved more 
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Non-SA1
SA1
X1
X2
X3
Figure 3-1
FIGURE 3.1 Profile-Based Classification System—distance.
This graphic shows a tree based on sequence similarity. The Select Agent has high se-
quence similarity to the non-Select Agent nearest neighbor. The shaded spheres indicate 
the sequence “space,” or known variability, surrounding an agent’s taxonomic name.
 •  X1 sequence is within SA1 “space” and would be classified as Select Agent1.
 •  X2 sequence is most similar to non-SA1 and would be classified as non-Select 
Agent1.
  IMPORTANT—this is not prediction! X1 may NOT be a pathogen. X2 may be 
a pathogen. This classification system identifies and clarifies what is subject to Select 
Agent Regulations. It cannot predict what is or is not a pathogen.
  IMPORTANT—classification does NOT designate new Select Agents. It identi-
fies sequences as belonging to a known sequence “space.” If the sequence does not 
belong to an established “space,” it is novel.
 •  X3 is a novel sequence that is more similar to the Select Agent than the non-Select 
Agent. This would initially be classified as a non-Select Agent. As biological in-
formation is acquired, this agent would be evaluated and might be added to the 
Select Agent list; or it would be considered another near neighbor, non-Select 
Agent sequence.
  IMPORTANT—acquiring sequence data and biological information is needed to 
define the space around Select Agents and close the gap around novel sequences.
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than once in different lineages (this is referred to as convergent evolution). For 
example, a vaccine strain may differ from a wild-type virus in only a few resi-
dues, so a sequence-based classification system might have to focus its definition 
of the vaccine strain’s space on the specific residue identities. Sequence-based 
classification is strictly operational (in the sense that it can be applied to non-
evolved artificial sequences, not just to naturally evolved ones) as opposed to 
sequence-based taxonomies that are backed by a notion of biological species 
evolution and evolutionary trees. A sequence-based classification draws “lines” 
(decision boundaries) that separate desired groups in sequence space; it 
is, not necessarily constrained by attempts to reconcile the patterns of com-
mon evolutionary descent of an organism and its individual genes. That is 
important, because we are interested in classification of genetically modified 
organisms and synthetic DNAs that may have no ancestors or no evolutionary 
history per se.
The “space” defined by a sequence-based classification will usually be 
large—almost always vastly larger than the space of verifiably viable sequences. 
That is one reason to use methods that define a space rather than simply mak-
ing a list of the sequences that we want to include in a group. For example, if 
we crudely defined the variola virus “sequence space” as everything within 10 
DNA substitutions of about a 186,000 nucleotide reference variola sequence, 
there would be over 10 such sequences.
It is unlikely that all those over 1050 sequences would function as a variola 
virus. Many substitutions would be deleterious or lethal to the virus. Predict-
ing whether and how well each one would function is the realm of sequence-
based prediction, whereas in a sequence-based classification scheme we do 
not necessarily care. Rather, we care whether the classifications we assign to 
viable sequences (or at least to sequences that someone would have a reason 
to synthesize) are correct. It is not a crucial mistake to misclassify a non-viable 
hypothetical genome that no one would make. That is a key distinction between 
prediction and classification. The classification system is not predicting that 
sequences actually “work” but only that they are closer to those of a known 
Select Agent than to those of any known non-Select Agents. Our main con-
cern in using a broadened definition of a Select Agent’s sequence space is to 
balance the need to encompass the most likely modifications and chimeras 
with the need to avoid the classification of a useful non-Select Agent genome 
(including those of vaccines and attenuated research strains) as Select Agents. 
We need only be sure that we define suitable non-overlapping sequence spaces 
that capture all known and expected variation in a named Select Agent and the 
nearest non-Select Agent groups.
The size of the “space” around any given classification will depend on 
how closely related the nearest competing classifications are. That is impor-
tant; classification boundaries are arbitrary and operational and are defined by 
human experts for the particular classification task at hand. There is no single 
threshold (for percent identity, BLAST score, and so on) that suffices to define 
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the boundary around biological names.6 The boundaries for a name’s sequence 
space must always be set relative to the nearest neighbors that have different 
names. Experts might define a tight space around a vaccine strain of one virus, 
a larger space around the pathogenic Select Agent form of the virus, and several 
competing “adjacent” spaces of different sizes representing the sequence varia-
tion observed in non-Select Agent natural relatives of the virus.
High-throughput automated annotation of individual gene, protein, or 
RNA sequences as belonging to particular sequence superfamilies, families, 
and subfamilies is already a robust and routine technology. At the whole (cel-
lular) organism level, sequence-based classification has most often been done 
by selecting one representative gene sequence (usually small subunit ribosomal 
RNA) and assuming that the phylogenetic tree of that sequence reflects the 
phylogenetic tree of the species. More recently, methods have begun to cal-
culate consensus phylogenetic trees on the basis of the simultaneous analysis 
of multiple genes. Virus taxonomy is somewhat more challenging; viruses lack 
ribosomal RNA genes or any other universally conserved sequence, and seem 
even more prone to lateral gene transfer than bacteria. But it is likewise increas-
ingly reliant on genome sequence-based classification that uses key conserved 
genes in each virus group. With a modest amount of research and development 
for the specific application, methods like those could be adapted to the problem 
of sequence-based classification of modified Select Agent genomes, and to some 
extent to chimeric assemblies.
SYNTHETIC GENOME CLASSIFICATION UNDER 
THE CURRENT SELECT AGENT REGULATIONS
As noted earlier, the current Select Agents Regulations cover not just 
culturable organisms, but also naked DNA, including synthetic genomes. The 
Select Agent Regulations language confers Select Agent status on “nucleic 
acids that can produce infectious forms of any of the Select Agent iruses” and 
“recombinant nucleic acids that encode for the functional form(s) of Select 
Agent toxins” (italics added). In a document interpreting the Select Agent 
Regulations with regard to synthetic genomics (“Applicability of the Select 
Agent Regulations to Issues of Synthetic Genomics” see Appendix E), we find 
a written interpretation that “non-infectious components of Select Agent vi-
ruses,” including “genomic fragments from Select Agents” and “material from 
regulated genomes that has been rendered non-infectious” are not covered as 
Select Agents.
This guidance is talking about using DNA synthesis technology to produce 
an exact copy of a known Select Agent. That is the most likely application of 
synthetic genomics; a naturally occurring genome sequence is already known 
6 That is, each Select Agent requires that its own sequence space to be defined.
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to function.7 Almost all Select Agent genomes have now been completely se-
quenced. The guidance is not attempting to deal with using DNA or synthetic 
biology to create a novel (modified, chimeric, or de noo) “synthetic” agent. 
The difficulties of dealing with modified, chimeric, and de noo synthetic agents 
constitute the reason for the charge to our committee.
Limiting the nucleic acids language to viruses and toxins reflects the cur-
rent technical state of the art that synthetic microbial genomes cannot be 
“booted” into new organisms, whereas many viruses can be, and toxin genes 
can be expressed in any host organism chassis (such as E. coli). The technical 
barriers to booting microbial genomes into new organisms are starting to fall 
(Lartigue et al. 2009; Gibson et al. 2010). Synthetic biology will sooner or later 
be able to “boot” a wide variety of organisms from synthetic DNA. The Select 
Agent Regulations language will need to broaden to cover nucleic acids of all 
Select Agents that can be booted from synthetic genomes.
The stickier point from the standpoint of sequence analysis and sequence-
based classification—and where one enters a grey area of modified synthetic 
agents, with engineered differences from wild-type Select Agents—is what ex-
actly is meant by such terms as infectious forms or functional forms or genomic 
fragments. This might mean having a complete set of all the right parts to at-
tempt to boot an organism, or it might mean that the resulting organism would 
actually be expected to work as an infectious and/or functional Select Agent. 
For example, the easiest viruses to boot are the small positive-stranded RNA 
viruses because the RNA itself is “infectious”; a full-length RNA can simply be 
synthesized and transfected into a host cell, where it will produce new virus. 
Researchers refer to the complete RNA transcript as “infectious” in the sense of 
being complete and sufficient to assemble new virus in laboratory cultured cells, 
regardless of whether the new virus is “infectious” in the sense of transmitting 
serious disease to humans or other host organisms. For example, an RNA virus 
laboratory might synthesize and transfect “infectious” mutant RNAs to study 
defects in virus replication or maturation in cultured cells, although any result-
ing viruses might not be harmful to humans.
There is no way for a DNA synthesis company to decide, from sequence 
alone, whether a variant genome sequence is “infectious.” Advances in syn-
thetic genomics make it clear that the Select Agent Regulations definition is 
underspecified. Drawing a distinction between an apparently complete set of 
parts to produce a virus and an actual working pathogenic virus and consider-
ing the problems posed by synthetic and natural variation bring us back to 
7 A qualification: DNA sequencing has an error rate that ranges from about 1/100 to 1/106 in 
most cases, depending on the sequencing strategy. Because of DNA sequencing error, the genome 
sequence in the public databases is not guaranteed to be a functional genome. DNA synthesis 
technology also has an error rate that makes it non-trivial to construct viable large constructs 
(Gibson, Glass et al., 2010).
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
A PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION 8
the distinction between classification and prediction. Determining whether 
a sequence encodes an “infectious form” of a Select Agent is an empirical 
experimental question and will long remain beyond any foreseeable predictive 
ability of biology. However, we should be able to use sequence-based classifica-
tion to establish a reasonable operational definition of the sequence space that 
circumscribes complete agent genomes, as distinct from incomplete genomes or 
complete genomes of related non-Select Agents.
There is an important distinction between identifying a suspicious “se-
quence of concern” that might be part of a Select Agent and determining that 
a genome sequence is “complete” (“infectious”) and therefore itself subject to 
the Select Agent Regulations. The former can be in a gray area, but the latter 
should be as bright a line as possible. The Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) has recently published a notice, “Screening Framework 
Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers” (DHHS 2009), 
that gives guidance to DNA synthesis companies on how to screen orders for 
possible components of Select Agents. The purpose of the DHHS screening 
guidance is not to define a complete Select Agent genome for the purposes of 
regulation but rather to harmonize the ways in which companies should screen 
customers and sequences and follow up on any suspicious orders with addi-
tional questions and scrutiny to be sure that appropriate biosafety procedures 
are used and regulations are followed. The guidance describes a “best match” 
procedure for identifying that one or more 200 nucleotide fragments of a syn-
thetic DNA order is more similar to a known Select Agent genome sequence 
than to any non-Select Agent sequence, by a local alignment search of the entire 
available nucleotide database (Genbank) at the amino acid coding level. Our 
committee found the suggested guidance in this Federal Register document to 
be strong, useful, and well thought out for the purpose of identifying sequences 
of concern, and (as we will discuss in more detail later) “best match” by percent 
identity is a reasonable rule-of-thumb sequence analysis procedure. However, 
the guidance is neither well defined nor stable enough for use in defining Select 
Agents for regulatory purposes. It relies on non-trivial manual examination of 
results (Select Agent versus non-Select Agent sequences are not clearly iden-
tified in Genbank), and the Genbank database itself is rapidly growing and 
changing, so results will vary. The guidance also makes no attempt to define a 
complete Select Agent genome.
The concepts that we develop below expand on the existing synthetic 
genomics guidance, and we describe how a reproducible objective definition 
of complete Select Agent genomes might be accomplished to delineate clearly 
which synthetic DNA constructs are and are not covered by the regulations. We 
emphasize that the system described is based on classification rather than on 
prediction. The technologies and scientific knowledge required for this system 
are available or could be available soon.
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CLASSIFICATION DEPENDS ON BOTH GENE 
CONTENT AND GENETIC DISTANCE
The problem of classifying a genome sequence as a complete Select Agent 
genome has two dimensions: (a) content—how much sequence (how many 
parts) must be present to distinguish a potentially complete “infectious form” 
of the Agent from a non-covered “genomic fragment” or “non-infectious com-
ponent”; and (b) distance—how close must the sequences of each of those parts 
be to an actual Select Agent sequence for the same Select Agent taxonomic 
name to be assigned to the synthetic organism.
Confusion will arise if content and distance are not distinguished. For 
example, the language of 18 U.S.C. 175c that the National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity recommended repealing defines variola virus as “a virus 
that can cause human smallpox or any derivative of the variola major virus that 
contains more than 85 percent of the gene sequence of the variola major virus 
or the variola minor virus.”
What does “85 percent of the gene sequence” mean? Does it mean a frag-
ment of 85 percent or more of the full-length variola virus genome? Does it 
mean a full-length genome of at least 85 percent or greater sequence identity to 
variola? The NSABB seems to have interpreted it as the latter (“the definition of 
‘variola virus’ in 18 U.S.C. 175c is based on genome sequence similarity”). They 
point out that this is problematic because “there are many genomes of the variola 
major virus genome and variola minor genomes that are significantly greater than 
85 percent similar to sequences found in related but relatively harmless viruses.” 
With that interpretation, 18 U.S.C 175c outlaws vaccinia virus, the smallpox 
accine. The NSABB recommended repealing this problematic language “par-
ticularly because the misuse of variola virus is adequately covered by other 
criminal laws already in place” (NSABB 2006:12), including the Select Agents 
Regulations and the Biological Weapons Convention. However, as we are seeing, 
although the language of the Select Agent Regulations avoids making the error 
of an overprecise and overbroad definition, it could easily be criticized for being 
underspecified with regard to technical capabilities in synthetic genomics.
We will deal with the issue of content versus distance separately.
USING “PARTS LISTS” TO DEFINE GENE CONTENT
“Content” is the first issue to address. What combinations of “parts” make 
a complete Select Agent genome? In the genome of a known Select Agent, how 
many parts can we alter, delete, or substitute before the organism ceases to be 
dangerous enough to still be considered a Select Agent?
Our state of knowledge will necessarily be partial. It is not feasible to test 
all possible alterations of a genome sequence experimentally. However, we have 
clues, from comparative analysis of genes conserved in similar organisms and 
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from experimental studies. We generally have a good idea of what genes are 
essential (required for viability of the organism under laboratory conditions, 
such as an RNA polymerase gene in an RNA virus), and some idea of what 
genes appear to be most critically involved in pathogenesis mechanisms. For 
the purposes of sequence-based classification, we do not need to have complete 
knowledge. Partial answers, given the current state of knowledge, suffice for 
an operational definition of a “complete” Select Agent genome. If an agent 
actually has 20 genes essential for viability and pathogenesis, and we know only 
about 10 of them, and we define any genome that contains those 10 genes as a 
“complete Select Agent genome,” our definition is biologically incorrect, but it 
can suffice as an operational definition.8
That is, for an operational definition of a complete Select Agent genome we 
can define a parts list of genes that are thought to be necessary but not sufficient 
for a biologically functional Select Agent genome. For example, we would not 
worry about the fact that an organism is not merely a bag of genes but contains 
extensive non-coding regulatory sequence information that would be neglected 
by a gene-based parts list. Especially in large genomes, we might even choose to 
simplify a classification system by defining an operationally complete genome 
as one that has a necessary subset of parts, rather than a complete set. An op-
erational definition of a complete Bacillus. anthracis-like Select Agent genome 
might use a handful of core essential genes (such as ribosomal RNA and DNA 
polymerase) combined with virulence genes carried on the pXO1 and pXO2 
plasmids.
Synthetic genomics raises a complication that someone might substitute 
some parts of a pathogen for “generic” parts from other genomes—for instance, 
swapping out genes for core replication functions or swapping out capsid (coat) 
proteins for different ones while trying to leave alone genes that code for patho-
genicity, or moving a toxic gene or pathway into an innocuous non-Select Agent 
“chassis,” such as E. coli. We would therefore want a classification system to 
have a concept of different “resolutions” at which individual parts are defined. 
For parts that we imagine are more likely to be swappable (such as a DNA 
polymerase), a part might be “any DNA polymerase,” whereas for parts that 
we think are essential to the Select Agent’s virulence, a part might be defined 
specifically as the Select Agent gene or a closely related modification.
The more modification, the less likely the resulting organism will work 
as a pathogen (this is related to the prediction problem). It is not at all likely, 
for example, that DNA polymerases are truly generic and swappable parts 
(except between closely related organisms), at least not without extensive trial-
8 It is this difference that makes “classification” feasible and applicable in the context of an 
oversight system, whereas “prediction” is not. Partial knowledge can usefully be applied for a 
classification system, while uncertainty and inaccuracy of prediction would result in a system that 
could not be implemented in a meaningful way.
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and-error engineering. But for an operational definition, we can be relatively 
inclusive and broad about defining a molecular parts list for each Select Agent 
for classification purposes without worrying too much about whether the as-
semblage of parts would actually work as a pathogen. We do not have to be 
concerned about impeding synthetic genomics designs that incorporate parts 
similar to Select Agents as long as there is no legitimate research purpose for the 
construct. The regulatory problem is to avoid writing regulations that unnec-
essarily impede beneficial biomedical research with innocuous organisms and 
constructs, such as research on vaccines and harmless non-pathogens related 
to Select Agents or on isolated genes that offer no possibility of resurrecting a 
complete organism.
It should be scientifically feasible, with current technology and knowl-
edge, to write a clear and acceptable definition of a covered complete Select 
Agent genome in the form of a genetic parts list, enumerating a subset of key 
genes (and possibly key regulatory sequences) that are thought to be required 
for the growth and pathogenicity of the Select Agent. The primary aim would 
be to define the sequence space around each Select Agent genome including 
“trivial” modifications that are most likely to encode a similarly hazardous 
agent without needing highly technical testing and iterative optimization,9 such 
as removal of non-essential genes, insertion of foreign genes, or deletion or 
substitution of non-essential residues. Genes crucial to pathogenesis (in which 
small variations are known to distinguish Select Agents from non-Select Agents) 
might be defined more specifically to avoid encompassing vaccines and related 
non-pathogens, and genes involved in backbone pathways such as replication 
might be defined more broadly. Within this framework, it might prove reason-
able to define an even broader sequence space to try to account for the most 
likely synthetic biology scenarios for chimeric agents, such as substitution of 
core genes for a more generic “chassis” and leaving alone genes for known 
mechanisms of pathogenesis.
Any given parts list would reflect only the current state of scientific knowl-
edge about each Select Agent.10 It would need to be subject to review and revi-
sion to keep up with the state of knowledge distinguishing Select Agents from 
other organisms.
SEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL “PARTS”
Given a parts list that addresses the content of a Select Agent genome, the 
other question is how to define sequences that are covered for each part—the 
9 That is, modifications that would not require work on the scale of an offensive bioweapons 
research program, which we deem to be beyond the scope of concern for counterbioterrorism in 
general and for the Select Agent Regulations in particular.
10 And a parts list would have to be defined for each Select Agent.
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genetic distance within which a given sequence is defined as being within the 
sequence space that defines the part, and distinguishes it from related parts of 
non-Select Agents. There is substantial established methodology regarding this 
part of the problem.
First we need to explain what commonly used sequence database similar-
ity search programs like BLAST are doing—what their scores mean—before 
we try to use the scores in an objectively defined classification system. More 
broadly speaking, what is the state of the art in sequence family classification 
in computational biology? How are biological sequences assigned to particular 
sequence groups rather than to others?
BLAST (like related programs) calculates a sequence alignment of the 
query sequence to a target database sequence, allowing insertions and dele-
tions. It uses a simple scoring system to find a maximum-scoring local alignment 
involving any piece of the query sequence that is aligned to any piece of the 
target (it does not require the entirety of the two sequences to align over their 
whole lengths). It calculates two numbers: a total score, which is the sum of 
all the residue alignment scores and gap penalties in the optimal-scoring local 
alignment, and an E alue (expectation value; or P alue, probability value, 
which is essentially the same sort of number) which represents the statistical 
significance of the total score.
A BLAST score constitutes an answer to the specific question: Is the target 
sequence homologous (related by evolutionary common ancestry) to the query 
sequence? The higher the score, the more statistical evidence that supports an 
inference that the query is homologous to the target.
The E value tells us how many times we should have expected to see a score 
that high if we searched a random target sequence database of the same size 
but consisting only of nonhomologous (unrelated) sequences. If the E value is 
low (say, 0.01 or less), we say that the hit is statistically significant; that is, that 
it was unlikely to have occurred by chance.
Neither a BLAST score nor an E value is a “distance” suitable for sequence 
classification into families. A BLAST score measures how likely it is that two 
sequences are related at all, not how closely related they are, and the E value 
just measures the statistical significance of the score. For example, the longer 
the alignment is, the more statistical signal in favor of homology accumulates, 
the higher the score, and the lower the E value. It is easier to find high-scoring, 
more significant alignments for long proteins than for short ones. However, a 
measure of genetic distance between two sequences should be independent of 
the lengths of the aligned sequences.
The standard unit of distance between two sequences in phylogenetic 
(evolutionary) inference is residue substitutions per site. Assuming that two 
sequences are homologous and assuming that we have an alignment of each 
individual homologous pair of residues in the two sequences, we infer how 
many residue substitutions have occurred at each aligned residue in the evo-
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lutionary time since the divergence of the two sequences. At short distances, 
simple percent identity of the alignment approximates the evolutionary dis-
tance; at longer distances, more sophisticated models are used to convert the 
observed dissimilarity between two sequences into a distance estimate. Thus 
perhaps counterintuitively, simple percent identity (not percent “similarity,” 
not BLAST score, and not E value) is a reasonable although rough measure of 
genetic distance. A caveat in using simple percent identity of a BLAST align-
ment as a genetic distance is that BLAST local alignments tend to identify and 
align different regions of different targets to the same query, and some regions 
of a protein or DNA are more conserved (and therefore more highly identical) 
than other regions.
Different sequences evolve at different rates. (Indeed, even different resi-
dues in the same sequence family will evolve at different rates; the residues 
in a critical enzymatic active site may be highly conserved, and residues in a 
solvent-exposed surface loop of a protein may be highly variable.) That is why 
it is not possible to define an overall threshold for genetic distance (or percent 
identity) that separates one sequence family from another (or one species from 
another) that works for all sequence families or all species.11
For evolved sequences, the distances can be used to infer a phylogenetic 
tree. A phylogenetic tree is the best representation of the hierarchy of relation-
ships between a set of sequences. There is no natural discrete classification 
of a set of homologous sequences into a subset of families. Breaking the set 
of sequences into more than one discrete family and assigning some sort of 
(taxonomy-like) name to these subsets must always be arbitrary, relying on some 
operational goal. Different reasonable people might break the same tree into 
different subsets to serve different goals.
Over evolutionary time, biological function changes in ways that are not 
fully predictable from evolutionary distance. A single residue change can change 
an agonist, an activator of some function, to an antagonist that blocks that very 
function. Exactly the same protein sequence can be found serving completely 
different functional roles, such as central metabolic enzymes that also function 
as “crystallins” to build the transparent lens in an eye, or iron-requiring meta-
bolic enzymes that also serve as regulatory proteins that turn other genes on 
and off in response to changing iron concentrations. It is only usually the case 
that homologous proteins have similar functions; the more closely related they 
are, the more likely they are to have more similar functions.
Those issues bring us back to the crucial difference between prediction 
and classification. We can classify a new sequence as being within a group of 
known sequences on a tree; we cannot necessarily predict the function that the 
11 That is, just as content (or a parts list) must be defined for each Select Agent, the distance must 
also be determined for each part of each Select Agent.
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sequence encodes. However, as long as our classification scheme does not mis-
label a non-Select Agent as a Select Agent, it may suffice operationally.
METHODS FOR SEQUENCE SUBFAMILY CLASSIFICATION
Armed with background about such sequence comparison programs as 
BLAST, evolutionary distances, evolutionary trees, and functional sequence 
subgroups as distinct clades on trees, we return to the problem of screening 
DNA sequence orders for Select Agents.
Screening for significant BLAST hits to a database of sequences of concern 
does not work, because the parts of Select Agents are homologous to parts of 
many non-Select Agent organisms. Many non-Select Agent organisms would 
trigger false-positive results.
No single threshold on BLAST score or E value solves this problem, be-
cause (to give just one reason) scores and E values depend on the length of the 
alignment, but different sequences of different genes have different lengths. No 
single threshold of percent identity will work, because some proteins are less 
conserved in sequence than others (that is, more tolerant of sequence differ-
ences while retaining function).
Intuitively, we would like to identify when a sequence is “closer” to a Select 
Agent sequence than to a non-Select Agent sequence. To do that, we must have 
a database not only of Select Agent sequences of concern, but also of at least a 
representative set of homologous non-Select Agent sequences that we are trying 
to distinguish from Select Agent sequences.
The simplest thing to do with the combined database is to look at the 
best BLAST hit for a new sequence: If the best BLAST hit is a Select Agent 
sequence, the new sequence is “closer” to a Select Agent than not.12
“Best BLAST match” classification is a reasonable and often used strategy, 
but it does not represent the state of the art in inferring subfamily classifications. 
Most important with “best match” it is hard to distinguish the case in which 
the new sequence belongs to a known subfamily (say, a Select Agent gene) from 
the case in which the new sequence is a member of a new subfamily (say, a 
 homologous non-Select Agent gene) that is not represented in the database yet. 
For example, if a sequence is only 30 percent identical to a Select Agent coding 
gene and 20 percent identical to the nearest known non-Select Agent homolog, 
but all known variants of the Select Agent gene are greater than 95 percent iden-
tical to each other, it is likely that the sequence is from a previously undescribed 
organism (because it falls well outside the expected range of variation within the 
known Select Agent sequences). A simple “best match” criterion nonetheless 
classifies the sequence as a Select Agent. That could be problematic if newly 
12 This is the method outlined in the DHHS Screening guidance for DNA Synthesis Companies 
(DHHS, 2009), and the combined database that it suggests is NCBI-Entrez.
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discovered organisms came to be classified as Select Agents solely because their 
closest known homolog in the database was a Select Agent, regardless of genetic 
distance or the disease-causing phenotype of the organism.
The state of the art in subfamily classification is called phylogenomic analy-
sis. The position of the new sequence in a tree of known homologous sequences 
that represent different functional subfamilies (or Select Agent and non-Select 
Agent sequences) is examined. If the new sequence falls within a clade on the 
tree that defines the observed range of variation in a subfamily, one can assign it 
to that subfamily with confidence. If the new sequence falls outside any known 
subfamily but is still homologous with the overall family, one would not assign 
it to a subfamily and instead would annotate it according to the more generally 
conserved features of the larger family. Phylogenomic analysis formalizes the 
intuitive idea of classifying sequences with their closest sequence relatives, while 
being careful to see the case in which a sequence is “novel,” falling outside the 
known range of variation of known nomenclature groups.
Phylogenomic analysis is usually done manually by human experts. The 
process of making high-quality phylogenetic trees involves several steps (col-
lecting representative sequences, making an accurate multiple alignment, and 
inferring a reliable sequence tree) that benefit from human judgment. There is 
a good deal of research into automating phylogenomic analysis, but one would 
probably not now seek to develop an automated high-reliability classification 
system based on explicitly tree-based phylogenomic inference.
The state of the art in automated subfamily classification uses models called 
profiles to represent each different subfamily. Especially in probabilistic form 
as what are called profile hidden Markov models (profile HMMs), a profile is 
a model of the space of possible sequences that belong to some group. Rep-
resentatives of the sequence group are identified and aligned into a multiple 
sequence alignment. Given a multiple sequence alignment, such software tools 
as HMMER build a profile of the alignmentin which each aligned column is 
represented by a position-specific scoring system that captures information 
about how conserved each residue is in any new homologous sequence that 
would belong to the sequence family. Profile HMMs calculate the likelihood 
that a new sequence “belongs” to the profile’s family. A comparison of two 
profile HMM scores is a hypothesis test for whether a new sequence belongs to 
one profile or the other. It allows experts to define protein or DNA sequence 
families of interest and to prebuild profiles that represent the sequences that 
belong to those families. New sequences are compared with profile libraries and 
automatically classified on the basis of profile score.
Profile-based classification is related to phylogenomic analysis. The main 
difference is that the phylogenetic tree is taken into account by human experts 
in building an appropriate set of profiles before any new sequences are analyzed; 
afterwards, the profile itself does not use an explicit phylogenetic tree. An 
expert identifies which subfamilies are of interest for classification and builds 
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a profile for each subfamily and for the entire family (and possibly at different 
levels of the hierarchy of the phylogenetic tree, capturing progressively smaller 
and more detailed levels of subfamily annotation).
For example, if a sequence analyst wanted to distinguish NAD-dependent 
malate dehydrogenases, NAD-dependent lactate dehydrogenases, and novel 
NAD-dependent dehydrogenases that might work on a novel substrate, she 
might produce a profile of known malate dehydrogenases, a second profile 
of known lactate dehydrogenases, and a third profile of all known NAD-
dependent dehydrogenases. If a new sequence is an NAD-dependent dehydro-
genase, it will probably get a significant score against all three profiles (because 
malate and lactate dehydrogenases are evolutionarily homologous and structur-
ally similar). If it is a lactate dehydrogenase, the highest score will (should) be 
to the lactate dehydrogenase profile; if it is a novel dehydrogenase, the highest 
score should be to the general dehydrogenase profile.
Large profile databases are in widespread use for protein-gene annotation. 
A good example of a large collection used for microbial gene function annota-
tion is the TIGRfams database at the J. Craig Venter Institute. For example, 
in TIGRfams, NAD-dependent L-lactate dehydrogenases are represented by 
model TIGR01771 (L-LDH-NAD), and bacterial NAD-dependent malate de-
hydrogenases are represented by model TIGR01763 (MalateDH_bact). TI-
GRfams does not include a general dehydrogenase profile to catch cases of 
novel dehydrogenases; instead it uses a strategy of predefining a curated score 
threshold for each family.
Different profile databases are in widespread use, aiming at different an-
notation goals with different levels of protein classification. TIGRfams is an 
example of a profile library that aims at functional protein subfamily classifica-
tion. In contrast, databases like Pfam and SMART aim at the “superfamily” 
level, aiming to capture the widest possible diversity of all remote homologs of 
protein families, regardless of functional classification. Pfam, for example, has 
a single profile (PF02615, Ldh_2) that classifies all NAD-dependent dehydro-
genases into a superfamily that includes both L-lactate and malate dehydro-
genases. Almost all profile libraries are based on the same underlying profile 
HMM approaches and use one of two software packages (SAM or HMMER).
Profile-based sequence classification is highly automatable because the 
classification system relies on a relatively stable set of sequence alignments of 
representative sequences that define the desired families. Thus, the classification 
system is relatively robust to the exponential growth of the sequence databases. 
In contrast, classification systems that rely on all-versus-all comparison of all 
known sequences tend to be unstable, and it is difficult to ensure their quality 
because the sequence database changes rapidly. A profile-based system can be 
developed, tested, and benchmarked with care by experts and then maintained 
and used stably over long time periods.
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OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE SYSTEM FOR PROFILE-
BASED CLASSIFICATION OF SELECT AGENTS
With current sequence analysis technology, it would be possible to develop 
an automated and precisely defined system for classifying genome sequences 
as to whether they are “complete” Select Agents. The system might look some-
thing like the following.
For each Select Agent, a minimal parts list would be identified by experts. 
It would be the set of genes that are thought necessary to make an infectious 
Select Agent genome. The parts list does not have to be exhaustively complete, 
because it is being used only to classify genomes, not to describe them fully; we 
might choose to include only a representative subset of the genes in a microbial 
genome to reduce the size of the classification system (and the work needed to 
create it). A genome that contained all the parts on the minimal parts list would 
be classified as a “complete, infectious” genome for operational purposes of the 
Select Agent Regulations. A genome that did not contain all of the parts would 
be a “genomic fragment” for the purposes of the Select Agent Regulations.
For each part, an automated profile-based classification system would be 
developed to differentiate the subfamily of sequences belonging to the Select 
Agent from the larger family of sequences belonging to non-Select Agent 
organisms. The specificity of these profiles would vary, some of them being 
very specific to only the Select Agent, and some of them being general and 
encompassing both Select Agent and non-Select Agent sequences. This step 
requires expert judgment. The more general models would allow the classifica-
tion system to deal with the possibility that some parts are substitutable (by 
synthetic biologists) with “generic” parts, so these profiles might be made at a 
more generic level—any RNA-dependent RNA replicase, rather than specifi-
cally the Select Agent RNA-dependent RNA replicase, for example. The more 
specific models would focus on the parts thought to be most responsible for 
pathogenicity as opposed to core replication, metabolism, and growth func-
tions. These specific models (as distinguished from the generic models) might 
be specially flagged to raise a flag to indicate that parts of a Select Agent are 
present even though a complete Select Agent genome is not, for the purposes 
of prudent follow-up on the part of a DNA synthesis company—for instance, if 
an order might represent an attempt to obtain a Select Agent genome in several 
individually legal pieces.
For each Select Agent, given a minimal parts list and a profile-based clas-
sification system for each part the classification system would be tested, bench-
marked, and challenged using known genome sequences. To be useful, the 
classification system would be required to classify correctly all known sequence 
variants of a Select Agent (and a set of reasonably imaginable ones), and a rep-
resentative set of the most closely related non-Select Agent genomes, including 
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very close relatives, such as vaccine strains or non-pathogenic variants used in 
laboratory research.
For good classification, it is not sufficient to know a single representative 
genome sequence of each Select Agent. Using a classification system is an at-
tempt to determine whether a novel sequence fits into the “cloud” of sequences 
representing expected genetic variation for a Select Agent genome, as opposed 
to the “clouds” of sequences representing the most closely related non-Select 
Agents. The more sequences are known, the better the expected genetic varia-
tion will be understood. Genome sequences of almost all Select Agents are 
available, but there has been less emphasis on obtaining genome sequences for 
closely related non-Select Agents. Future studies are sure to discover numerous 
new microbial and viral species, and it is desirable that these new discoveries 
not be misclassified as Select Agents just because they are closely related to Se-
lect Agents. More systematic genome sequencing of non-Select Agents would 
improve our knowledge of biodiversity and would be useful in developing a 
good classification system.
The profile classification system would have to be reviewed and revised, as 
new knowledge accrued that required newly discovered Select Agent or non-
Select Agent variants to be classified. The updating process would resemble 
the continuing curation of other profile library classification systems, such as 
TIGRfams and Pfam.
Because it is automatic and software-based, the classification system could 
be made readily and transparently available on the Web, where it could be re-
viewed and challenged by scientists in the community to be sure, for example, 
that it was not inadvertently misclassifying useful non-Select Agents, such as 
vaccines and attenuated research strains.13
Timely testing, updating, and public review of the system would guard 
against classification errors. Automated annotation of protein function based on 
sequence similarity analysis is robust but not error-free (Schnoes et al. 2009).
This essentially phylogenetics-based system will work better for some Se-
lect Agents than for others. The greatest difficulty in clasifying Select Agents 
with a phylogenetic subfamily system will occur in cases in which very closely 
related viruses in the same phylogenetic group that have small, easily evolved 
genetic changes that differentiate highly pathogenic Select Agent strains from 
low-pathogenicity non-Select Agent strains, that come and go in a phylogenetic 
tree; the “high-pathogenicity” avian influenza viruses are an example. Similar 
cases of convergent functional evolution arise in protein function annotation, 
in wihch a small number of changes in active site residues can shift a protein 
function and these changes convergently evolve multiple times in multiple lin-
eages. Alternative methods that key on critical functional residues have been 
13 This would require a process for reclassifying an agent in response to input from the scientific 
community.
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developed to deal with the problem for protein function annotation (Hannen-
halli and Russell 2000) and could be deployed and benchmarked for the Select 
Agent classification problem.
There will be cases in which any sequence-based classification system 
must fail altogether. For example, the bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) prion agent is on the Select Agent list, but prions are an alternatively 
folded conformation of a host protein; the amino sequence of the prion form 
of the protein is identical to the benign host form. The only way to distinguish 
the BSE prion from the natural host protein is by experimental assay.
There would be no pretense of prediction in this classification system. 
Many genomes would be classified as a Select Agent because they have all the 
parts of a Select Agent, but there is little reason to think that all those parts 
would necessarily work in concert to produce a working, infectious, patho-
genic organism; indeed, most synthetic genomes that had all the independent 
parts would probably not work as dependent wholes. From the standpoint 
of dealing with the implications of synthetic biology and synthetic genomes, 
the utility of the classification system would not be to distinguish successful 
genome designs from unsuccessful ones—“bootable” pathogens from inert 
DNA sequences—but to distinguish attempts to synthesize a dangerous ge-
nomes similar to a Select Agent from an attempt to synthesize benign genomes 
from a non-Select Agent organism, a non-pathogenic strain, or a vaccine. The 
classification system does not distinguish legitimate research from illegitimate 
research; rather it identifies agents that are restricted under the Select Agent 
Regulations and provides a means of identifying “sequences of concern” that 
may be worth monitoring.
The goal of the Select Agent Regulations is to restrict availability of the 
most dangerous known pathogens while not impeding beneficial biomedical re-
search on known or emerging pathogens. In dealing with synthetic biology and 
the potential threat posed by novel agents, our goal is to try to regulate the most 
obvious attempts to synthesize a potentially working pathogen, and the current 
state of the art in synthetic biology is the ability to produce new combinations 
of existing biological parts, not to devise new genomes entirely de noo. We can 
never exclude radically novel synthetic biology designs, but we can raise the bar 
to the point where bioterrorists would have to possess knowledge better than 
the current state of the art with respect to what biological parts are necessary 
in a pathogen to evade a parts-list-based Select Agent classification system or 
would have to engage in an offensive biological weapons research program on 
a scale that would come under the Biological Weapons Convention.
A classification system would clearly be the easiest to develop for Select 
Agents with the smallest parts lists. The easiest would be the protein toxins 
composed of one or a few proteins, such as abrin and ricin. The next easiest 
would be the proteins encoding the multistep synthetic pathways for metabolite 
toxins such as diacetoxyscirpenol, saxitoxin, and tetrodotoxin (on the presump-
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tion that this biosynthetic pathway might be moved in a modular form into a 
new host to create a new organism that expresses the toxin). Next would be the 
viruses, ranging from small genomes (such as Lassa virus) to large ones (such 
as smallpox). The microbial genomes would be the hardest to deal with, and 
would require the most thought about what parts are generic and what parts 
are specific to a Select Agent pathogen.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A 
PROFILE-BASED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
It is not the role of our committee to recommend specific implementation 
plans, nor are we properly constituted to do so. But we were tasked with de-
scribing an “alternative framework” for oversight, so it is appropriate to make 
some observations about implementing a profile-based sequence classification 
system along the lines discussed in this chapter.
To be useful for unambiguous regulations, there would need to be a single 
agreed-on classification system as opposed to multiple competing systems 
developed by different research groups. That would require a centralized fund-
ing plan that would balance the benefits of single source standardization by a 
single Select Agent classification system team against the need for oversight and 
review to maintain quality and efficiency in the absence of peer competition.
A classification system would require a small team of full-time staff to 
develop and maintain it. The sequence curation work required is substantial. 
Classifying the current 82 Select Agents would require 82 parts lists and on 
the order of several thousand different profiles for the parts, and each Select 
Agent classification would need to be carefully tested and maintained over time. 
That would be on the same scale as the curation effort involved in the current 
Pfam or TIGRfams databases for automated protein sequence annotation. The 
Pfam database, for example, consists of about 12,000 profiles of common pro-
tein domain families, maintained by four to six skilled full-time staff since the 
mid-1990s, including sequence analysts, database administrators, and software 
developers.
The curation team would need advice from a panel of leading scientists 
for each group of pathogens. The scientific advisory panels would need to 
meet regularly to review the relevant literature and research results and would 
need to develop and maintain up-to-date consensus on the parts lists and parts 
classifications that define suitable sequence spaces around each Select Agent. 
These defined sequence spaces would be embodied in an automated classifi-
cation system by the curation team. The classification system (and comments 
from the scientific community on its accuracy, gathered from the scientific 
community) could be reviewed by the appropriate government departments, 
and the database system would be approved as guidance in interpreting the law, 
much as the Centers for Disease Control issued a written document to guide 
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gene synthesis companies in interpreting the application of the Select Agent 
Regulations to synthetic DNA.
These scientific advisory panels would probably include not only U.S. 
scientists, but the best scientists from around the world. International partici-
pation would have intangible additional benefits. Gene synthesis is an interna-
tional industry; international harmonization of regulation and best practices 
for biosafety and biosecurity in synthetic genomics is an important area. In 
addition, participation of international scientists in the undertaking could raise 
awareness of dual-use issues among international researchers—a major objec-
tive of the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats14 and of the 
NSABB.
A balance would need to be struck between the need to keep definitions 
up to date with the state of scientific knowledge about the genetic composition 
of plausible complete and infectious Select Agent pathogens and the need to 
have a stable regulatory environment. It would be undesirable to have high-
consequence regulations like the Select Agent Regulations changing on a rapid 
time scale. It would be unreasonable, for example, to have sequences moving 
on and off the list on a time scale much faster than the time scale of converting 
a laboratory to meet the Select Agent Regulations. A suitable time scale might 
be to issue an updated classification system every two years. This is consistent 
with the current review process for the Select Agent Program, which is overseen 
by the Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Com-
mittee (ISATTAC).
The periodic expert review and update cycle could be meshed well with 
recommendations of other recent advisory reports calling for increased cross-
agency harmonization of the Select Agent Regulations, and for increased trans-
parency in the procedures for moving agents on and off the list.15
As we have discussed, the decisions made in establishing classification 
boundaries in sequence space are unavoidably arbitrary. They cannot be inter-
preted as biological predictions of whether given synthetic genome sequences 
would function as dangerous pathogens. Nevertheless, such a system would be 
an improvement over the current process. It would transparently, consistently, 
14 “Transform the international dialogue on biological threats: Activities targeted to promote a 
robust and sustained discussion among all nations as to the evolving biological threat and identify 
mutually agreed steps to counter it.”
15 2009 National Research Council report Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and 
Toxins, “RECOMMENDATION 2: To provide continued engagement of stakeholders in oversight 
of the Select Agent Program, a Biological Select Agents and Toxins Advisory Committee (BSATAC) 
should be established. The members, who should be drawn from academic/research institutions 
and the private sector, should include microbiologists and other infectious disease researchers 
(including Select Agent researchers), directors of BSAT laboratories, and those with experience in 
biosecurity, animal care and use, compliance, biosafety, and operations. Representatives from the 
federal agencies with a responsibility for funding, conducting, or overseeing Select Agent research 
would serve in an ex officio capacity . . .” (NRC 2009b).
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and unambiguously represent the harmonized views of a community of experts. 
A centralized system would almost certainly lead to better decisions than reli-
ance on a series of dispersed judgments by individual scientists in gene synthesis 
companies who have little specific knowledge about the pathogen sequences 
that they might be asked to synthesize.
It would be prudent to develop the system in phases, starting with a pilot 
project on a subset of the smallest Select Agent sequences, such as the protein 
toxins and the smallest Select Agent viruses. Several of the smallest Select Agent 
sequences are at the same time considered the most dangerous and feasible 
threats for current synthetic genomic technology, and also the smallest and 
easiest test cases for a profile-based classification system (because they require 
definition of the fewest parts).
ROLE OF PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION IN BIOSAFETY
Chapter 2 discussed how high-level biological phenotypes, such as patho-
genicity and transmissibility, cannot plausibly be predicted with the degree of 
certainty required for statutory biosecurity regulations, either now or in the 
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, predictive ability is a major goal of biology, 
and it is sure to develop. Any predictive ability will develop first in ways suited 
for probabilistic risk assessment—for raising potential biosafety concerns about 
an encoded organism—long before prediction reaches the far higher bar of 
making completely precise and accurate judgments suitable for declaring that 
novel synthetic constructs are dangerous weapons and immediately subject to 
Select Agent Regulations in the absence of actual experience with the encoded 
organism’s properties. Predictive systems biology will slowly give us a better 
ability to assess whether a synthetic genome sequence might be more or less 
hazardous and whether the organism that it encodes might be more or less likely 
to have the phenotypic properties of Select Agents. Therefore, to the extent that 
prediction of biological properties of Select Agents does become possible, we 
believe that it will first be useful in the context of a yellow flag biosafety warning 
system—warning investigators and their institutions and institutional biosafety 
committees (IBCs) that a synthetic construct might be hazardous, perhaps 
inadvertently so, and that the construct and its encoded organism ought to be 
handled with an appropriate level of biosafety containment.
The centralized classification system for pathogen sequences described 
above could inform biosafety judgments long before prediction has a substan-
tial impact. The two concepts of a minimal parts list for a complete pathogen 
and a profile-based classification system could help scientists to identify con-
structs that, although not complete pathogens within the definitions of the 
Select Agent Regulations, merit close scrutiny for their biosafety and biosecurity 
implications. Classification is not prediction, but it is completely plausible that 
constructs that are close to a minimal parts list for a pathogen or are similar 
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to a pathogen gene merit more thorough biosafety evaluation than constructs 
that are not.
RAISING A YELLOW FLAG FOR “SEQUENCES OF CONCERN”
A wide array of DNA sequences are in a category that, although not com-
pletely innocuous, should not be subject to the severe constraints on research 
imposed by the Select Agent Regulations. The Select Agent Regulations cover 
complete genomes (“nucleic acids that can produce infectious forms of any of 
the Select Agent iruses”—language that has been formally interpreted as ex-
cluding “genomic fragments from Select Agents”). There are many reasons for 
prudent concern about providing synthetic genomic fragments of Select Agents. 
A “bad actor” might seek to obtain a genome in fragments that individually 
did not meet the criteria of the Select Agent Regulations and then assemble the 
complete genome. The “bad actor” would be in violation of the Select Agent 
Regulations by constructing a complete genome, but from a regulatory perspec-
tive, we might want to make this technically plausible scenario more difficult 
to carry out and might want to have more advance notice when such a scenario 
might be playing out.
We would like to explore the concept of a “yellow flag” system that could 
provide a transition between the standard biosafety practices that are applied 
to the vast majority of research projects and the highly regulated, highly re-
strictive practices required by the Select Agent Regulations. (The concept of 
the yellow flag will also be discussed in Chapter 4 and Appendix L.) Our best 
chance to reduce public health risks posed by infectious disease is an active, 
efficient, and safe R&D program directed at known and emerging pathogens. 
This committee and others believe strongly that overbroad application of the 
Select Agent Regulations will increase risks to public health by increasing the 
cost and reducing the speed of critically important research on pathogens. The 
aim of the yellow flag is to provide a set of practices that improve safety and 
security without increasing the number of sequences that are covered by the 
Select Agent Regulations.
Restrictions on pathogen research have two primary goals: to make it 
harder for bad actors to use pathogens as weapons or as tools for bioterror and 
to avoid the accidental, inadvertent, or ill-advised production of hazardous 
constructs by well-meaning investigators. Meeting both goals through a yel-
low flag system probably requires some form of disclosure of the pathogenic 
sequences or experimental plans to scientists outside the groups carrying out 
the research. Thiat disclosure could involve centralized reporting of yellow flag 
sequences, public disclosure, or some kind of institutional review. A centralized 
system for reporting yellow flag sequences would allow detection of the simplest 
scheme for avoiding the Select Agent Regulations—splitting the order for a viral 
genome or a toxin between two different gene synthesis companies. It would 
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also enable intelligence analysis and monitoring of DNA sequence orders. Pub-
lic disclosure would offer the virtues of an open-source system—the power of 
review by many different observers—but it would require a substantial change 
in the culture of science. A standardized system for identifying “yellow flag” 
sequences coupled with biosafety review (and biosecurity monitoring) might 
offer the simplest approach to reducing risks.
We envision that the actions taken in response to a yellow flag could be 
informal, prudent best practices in that they fall outside the strict regulatory 
boundaries of the Select Agent Regulations. It would also be possible to use 
a yellow flag system in more formal ways. For example, an IBC or funding 
sponsor could ask that yellow-flagged synthetic constructs trigger some sort of 
special notification for purposes of oversight if for no other reason than to track 
what laboratories were in possession of such constructs. Similarly, DNA synthe-
sis companies might be asked to maintain records of yellow-flagged constructs 
that they provide, to facilitate forensic investigation in the event of the criminal 
construction of a complete Select Agent from synthetic parts.
The concept of raising a yellow flag on synthetic genomic constructs clearly 
overlaps with the biosecurity goals of the Select Agents Program—providing a 
sort of buffer zone that identifies individual Select Agent synthetic parts that 
do not rise to the precise inclusive definitions of the “complete, infectious” 
genomes that come under the Select Agent Regulations. Moreover, we view 
a yellow flag system more broadly from a biosafety perspective. We believe 
on intuitive grounds that the probability of accidental, inadvertent, or ill-
advised hazardous constructs by well-meaning investigators (including hobbyist 
biohackers) is much higher than the probability of deliberate weapons con-
structs,16 although neither probability can be estimated. A yellow flag system 
could help to build a web of reasonable oversight of synthetic genomic con-
structs. Investigators or biohackers could be warned if their constructs included 
potentially dangerous Select Agent-like parts, to be sure that they were aware 
and to be sure that they were prepared and equipped to handle the constructs 
appropriately. It would also be possible to expand the list of yellow flag parts 
used in profile-based classification beyond the Select Agents list to include 
other sequences of concern.
Initially, the “yellow flag” system could be based on the profile-based clas-
sification system described above, and best practices could be promulgated for 
how investigators, institutions, IBCs, and synthetic genomics companies should 
deal with constructs deemed to be “potentially risky.” As predictive methods 
are developed, they would naturally augment such risk assessments. Because the 
profile-based classification system would be transparently available in its func-
16 At the very least, those engaged in a deliberate weapons program are less likely to use DNA 
sysnthesis companies as a means of obtaining genomic fragments, when those companies are known 
to screen orders for “sequences of concern.”
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tion for the Select Agent Regulations, it would also be transparently available 
for parallel development of biosafety best practices of the yellow flag variety. 
That is, community awareness and best practices for responsibility, review, and 
oversight of biosafety of synthetic constructs could be developed now, starting 
with the profile-based classification system, and this biosafety framework would 
then be in place as scientifically sound de noo predictive systems develop.
SHOULD SUCH A SYSTEM BE BUILT?
All that said, should such a profile-based classification system be built? Our 
committee is not constituted to answer that question. Our answer to this part 
of our charge is that it could be built.
Together, the profile-based classification for Select Agents, and the yellow 
flag system for sequences of concern would address many of the emerging bios-
ecurity concerns posed by synthetic biology. Gene synthesis companies, which 
have to make daily judgments based on the Select Agent Regulations and other 
regulations, strongly favor development of such a system. As discussed in Chap-
ter 1, several of the companies have agreed to a common set of procedures for 
screening customers and sequences. In addition to helping to identify sequences 
that qualify as Select Agents, the parts list profile-based classification system 
would provide information to be used for flagging sequences of concern. The 
companies have agreed to apply enhanced customer screening to orders that do 
not meet the definition of the Select Agent Regulations but do include Select 
Agent sequences or other pathogen sequences. The goal of such screening is 
to supply sequences only to customers that have a legitimate research use for 
them and have the resources to handle them safely.
The system could also have utility that is independent of its role in clarify-
ing the regulation of pathogen sequences. One of the most consistent lessons 
of modern biological research is that cross-pollination between diverse fields 
of expertise consistently yields valuable scientific insights and useful new 
tools (NRC 2009b). Gathering information on the most important human and 
animal pathogens into a single, consistently annotated database will make it 
easier for scientists and engineers who are not experts on a particular patho-
gen to develop new diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics.
However, the system we have described does have some objectionable 
qualities. It may be “overkill.” It erects a moderately complicated and pe-
dantic definitional framework around the purely regulatory question of what 
sequences represent complete, infectious Select Agents or not.
One might take an alternative view that the regulatory language could 
be clarified more simply and elegantly with a language of “reasonableness,” 
expressing the concepts of sequence classification methods we have described 
here but without the potential heavy-handedness of a centralized automated 
computational implementation. For instance, there might be regulations and 
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guidelines that declare the intuitive notion that a synthetic genome is “rea-
sonably” expected to be complete and infectious and that the sequence of its 
parts would appear to a “reasonable” person to be closer to that of a Select 
Agent reference sequence than to that of the nearest non-Select Agent refer-
ence sequence. Such language alone would be an improvement over the use of 
problematic percent identity thresholds in some current regulatory language, 
and over the absence of any guidance at all for dealing with modified or chime-
ric Select Agent synthetic genomes. The intuitive concepts of sequence-based 
classification are sufficiently clear for anyone to know whether a sequence is in 
the vicinity of any reasonable definition of the line. However, a “reasonable-
ness” approach does not solve the problem of vagueness that troubles the DNA 
synthesis companies, researchers, and law enforcement as they try to apply the 
Select Agent Regulations. Without a precise definition of the sequences cov-
ered by the Select Agent Regulations, companies might choose to reject any 
construct that contains Select Agent-related sequences, and researchers are left 
unsure whether they are subject to the Select Agent Regulations. Moreover, the 
reasonableness approach does not begin to address the issue of novel synthetic 
constructs and sequences of concern, which are a motivator for the develop-
ment of an alternative framework for oversight.
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4
Committee Findings and Conclusions
This chapter summarizes key findings and major conclusions. As discussed 
below, the committee finds that it is not feasible to develop an accurate over-
sight system based on prediction. However, a gene sequence based classification 
system for Select Agents and a “yellow flag” biosafety system for “sequences of 
concern” could be developed with current technologies. The classification sys-
tem discussed in Chapter 3 (see also Appendix L) could provide much needed 
clarification regarding application of the Select Agent Regulations. The “yellow 
flag” system could provide a means of guidance and oversight for “sequences of 
concern.” The “yellow flag” system would function as an extension of biosafety; 
however, because it is not regulatory in nature, it could provide information 
relevant to biosecurity in a more dynamic and timely fashion than the Select 
Agent Regulations.
The committee has identified crucial components that would enable such 
systems. Although the individual near-term milestones, as described, may be 
beneficial to scientific progress and would probably improve the current bio-
safety and biosecurity system, careful consideration should also be given to the 
limitations and challenges of developing and implementing these or similar 
systems.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
(1.) Purpose of the Select Agent Program: The Select Agent Program 
is intended to restrict access to known agents that pose a threat to 
biosecurity.
 (a.) The Select Agent Program is intended to focus on biosecurity, rather 
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than biosafety.1 As discussed in Chapter 1, biosafety and biosecurity are re-
lated and complementary, but there are important distinctions. Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (CDC/NIH 2007) defines biosafety 
programs as those which “reduce or eliminate exposure of individuals and the 
environment to potentially hazardous biological agents,” whereas the objective 
of biosecurity is to “prevent loss, theft or misuse of microorganisms, biological 
materials, and research-related information” (CDC/NIH 2007). Biosafety is 
reducing the risk that pathogens or toxins will escape containment and cause 
illness in researchers, clinicians, or the general public. Biosecurity is related to 
minimizing the possibility that such pathogens will be used for malevolent pur-
poses.2 The BMBL sets standards for how U.S. laboratories conduct research 
with biological agents and toxins; the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee 
(RAC) and Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) provide guidance and 
oversight focused on biosafety.3 This is a robust and effective system. In fact, 
if the purpose of the Select Agent Regulations were solely biosafety, it would 
largely be an unnecessary duplication. However, the primary role of the Select 
Agent Regulations is to restrict access to agents that may be used as biological 
weapons by someone with nefarious intent. There is a good deal of overlap 
between biosafety and biosecurity threats in that the pathogens deemed to pose 
1 This section draws on discussion in the 2009 National Research Council report “Responsible 
Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins.”
2 The 2009 National Research Council report states:“[i]t should be noted that the use of the 
term “biosecurity” presents a number of difficulties. At its most basic, the term does not exist 
in some languages, or is identical with “biosafety”; French, German, Russian, and Chinese are 
all examples of this immediate practical problem. Even more serious, the term is already used to 
refer to several other major international issues. For example, to many “biosecurity” refers to the 
obligations undertaken by states adhering to the Convention on Biodiversity and particularly the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which is intended to protect biological diversity from the potential 
risks posed by living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. (Further informa-
tion on the Convention may be found at <http://www.cbd.int/convention/> and on the Protocol 
at <http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/>.) “Biosecurity” has also been narrowly applied to efforts to 
increase the security of dangerous pathogens, either in the laboratory or in dedicated collections; 
guidelines from both the World Health Organization (WHO 2004) and the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2007) use this more restricted meaning of the term. 
In an agricultural context, the term refers to efforts to exclude the introduction of plant or animal 
pathogens. (See NRC 2009a:8-9 for a discussion of this and other issues related to terminology.) 
Earlier NRC reports (2004ab, 2006, 2009a) confine the use of “biosecurity” to policies and practices 
to reduce the risk that the knowledge, tools, and techniques resulting from research would be used 
for malevolent purposes.”
3 The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) assisted the NIH in the development of the 
NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, which has become the stan-
dard of safe scientific practice in the use of recombinant DNA. Institutional Biosafety Committees 
(IBCs) which are mandated by the NIH Guidelines, are charged with reviewing research involving 
recombinant DNA, although many IBCs have chosen to review other forms of research that involve 
potential biohazards—including research involving Biological Select Agent and Toxins (BSATs). 
Institutions are required to register their IBCs with NIH’s Office of Biotechnology Activities.
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as the greatest biosafety risk (BSL-4 agents) are all Select Agents; however, not 
all Select Agents pose substantial risk to individual public health (for example, 
BSL-2 agents may be Select Agents). An agent may pose a security risk because 
of its potential for weaponization or adverse economic consequences, rather 
than direct effect on human health.
Handling of Select Agents requires controlled access to facilities, physical 
security, inventory control, and site-specific risk assessments. Everyone who 
has access to Select Agents must be cleared through the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division with a background 
check. Failure to meet the requirements may result in criminal penalties of fines 
and up to 10 years of imprisonment. Thus, the Select Agent Regulations can be 
reasonably viewed as an instrument of law enforcement to facilitate attribution4 
and prosecution in the event of domestic use or, deliberate or inadvertent pos-
session of potential biological weapons.
 (b.) The Select Agent Program necessarily focuses on the known. The 
Select Agent Program is intended to limit access to agents that there is reason 
to believe could be used as weapons—essentially to remove the “low-hanging 
fruit” and make it more difficult for persons with nefarious intent to obtain or 
create a bioweapon. The Select Agent Regulations work primarily and most ef-
fectively in the context of possession and transfer of known stocks—providing 
a “chain of custody” 5—in which names and Select Agent status are propagated 
4 Microbial forensics plays an important role in attribution efforts. Microbial forensics, also called 
bioforensics, is a relatively new scientific discipline that draws from other disciplines including ge-
nomics, microbiology and plant pathology. Microbial forensics is dedicated to analyzing microbial 
activity as evidence for attribution purposes and backtracking. Microbial forensics procedures sup-
port ‘decision taking’ at biosecurity levels, follows strict chain of custody of specimens and demands 
a rigorous (accredited) and unbiased performance. Therefore, microbial forensics includes the 
complete range of forensic evidence analysis from microorganisms to associated evidence materials 
found at the site of a suspected outbreak or crime scene.
5 The term chain of custody can be used on several different scales of resolution. On the grossest 
scale, it is sometimes used to describe the provenance of a physical sample of an organism. For 
example, after the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, a large effort was expended to attempt to trace the 
provenance of all the Ames strains at laboratories in the United States. Lack of comprehensive 
recordkeeping before the Select Agent rules made that a difficult and imprecise process at best. 
On a medium scale, chain of custody as applied to a single laboratory now is used to mean the 
strict recordkeeping that allows knowledge of which staff had access to the locked laboratories 
and locked freezers or cabinets where the Select Agent organisms are stored and knowledge of 
all dispositions of materials that have taken place within the laboratory. On the finest scale of 
resolution, chain of custody has a specific meaning related to evidence handling for a potential 
court case: written records of each person and each procedure followed and sealed evidence bags 
documenting all the physical containers that held the Select Agent material in the different process 
steps (tubes, plates, and so on). In this report we refer mainly to the two larger-scale resolutions 
of chain of custody.
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in a well-defined manner from registered sender to registered recipient of Select 
Agent cultures.
 As discussed throughout this report, Select Agents are defined according 
to a taxonomic list of known bacteria, viruses, toxins, and fungi. Novel agents, 
whether natural or synthetic, are not covered by the Select Agent Regulations. 
When a novel agent emerges, it is named, and research is initiated to study its 
mechanism of action, the potential threat that it presents, and its susceptibility 
to countermeasures. After knowledge is obtained, an agent may be considered 
for inclusion on the Select Agent list. It is a deliberate process. The Select Agent 
Regulations are appropriately backwards-looking and based on a list of known 
agents. They are intended to protect the nation by restricting the availability of 
agents that are known from actual experience to be dangerous, that can be use-
fully controlled by “chain of custody” measures, and that have a high potential 
for biowarfare or bioterror. A list of named agents is in fact a reasonable model 
for the Select Agent Regulations despite the serious problems and ambiguities 
inherent in assigning discrete taxonomic identities to a continuum of biological 
organisms.
(2.) “Select Agent-ness” has biological and non-biological compo-
nents. The Select Agent designation depends on a variety of considerations. 
Some of these are biological (such as virulence, transmissibility, dissemination, 
and ability to be weaponized); but others are not (such as public perception, 
economic impact, intelligence data, availability of countermeasures, and natural 
prevalence). Because the security threat posed by an agent is not determined 
by biological criteria alone, Select Agent status can never be predicted from 
sequence alone. “Select Agent” is not a scientific description; it is a policy 
designation.
(3.) Biology is not binary. Microorganisms are not either “potential weap-
ons of mass destruction” or “of no concern.” No single characteristic makes 
a microorganism a pathogen, and no clear-cut boundaries that separate a 
pathogen from a non-pathogen. Pathogenic microorganisms are not defined 
by taxonomy; it is common for a microbial species to have pathogenic and 
non-pathogenic members. An agent has multiple biological attributes, and the 
degree to which they are expressed falls along a spectrum for each biological 
characteristic;6 consequently, agents pose varying degrees of risk.7
6 For example, one microorganism may be highly virulent, but poorly transmissible from person 
to person, whereas another may spread easily but produce only mild illness.
7 As described in Chapter 1, there are many ways to categorize microorganisms according to risk: 
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories biosafety levels 1-4; National Institutes of 
Health guidelines risk groups 1-4; Centers for Disease Control bioterrorism agents categories A, 
B, and C; and the Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Threat Assessment and the 
Select Agents list, which currently is not stratified according to risk.
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 Moreover, the genes and sequences that could potentially be used to 
create a bioweapon come from all of biology. For instance, a human sequence, 
such as interleukin-4, could be appropriated to trigger a severe immunological 
response and cause illness or death. Likewise, a toxin gene from a plant could, 
in theory, be incorporated into a bioweapon. Microorganisms are by no means 
the only source of sequences of concern. Biology is diverse and dynamic and 
has many unclear boundaries. No single criterion or absolute threshold can 
be applied to identify biological threats. The biosafety framework uses several 
levels of containment to addresse the various degrees of risk posed by a mi-
croorganism or experiment using several levels of containment. Because of the 
complexity of biology, a microorganism or an experiment is best evaluated and 
best overseen case by case.
(4.) It is not feasible to predict pathogenicity from sequence now, 
and it will not be in the foreseeable future. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
sequence prediction in biology is subject to a hierarchy of difficulty that reflects 
the complexity of the system under analysis. The simplest of such predictions 
would probably be that of a single protein. Next in order of predictive difficulty 
would be a genetic pathway (a group of co-regulated multiple proteins that act 
in concert). The third simplest set of sequences to evaluate as a means of fore-
casting function are those of whole organisms alone in a controlled environment 
(multiple pathways act in concert). The most difficult predictive situation would 
be one in which two or more organisms interact in their natural environment.8 
It is that last level of complexity may give rise to the key biological attributes 
of pathogenicity and transmissibility, which contribute to the criteria that form 
the basis of inclusion of an organism on the Select Agents list.
 Predicting pathogenicity, transmissibility, or environmental stability of a 
microorganism requires a detailed understanding of multiple attributes of the 
pathogen, its host, and its environment. It is a prediction problem of the great-
est complexity. By the time we have a general ability to predict host-pathogen 
interactions on the basis of pathogen genome sequence alone, we will probably 
have solved a number of other major problems in biology (such as developing 
a vaccine for HIV, curing the common cold, and achieving personalized medi-
cine). It might never be possible to predict pathogenicity from sequence at a 
level of certainty that would be required for legal statutes, such as the Select 
Agent Regulations, that require definitive accuracy as opposed to probabilistic 
risk assessment. Reliable prediction of the hazardous properties of pathogens 
from their genome sequence alone will require an extraordinarily detailed un-
derstanding of host, pathogen, and environment interactions integrated at the 
systems, organism, population, and ecosystem levels. For the foreseeable future, 
8 Consider, the enormous number of gene sequences at play and which must be choreographed as 
a microorganism leaves the salivary gland of a biting insect and is injected into the human tissues.
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the only reliable predictor of the hazard posed by a biological agent is actual 
experience with it. High-level phenotypes like pathogenicity and transmissibil-
ity cannot now plausibly be predicted with the degree of certainty required 
for regulatory purposes, and it will probably not be possible in the foreseeable 
future.9
(5.) Prediction and design are linked. Design and prediction go hand in 
hand; our lack of predictive ability in biology also means that we cannot design 
genomes de noo. If we lack the ability to predict an organism’s phenotype from 
its genome sequence, we necessarily lack the ability to design a novel genome 
sequence with a desired phenotype. Designing a self-replicating organism that 
has only to interact with simple molecules in a test tube is difficult; designing a 
pathogen that has to interact with a complicated host, evade the host’s immune 
system, and be transmissible in the natural environment adds daunting layers 
of biological complexity. There are very few cases in which a single protein 
sequence has been designed to fold in a particular novel way. The first few mod-
est successes in de noo design of single proteins constitute the current state 
of the art. Synthetic biology cannot be used to design and create an entirely 
novel pathogen, for exactly the same reasons that we cannot predict whether 
a genome sequence will be that of a pathogen. Without predictive ability, de-
signers cannot know whether their designed sequences will work. The “entirely 
novel synthetic bioweapon” scenario is not plausible. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is possible, and even routine, to modify known organisms and to 
construct chimeras.
(6.) Synthetic genomics poses three threat scenarios that would 
allow a “bad actor” to obtain a pathogenic organism with Select 
Agent properties; one of them (modified Select Agents) is of most im-
mediate concern. Chapter 3 described three scenarios in order of increasing 
technical difficulty, and therefore decreasing likelihood: modified pathogens; 
chimeric pathogens; and designed pathogens. More likely scenarios should be 
addressed before there is inordinate worry about less likely ones. The Select 
Agent Regulations are intended to control facile access to the most danger-
ous known pathogens. Synthetic genomics is beginning to make it possible 
to obtain pathogens by synthesis without the need for access to a live culture 
of an agent. A high degree of technical sophistication and great expense are 
necessary to synthesize and “boot” a known Select Agent genome, and an even 
higher degree of sophistication is required to produce a non-trivially modified 
9 It is important to note that identifying hazardous pathogens or experiments is not the same as 
distinguishing experiments that are legitimate from those that are illegitimate. Legitimate research 
aimed at understanding pathogenicity and treating infectious disease often requires work with 
biological hazards.
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Select Agent genome (a synthetic genome derived from a Select Agent with a 
small number of additions, deletions, and modifications of genes) that would 
be likely to function; nonetheless, these are the most plausible (if unlikely) “ga-
rage laboratory” scenarios. Non-trivial chimeric constructions (more wholesale 
rearrangement and “assembly” of parts from different organisms into a novel 
whole) are extraordinarily challenging and would almost certainly require large 
laboratory resources and iterative optimization in an experimental testing pro-
gram in susceptible hosts, contravening the Biological Weapons Convention 
(The committee sees the realm of chimeric genomes as beyond the regulatory 
scope of the Select Agent Regulations). De noo design remains essentially 
infeasible. Thus the committee believes that the most pressing issues raised 
in connection with the Select Agent Regulations by synthetic genomics and 
synthetic biology involve the synthesis or modification of known Select Agent 
genomes or modifications of known Select Agent genomes.
(7.) There is an important distinction between sequence-based pre-
diction and sequence-based classification.
 Prediction of complex biological properties is not currently feasible, 
just as design of an entirely novel pathogen de noo is not possible. For the 
foreseeable future, synthetic genomics and synthetic biology will be done by 
modification and rearrangement of genes that already exist in nature. If we as-
sume the most plausible threat to come from modifications and rearrangements 
of genes from known Select Agent genomes, we can anticipate the most likely 
“space” of possible modifications and most obviously worrisome chimeras that 
might create a genome that encodes Select Agent properties. Because we can 
use sequence analysis to recognize genes and genomes and classify them into 
known families, we can use sequence analysis to designate particular genome 
sequences unambiguously as equivalent to “complete, infectious” Select Agents 
and to identify “sequences of concern.”
 Sequence-based classification is strictly operational—a set of tools for 
drawing decision boundaries around known sequences that do and do not be-
long to a desired classification. The tools are used now for robust and automatic 
classification of gene sequences into usefully annotated sequence families. For 
an operational definition of a complete Select Agent genome, we can define a 
parts list of genes that are thought to be necessary, although not sufficient, to 
make up a biologically functional Select Agent genome. We might even choose 
to simplify a classification system deliberately by defining an operationally 
“complete” genome as having a necessary subset of parts rather than a com-
plete set. We should be able to establish a reasonable operational definition of 
the sequence space circumscribing complete agent genomes, as distinct from 
incomplete genomes or complete genomes of related non-Select Agents thus 
establishing a “brighter line,” an unambiguous procedure for deciding when a 
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genome sequence is assigned one of the taxonomic names on the Select Agent 
list.
 Determining whether a sequence really does encodes a viable, functional, 
“infectious form” of a Select Agent is an empirical experimental question, and 
will long remain beyond any foreseeable predictive ability in biology. However, 
for the purposes of sequence-based classification, we do not need to have com-
plete knowledge. Partial knowledge reflects the state of current knowledge, 
suffices for an operational definition that partitions sequence space in a way 
that avoids the misclassification of non-Select Agent genomes (such as those 
of vaccine strains or related non-pathogenic species) while trying to “deny” 
the spaces encompassing the modifications of Select Agent genomes that could 
most plausibly still encode a Select Agent pathogen.
(8.) Sequence-based classification could be used to address an im-
mediate challenge raised by synthetic genomics.
 Synthetic genomics is increasingly making it possible to obtain Select 
Agents by synthesis rather than by access to a live laboratory culture and to 
create modifications that blur taxonomic classification boundaries yet still might 
be expected to function as a Select Agent. Because the Select Agent Regula-
tions cover creation, transfer, and possession of complete synthetic genomes, 
not just those of viable Select Agents, gene and genome synthesis companies, 
for example, need to know unambiguously whether a customer’s order is for a 
synthetic Select Agent genome or not. A sequence-based classification system 
could provide a high degree of clarity—for investigators, biohobbyists, syn-
thesis companies, and law-enforcement officials—about what DNA sequences 
are subject to the Select Agent Regulations and which ones are not. The cur-
rent boundaries are unclear, and this does not seem appropriate for high-
consequence regulations like the Select Agent Regulations.
(9.) Sequence-based classification could also be used to define se-
quences of concern that are not themselves Select Agents, but that 
may nonetheless constitute a threat.
 One might argue that a disadvantage of bright line classification of Select 
Agent genomes is that the “bad actor” knows where the line is, too, and so can 
try to skirt it. What happens if the bad actor orders a Select Agent genome 
in pieces from different companies, or introduces just enough changes into 
a synthetic genome to evade Select Agent classification, or creates an entirely 
unexpected chimera from non-Select Agent parts?
 One answer to that concern is that the Select Agent Regulations can make 
acquisition of Select Agents only more difficult, not impossible. It is already 
the case that Select Agents can be collected from the wild rather than obtained 
from a registered laboratory. A classification system could be designed to recog-
nize the most plausible modified genomes and even the most obvious chimeric 
genomes that, according to the current state of the art, would (a) have some 
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possibility of encoding an agent with Select Agent properties and (b) have little 
possibility of encoding an agent that should not be considered an Select Agent. 
The Select Agent list and the associated classification system would be updated 
as the state of the art advanced. Of course, a person with nefarious intent might 
be able to do better than the current state of the art in the scientific community, 
but this ought to be unlikely.
 A second answer to the concern is that it is not and should not be the 
purpose of the Select Agent Regulations to regulate novel agents, any more than 
it is the purpose of the Select Agent Regulations to regulate access to novel 
emerging diseases in nature. To prohibit possession and transfer of de noo 
agents at the point of their synthesis would require the kind of forward-looking 
predictive system that we find infeasible. Rather, the Select Agent Regulations 
implement a necessarily backward-looking system based on a taxonomy of 
known Select Agents—already known from experience to be extraordinarily 
dangerous. If a new agent is found to be extraordinarily dangerous, it can be 
added to the Select Agent list, whether it is a naturally emerging pathogen or 
a synthetic. Initially, that may sound like closing the barn door after the horse 
is gone if we imagine a sophisticated bioterrorist engaged in designing novel 
agents; but it seems far more plausible that a novel agent would be discovered 
first as a newly emerging disease in nature or by accident in the course of le-
gitimate biotechnology research.
 The committee has a third answer. It is useful to identify suspicious se-
quences of concern that might be parts of a Select Agent or a bioweapon threat, 
even if they do not make up a complete genome subject to the Select Agents 
Regulations. As long as the response to a sequence of concern is flexible and 
does not immediately trigger regulatory or law-enforcement intervention, this 
can be a gray area, not a bright line. A sequence-based classification system 
would inherently organize and condense the current state of knowledge about 
the genomic composition of dangerous pathogens. The same system could be 
used to identify partial genomes and suspicious parts in the gray area, trigger-
ing common-sense follow-up. For example, a DNA-synthesis company might 
contact a customer to be sure that the customer is legitimate, and the customer 
knows that what is being ordered might be considered dangerous. A sequence-
based classification system could help to make the identification of sequences of 
concern more systematic and consistent in the synthetic genomics community. 
Our committee referred to this as a yellow flag system (Figure 4.1, right side).
(10.) As predictive ability develops in biology, it will be more appro-
priate to use it in the context of probabilistic risk assessment (such 
as the yellow flag system), not in rigid classification of Select Agent 
properties.
 The ability to predict biological properties from genome sequence will 
come gradually in a long series of steps of refinement and slowly increasing 
accuracy. For all the reasons described in Chapter 2, it is not reasonable to 
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expect predictive technology to reach the accuracy necessary for defining Select 
Agents. However, we found it natural to think of the slowly increasing accuracy 
of predictive methods in the context of probabilistic risk assessment, in which 
the uncertainty of a prediction can be weighted appropriately. Advances in 
predictive technology might gradually become a counterpart of a “yellow flag” 
warning and biosafety framework that was initially based only on sequence-
based classification. (As noted throughout this report, the classification and 
“yellow flag” system are presented as proposals for consideration; they should 
not be read as recommendations.)
The Yellow Flag System
The yellow flag system would have two primary goals: (1) to make it harder 
for bad actors to obtain pathogens as weapons or as tools for bioterror without 
detection and (2) to avoid the accidental, inadvertent, or ill-advised production 
of hazardous constructs by well-meaning investigators.
The yellow flag system would comprise four main elements: a centralized 
biosafety sequence database, annotation of the sequences as empirical evidence 
of the function of the genes encoded by the sequences is acquired, a process 
for review and assessment of the evidence to determine the disposition of the 
sequence of concern, and a yellow flag of the sequences that are deemed “of 
concern” (see Fig 4.1, right side).
There are many avenues by which a sequence might be deposited in the 
database and given a yellow flag, including but not restricted to the following: 
a researcher may observe that the gene product increases pathogenicity, the 
sequence may be derived from a known Select Agent and is in a region known 
to be critical for causing disease, or the disease-causing characteristic is elimi-
nated when the sequence is deleted from a known pathogen. Movement of a 
sequence into the database can be dynamic because the system is not regulatory 
and a yellow flag does not restrict access to the sequence. This database system 
is intended to serve as a resource for information sharing.
Once a sequence is deposited in the biosafety database, it serves as a refer-
ence for anyone carrying out relevant investigations and for gene synthesis com-
panies that would be able to compare their orders with entries in the database, 
screening for yellow flags. If a match occurs, the company would have a basis 
for notifying the purchaser of the possible concern and would request that any 
research results that support or refute the cause for concern be contributed to 
the annotations associated with the sequence in question. Similarly, other re-
searchers carrying out experiments involving analysis of the function of yellow 
flag sequences would also be encouraged to provide follow-up information or 
references.
Scientific workgroups would be charged to analyze the annotations and 
make determinations as to whether the degree of concern is sufficient to merit 
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consideration as a Select Agent, needs further study, or should be cleared of 
the yellow flag. A sequence may be removed from the database system entirely, 
although it is reasonable to retain the information in the database and indicate 
that the sequence has been examined and cleared. The database system would 
probably grow to include a variety of biosafety information, and only a subset 
of the sequences in the database would have yellow flags. It is important that, 
like the Select Agent list, the yellow flag system be fluid; sequences should be 
examined and yellow flags removed when they are unwarranted. The authority 
and resources necessary to make the process work should be provided centrally 
as a function supporting both biosafety and biosecurity.
We envision actions taken in response to a yellow flag as informal, prudent 
best practices, in that they fall outside the strict regulatory boundaries of the Se-
lect Agent Regulations. However, it would also be possible to use a yellow flag 
system in more formal ways. For example, an IBC or funding sponsor could ask 
that yellow-flagged synthetic constructs trigger special notification for purposes 
of oversight to track what laboratories were in possession of yellow-flagged con-
structs. Similarly, DNA synthesis companies might be asked to maintain records 
of yellow-flagged constructs that they provide to customers to facilitate forensic 
investigation in the event of criminal construction of a complete Select Agent 
from synthetic parts. Finally, a centralized system for reporting orders of yellow 
flag sequences could be developed to allow detection of the simplest scheme for 
avoiding the Select Agent Regulations—splitting the order for a viral genome 
or a toxin between two different gene synthesis companies.
A yellow flag biosafety system as described here would complement the 
Select Agent Regulations by providing oversight that is broad and flexible. It 
would identify sequences that potentially pose a risk without diverting atten-
tion from recognized threats or imposing restrictions and adding burden to the 
scientific community.
NEAR-TERM10 MILESTONES FOR SEQUENCE-
BASED CLASSIFICATION
The committee’s analysis of sequence-based classification in Chapter 3 
stems from a broad interpretation of its charge. However, it is the only positive 
and constructive response that the committee identified to address the chal-
lenges that synthetic genomics and synthetic biology pose to the Select Agent 
Regulations. The primary direction we were asked to consider, prediction of 
biological properties from sequences, is not feasible now and probably will 
10 Near-term is used here to indicate that the milestones are not dependent upon future techno-
logical advances. The technical capabilities and biological knowledge needed to achieve them are 
available now. Several of these milestones would improve and evolve but they could be started now, 
and substantial progress could be made within 5 years.
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not be in the foreseeable future. The sequence-based classification discussed 
in Chapter 3 is technologically feasible and may improve the current system. 
However, such a system has limitations and potential adverse consequences.11 
Therefore, we do not specifically recommend that it be implemented. Rather, 
we offer the two following recommendations:
• The sequence space around each discrete taxonomic name on the 
Select Agent list should be clearly defined, so that Select Agent sta-
tus can be unambiguously determined from a genome sequence (for 
example, by a DNA synthesis company).
  The sequence space should be broad enough to include the plau-
sible modifications and chimeras that experts reasonably believe will 
probably also act as Select Agents, without encompassing existing 
non-Select Agents.
• A sequence-based classification system could address this problem, 
and should be considered and weighed against the cost and complex-
ity of implementing this technological augmentation to the current 
Select Agent Regulations.
Specific milestones or research areas that would aid in implementing a 
sequence-based classification system are presented below. (Appendix L pres-
ents additional near-term milestones for consideration.)
(a.)  A sequence database with a Select Agent focus: The computa-
tional sequence analysis technologies used for sequence-based classi-
fication define sequence spaces that circumscribe the known variation 
of sequences that are considered to belong to a useful name while 
excluding the known variation of sequences that are considered to be 
attached to different names (see Figure 3.1). A necessary precondition 
is to have a number of representative sequences that belong to the de-
sired classification and a number of the most closely related sequences 
that do not belong. It is not sufficient to know a single representative 
genome sequence of each Select Agent. The more sequences that are 
known, the better the expected genetic variation will be understood. 
To provide a sound foundation for sequence-based classification of 
existing Select Agents, a comprehensive sequence database should be 
created that thoroughly covers naturally occurring genetic variation 
based on geographic distribution, ecological or laboratory adaptations, 
and those associated with clinical severity or attenuation. The database 
should include not only Select Agent sequences, but also a representa-
tive set of near-neighbors for each Select Agent.
11 Including dual-use concerns, as discussed below. (See also Appendix L.)
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(b.)  An expanding sequence database of all biology: There are mas-
sive gaps in our knowledge of the genetic characteristics of much of 
the biological world. Genome and metagenome sequencing is rapidly 
closing some of the gaps in some groups of organisms but not oth-
ers. For example, it would be useful to know much more about viral 
and microbial biodiversity in nature. Many new emerging pathogens 
(such as Nipha, SARS-CoV, and H5N1) were animal pathogens that 
suddenly jumped the species barrier; more sequence coverage of the 
viral and bacterial phylogenetic landscapes encoded in animal reser-
voirs would help in anticipating, monitoring, and responding quickly 
to future threats. Such a sequence database could be used to help to 
identify sequences of concern that may be appropriate to monitor in 
the yellow flag system in the interests of biosafety and biosecurity.
(c.)  Define the Criteria for Select Agent Designation: The criteria 
for designating a pathogen as a Select Agent should be reviewed and 
clearly defined to allow unambiguous implementation of the Select 
Agent Regulations. The Select Agent Regulations are based in law and 
backed up by serious penalties. However, the criteria for designation 
of a pathogen as a Select Agent are not well established and include 
characteristics that are independent of biological or genomic char-
acteristics. It is not always evident to the regulated community why 
particular agents are included on the list. Each agent that is designated 
as a Select Agent should have a readily justifiable reason for such desig-
nation. The criteria for Select Agent designation should be made clear 
and should focus on biosecurity concerns. Agents that do not meet the 
criteria (whether biological and non-biological) should not be added 
to the list. The committee recognizes that the reason for placement on 
the Select Agent list may involve classified information. However, even 
such non-biological considerations should be based on clear criteria 
and informed by scientific data. For instance, in some cases, it appears 
that past experimentation with an agent for purposes of warfare or 
terrorism has resulted in de facto inclusion on the Select Agents list. If 
experiments led to the conclusion that the agent is unstable, difficult to 
make, or poorly transmissible, then the agent might not pose a threat 
worthy of Select Agent designation. Furthermore, because the level of 
threat posed by a microorganism or toxin may change over time, (for 
example, countermeasures may become available or the agent may be 
endemic), each Select Agent and Toxin should be reevaluated regularly 
to ensure that it meets the criteria for Select Agent designation, and is 
not diverting attention from more important threats.
  The committee concurs with other groups that the current system 
would be improved if each agent were assessed on the basis of clear 
criteria. Moreover, it will be difficult to create any clear and effective 
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sequence based system, whether classification based or prediction 
based,, if the criteria and purpose of the Select Agent list remain 
unclear.
(d.)  Stratification of the Select Agent list: The existing list of Select 
Agents and toxins should be reviewed on the basis of clear criteria with 
the goal of prioritizing the Select Agent list on the basis of risk. Mecha-
nisms for timely inclusion and removal of an agent or toxin from the 
Select Agent list are necessary for a robust oversight system. Several 
recent advisory panels have recommended stratification or reduction 
of the Select Agent list, and we are in agreement with their recom-
mendations.12,13 As stated in the 2009 National Research Council 
report, “a list of more than 80 agents of varying risks dilutes attention 
from those that pose the greatest degree of concern, which may, in the 
process, render the nation less secure. It would be more effective to 
focus the highest scrutiny on those agents that are, indeed, of greatest 
concern . . . (NRC 2009a)” A gene sequence based classification system 
is certainly an example of this situation.14 Classifying the current 82 
Select Agents would require 82 parts lists and several thousand profiles 
for the parts, and, as mentioned, each Select Agent classification would 
need to be carefully tested and maintained. A classification system 
would require a small team of full-time staff to develop and maintain. 
Sequence curation would require substantial work. Prioritizing the 
Select Agent list on the basis of risk would make any sequence-based 
approach to oversight more feasible
LONG-TERM MILESTONES FOR GENOME SEQUENCE-
BASED SELECT AGENT REGULATIONS
The use of the term milestones may be somewhat misleading here, in as 
much as the research described is ongoing, and will evolve in a continuous and 
12 “The list should be either reduced or stratified so that biosecurity measures can be more easily 
applied by the registered entities according to the level of risk” and “Perform a risk assessment 
for each select agent and toxin on the BSAT list and develop a stratification scheme that includes 
biodefense and biosecurity criteria, as well as risk to public health, so that security measures may be 
implemented based upon risk” (NSABB 2009b). Report of the Working Group on Strengthening 
the Biosecurity of the United States.
13 “RECOMMENDATION 3: The list of select agents and toxins should be stratified in risk 
groups according to the potential use of the agent as a biothreat agent, with regulatory require-
ments and procedures calibrated against such stratification. Importantly, mechanisms for timely 
inclusion or removal of an agent or toxin from the list are necessary and should be developed 
(NRC 2009b).”
14 The committee wants to be clear that implementation of a classification system is not a reason to 
subtract specific agents from or add specific agents to the Select Agent list. Rather, implementation 
of a sequence based system is a benefit of reducing the list.
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interrelated way. A robust oversight system will have to be able to evolve as 
well, with continuing integration of scientific advancements. The milestones 
toward developing the knowledge and capabilities needed to enable a predic-
tive oversight system (or to enhance a classification system) are shared among 
all fields of biology. It is a major goal of all biology to understand how DNA 
sequence determines the properties of biological systems, ranging upwards in 
complexity from single macromolecules to pathways, organisms, populations, 
and ecosystems. We are far from that goal. Successes in prediction and design at 
each level of complexity in biology as a whole are the relevant achievements to 
watch for, before we will be able to predict confidently from genome sequence 
analysis how a designed organism would replicate, interact with a host, evade a 
host immune system, and spread in a population to cause disease.
The goal of a predictive oversight system is so far out in front of current 
biological understanding that it would be unwise to attempt to address it in 
detail. Instead, we offer the following general milestones:
• Ability to predict accurately the function of individual proteins from 
genome sequence sequence, including what ligands or macromol-
ecules they bind to, what reactions they catalyze, where they localize, 
and what the kinetic rate constants for these processes are.
• Ability to predict accurately from genome sequence the output of 
biochemical, regulatory, and genetic pathways (modules) of several 
proteins acting together.
• Ability to predict accurately the behavior of a whole organism from 
its genome sequence.
• Ability to predict accurately from their genome sequences the in-
teractions of organisms in their natural environment from their ge-
nome sequences, such as microbe-host symbioses or host-pathogen 
interactions.
Those very general goals are already shared by all the biomedical sciences 
for advancing understanding of all biological systems. They are not peculiar to 
Select Agents, or even to infectious disease.
Although specific milestones for prediction of Select Agents are far beyond 
current scientific insight, the committee is able to identify promising research 
areas and technologies that would improve the ability to predict gene func-
tion, enhance understanding of infectious disease, and consequently strengthen 
biosecurity.15 What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive list; research 
15 This is consistent with the National Strategy for countering Biological Threats “The objectives 
of our Strategy [include] . . . Promote global health security: Activities that should be taken to 
increase the availability of and access to knowledge and products of the life sciences that can help 
reduce impacts of outbreaks of infectious disease whether of natural, accidental, or deliberate ori-
gin.” NSC (2009). National strategy for countering biological threats. Washington, D.C., National 
Security Council.
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findings in fields not described could well provide important advances in our 
understanding of genotype-to-phenotype prediction.
The committee recommends supporting these research efforts and tech-
nological developments, with the understanding that predicting function from 
sequence is a major biological goal. Progress in these efforts could be applied to 
strengthen a gene sequence-based oversight system as it evolves, but, the value 
of the research extends far beyond its potential contribution to biosecurity.
(a.)  Protein structure and function: There are important gaps in our 
understanding of the relationships between nucleic acid sequence and 
protein structure, and between protein structure and gene function. 
Developing a better understanding of the relationships between nu-
cleic acid sequence, protein structure, and gene function will be critical 
for improving our knowledge base.
(b.)  Gene expression and regulation: Gene function may be multi-
factorial—based on interactions with other genes, physiological condi-
tions, and other regulatory events. Developing a better understanding 
of factors that regulate gene functions is needed. If an organism has 
specialized gene products for its virulence, it must be able to use them 
when they are needed but not squander its metabolic energy in pro-
ducing them aimlessly or risk having them detected by host defenses 
and prematurely neutralized. Consequently, regulating the expression 
of virulence factors is an additional, essential complication of a patho-
genic microorganism’s life. The number of well-characterized virulence 
regulatory systems is increasing rapidly, in part because of the develop-
ment of rapid methods for screening gene expression on a genome-
wide basis (for example, with DNA microarrays). At the same time, 
relatively little is known about both the specific environmental signals 
to which the systems respond and the exact role of the responses in 
the course of human infection.
(c.)  Pathogenic mechanisms: The molecular basis of the pathogenic 
characteristics of currently designated Select Agents is, in general, 
poorly understood, may be multigenic, may in some cases be greatly 
influenced by one or a few single-nucleotide polymorphisms, and may 
be regulated by mechanisms that are not well defined. The molecular 
basis of novel pathogens or human-made organisms with pathogenic 
potential is also not established. To inform a gene sequence-based 
classification system, improve our biodefense capabilities, and, most 
important, combat infectious disease and improve public health, a 
better understanding of the molecular basis of virulence should be 
developed. Pathogenesis due to an existing Select Agent or a novel 
pathogen is often host-specific, but there is little information to explain 
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the contrast between pathogenesis in a receptive host species and the 
absence of pathogenesis in a species (or individual) not affected by the 
pathogen. Any determination of the molecular basis of the pathogenic 
characteristics of a microorganism must include consideration of its 
host and the host response. Developing a comprehensive understand-
ing of the pathogen-host interactions that result in the creation of a 
disease state would be an important achievement.
(d.)  Animal models of disease: For many Select Agents, there are no 
surrogate experimental hosts for characterizing virulence; the only 
suitable host for a human pathogen may be humans. An adequate 
understanding of the function of a gene or cluster of genes cannot be 
obtained through computational modeling alone; to ensure confidence 
in results, it is essential in determining virulence characteristics should 
include experimental validation of function in an appropriate model 
system. Further development of genetically characterized animal mod-
els of various species, including non-human primates, is an important 
objective. For instance, current efforts to create the “Collaborative 
Cross” and related genetically well-defined and well-characterized 
mice will provide a valuable new tool to assist in the understanding 
of host-pathogen interactions. Novel model systems that more closely 
replicate human disease processes—such as humanized mice, in vitro 
models of human organ systems, and complete in silico models that 
recapitulate human physiological processes at a molecular level—are 
needed.
(e.)  Data and information management for Systems Biology: A 
dynamic, sequence-based program will require creation of massive new 
and well-integrated databases to manage greatly expanded sequence 
information on orders and families of organisms yet to be examined; 
enumeration of protein-fold families; host pathways; protein structural 
determinations, including posttranslational modifications; the genetic 
basis of virulence and immune response from the perspective of the 
host and the pathogen at both the pathway interaction and more de-
tailed 3-D structural interaction levels; and vastly improved software 
capabilities to use the databases to predict 3-D structural effects of 
nucleic acid variations and host interactions accurately, especially in 
relation to pathogenic effects.
(f.)  Synthetic Biology: Synthetic biology approaches biology from an 
engineering perspective; it is aimed at solving a problem, creating 
tools, and designing or improving a system. All existing and reasonably 
foreseeable uses of synthetic biology involve modification or rearrange-
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
ment of existing biological components. For instance, a precursor of 
the antimalarial compound artemisinin is being produced in E. coli, 
and other microorganisms are being designed to address biofuel pro-
duction. The design of such pathways and chimeras is no easy task, and 
the entirely de noo design of genomes and organisms remains science 
fiction. That is due largely to the difficulties in predicting function 
from sequences, as described in Chapter 2; biological context is key 
to gene or protein function. As discussed in the recent Nature News 
feature “Five Hard Truths for Synthetic Biology,” the developing field 
of synthetic biology faces several important challenges.16 They are cen-
tered around translating biological complexity into simple tools and 
standardized parts that behave in a predictable ways. The committee 
is in agreement with the National Science Advisory Board for Bios-
ecurity, which has stated that “synthetic biology is a rapidly evolving 
field, and, given its potential benefits to public health and national and 
economic security, research in these disciplines should be encouraged 
and maintained.”
(g.)  Metagenomics (phylogenomics): Environmental metagenomic 
sequencing of soils, seawater, and other complex samples consistently 
yields a high percentage of proteins of unknown function. It is clear 
that many natural offensive and defensive mechanisms that may have 
relevance to furthering our understanding of human pathogenesis 
await discovery. The advent of short-read sequencing technologies 
is making deep studies of complex environmental samples possible. 
The flood of data resulting from such studies is illustrating the need 
for better computational tools and infrastructure to manage, analyze, 
and correlate staggering amounts of information. Such efforts should 
be strongly supported inasmuch as unexpected discoveries from un-
known organisms may prove to yield more advances than incremental 
hypotheses related to known organisms.
(h.)  Microbiome: Although possibly germ-free (gnotobiotic) before birth, 
humans develop a resident microbiota shortly after birth. The human 
microbiome is the subject of intensive study, including the major in-
ternational Human Microbiome Project (HMP). Because of advances 
in DNA sequencing technologies and improvements in bioinformatics, 
it has become possible to characterize the great diversity in the hu-
man microbiota. In 2007, the National Institutes of Health launched 
16 “Many of the parts are undefined”; “The circuitry is unpredictable”; “The complexity is un-
wieldy”; “Many parts are incompatible”; and “Variability crashes the system” (Kwok 2010).
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the Human Microbiome Project (HMP) as one of its major roadmap 
initiatives. This major scientific endeavor has the following aims:
  •  Determining whether individuals share a core human 
microbiome.
  •  Understanding whether changes in the human microbiome 
can be correlated with changes in human health.
  •  Developing the technological tools to support these goals.
  •  Addressing the ethical, legal, and social complications raised 
by human microbiome research.
  The Human Microbiome Project will add an enormous amount of 
additional microbial sequence to the already burgeoning database. 
That will be invaluable as we continue to sort out the sequences that 
have real predictive value instead of being merely suggestive because 
of some degree of relative homology with a putative virulence factor 
of a pathogen and especially of a Select Agent.
CONCLUSION
The milestones and focus areas listed above aim either to expand the gen-
eral frontiers of biological knowledge, or to apply existing knowledge to the 
Select Agent Regulations. Our committee was deeply uncomfortable with re-
search programs that would seek to expand knowledge solely for the purposes 
of improving the Select Agent Regulations.
Developing the ability to predict Select Agent pathogenicity from genome 
sequence raises serious dual-use concerns because prediction and design go 
hand in hand. Accurate computational prediction of Select Agents from ge-
nome sequences enables computational design and optimization of bioweapon 
genome sequences. Two major goals of biology are to predict phenotype from 
genotype and to improve public health by understanding pathogenicity. It does 
not seem wise to make special plans for an effort in predicting the character-
istics of Select Agents, in advance of other important frontiers of biological 
knowledge.
It is more prudent to base the Select Agent Regulations on the current state 
of biological knowledge, as an applied problem, not a basic research problem. 
Predictive successes in the general biology research community should be pas-
sively monitored. Once biology in general approached the goal of determining 
pathogenicity from sequence, it would be appropriate to consider a predictive 
oversight system to identify Select Agent properties accurately from a novel 
genome sequence. That time may not come for decades, and it may be more 
than a century away.
And in the meantime? The technology and knowledge base for sequence-
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
based classification exist now, as we described in Chapter 3. Even a classifica-
tion system can present dual-use issues, in that for the system to be usefully 
implemented, the information must be shared. Listing the parts of a Select 
Agent and identifying other sequences of concern entirely on the basis of their 
potential to be dangerous when incorporated into a synthetic construct dis-
seminates knowledge that theoretically could facilitate the design of a synthetic 
pathogen by a bad actor. However, inasmuch as this knowledge would be 
based on the current published state of the art (and pathogen sequences that 
are already widely available in GenBank), any additional dual-use concerns are 
not nearly as grave.
The Select Agent Regulations strive to balance a need for regulating access 
to the most dangerous pathogens with minimizing regulatory burdens on basic 
biological research aimed at monitoring, understanding, treating, and prevent-
ing disease. If the Select Agent Regulations are too burdensome, they may 
diminish long-term safety. Our report stops short of recommending the imple-
mentation of any specific sequence-based system for defining Select Agents; it 
was not our charge, and we were not properly constituted to estimate the costs, 
benefits, or risks associated with any specific implementation. We do find that 
the sequence-based classification system and yellow flag system of Chapter 3 
are technologically feasible, but we have not carefully examined their costs or 
their effects on basic research or national security (see Appendix L). We have 
made no argument that the favorable aspects of using such systems to clarify 
a sequence-based definition of the discrete taxonomic names on the Select 
Agent list would outweigh any adverse aspects of creating additional layers of 
complexity in the regulatory framework. Rather, our principal finding is that 
sequence-based prediction of Select Agent properties is not feasible and is 
unlikely to be feasible in the foreseeable future; any research effort dedicated 
solely to this purpose is likely to have only adverse consequences.
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Statement of Task
NIH has requested the National Research Council to convene an ad hoc 
committee to identify the scientific advances that would be necessary to permit 
serious consideration of developing and implementing an oversight system for 
select agents that is based on predicted features and properties encoded by 
nucleic acids rather than a relatively static list of specific agents and taxonomic 
definitions.
The committee is asked to address several questions:
• What would be the key scientific attributes of a predictive oversight 
system?
• What are the challenges in attempting to predict biological character-
istics from sequence?
• Does the current state of the science of predicting function from se-
quence support a predictive oversight system at this time?
• If not, what are the scientific milestones that would need to be realized 
before a predictive oversight system might be feasible?
• In qualitative terms, what level of certainty would be needed about the 
ability to predict biological characteristics from sequence data in order 
to have confidence in a predictive oversight system?
• In what time frame might these milestones be realized? What kinds of 
studies are needed to achieve these milestones?
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Committee Member and Staff Biographies
CHAIR
Dr. James W. LeDuc directs the Program on Global Health in the Institute for 
Human Infections and Immunity at the University of Texas Medical Branch. 
He also serves as deputy director of the Galveston National Laboratory. Previ-
ously, he served as the coordinator for influenza for the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, and was the director of 
the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases in the CDC National Center for 
Infectious Diseases (NCID). He began his professional career as a field biologist 
with the Smithsonian Institution’s African Mammal Project in West Africa. He 
then served for 23 years as an officer in the U.S. Army Medical Research and 
Development Command. He joined CDC in 1992, was assigned to the World 
Health Organization as a Medical Officer, and later became the associate direc-
tor for global health at NCID. His research interests include the epidemiology 
of arboviruses and viral hemorrhagic fevers and global health. He has partici-
pated in a number of National Research Council studies.
MEMBERS
Dr. Ralph Baric received his BS from North Carolina State University in 1977. 
He obtained his PhD from the Department of Microbiology of North Carolina 
State University in 1982, studying alpha-virus–host interaction and pathogen-
esis under the direction of Robert E. Johnston. He continued his postdoctoral 
training on coronavirus replication and pathogenesis under the direction of 
Michael M. C. Lai at the University of Southern California. In 1986, Dr. Baric 
was hired as an assistant professor in the Department of Parasitology and 
Laboratory Practice, and he is currently a professor in the Department of 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
8 APPENDIX B
Epidemiology and the Department of Microbiology and Immunology of the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. During his early training, Dr. Baric 
was a Harvey Weaver Scholar for the National Multiple Sclerosis Society and 
an established investigator for the American Heart Association in association 
with his studies of coronavirus replication, cross-species transmission, persis-
tence, evolution, and pathogenesis. He is a member of the Editorial Board of 
the Journal of Virology and a senior editor for PLoS Pathogens. Dr. Baric is 
a permanent member of a National Institutes of health (NIH) study section 
(VirB); has been a consultant for the World Health Organization, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, and NIH; and has served on various in-
stitutional recombinant-DNA review committees. He has published over 130 
peer-reviewed manuscripts, including several in Science, the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, and Nature Medi-
cine, and his research efforts are supported by several NIH research grants. Dr. 
Baric’s expertise is primarily in norovirus molecular evolution and susceptibility 
and in coronavirus reverse genetics, synthetic genome reconstruction, patho-
genesis, vaccine design, and cross-species transmission of viruses, often using 
the SARS coronavirus or noroviruses as models.
Dr. Roger G. Breeze received his veterinary degree in 1968 and his PhD in 
veterinary pathology in 1973, both from the University of Glasgow, Scotland. 
He was engaged in teaching, diagnostic pathology, and research on respiratory 
and cardiovascular diseases at the University of Glasgow Veterinary School 
from 1968 to 1977 and at Washington State University College of Veterinary 
Medicine from 1977 to 1987, where he was professor and chair of the Depart-
ment of Microbiology and Pathology. From 1984 to 1987, he was deputy direc-
tor of the Washington Technology Center, the state’s high-technology sciences 
initiative, based in the College of Engineering of the University of Washington. 
In 1987, he was appointed director of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Plum Island Animal Disease Center, a Biosafety Level 3 facility for 
research and diagnosis related to the world’s most dangerous livestock diseases. 
In that role, he initiated research on the genomic and functional genomic basis 
of disease pathogenesis, diagnosis, and control of livestock RNA and DNA vi-
rus infections. That work became the basis of U.S. defense against natural and 
deliberate infection with those and led to his involvement in the early 1990s 
in biologic-weapons defense and proliferation prevention. From 1995 to 1998, 
Dr. Breeze directed research programs in 20 laboratories in the Southeast for 
the USDA Agricultural Research Service before going to Washington, D.C., to 
establish biologic-weapons defense research programs for USDA. He received 
the Distinguished Executive Award from President Clinton in 1998 for his 
work at Plum Island and in biodefense. Since 2004, he has been chief execu-
tive officer of Centaur Science Group, which provides consulting services in 
biodefense. His main commitment is to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 
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Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program in Europe, the Caucasus, 
and Central Asia.
Dr. R. Mark Buller is widely recognized as a leader in the field of viral patho-
genesis. His current research focuses on the interplay between the genetic 
expression of orthopoxviruses—such as monkeypox virus, ectromelia virus, 
and vaccinia virus—and the hosts’ response to infection. Dr. Buller applies this 
work to the development of animal models for the evaluation of antivirals and 
vaccines for smallpox. He currently serves as a professor at Saint Louis Univer-
sity, Missouri, in the Department of Molecular Microbiology and Immunology. 
Dr. Buller is also director of the Aerosol Biology Core of the multi-institutional 
Midwest Regional Center for Excellence in Biodefense and Emerging Infectious 
Diseases Research. Before joining Saint Louis University, he was head of the 
Poxvirus Pathogenesis Group at the National Institute of Allergy and Infec-
tious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health. Dr. Buller holds a PhD in 
virology from the Institute of Virology in Glasgow. He has published over 130 
peer-reviewed scientific articles, reviews, and book chapters, and is a member 
of the editorial review boards of major scientific publications. Dr. Buller has 
also served as an invited reviewer, committee member, or speaker on the topic 
of bioterrorism and biomedical research.
Dr. Sean R. Eddy is a group leader at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute’s 
Janelia Farm Research Campus outside Washington, D.C. His research inter-
ests are in the development of computational algorithms for genome-sequence 
analysis. He is the author of several widely used software tools for biologic 
sequence analysis, including a software package called HMMER; a coauthor of 
the Pfam database of protein domains; and a coauthor of the book Biological Se-
quence Analysis: Probabilistic Models of Proteins and Nucleic Acids (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). He received a bachelor’s degree from the California 
Institute of Technology and a PhD from the University of Colorado at Boulder, 
and he was a postdoctoral fellow at NeXagen Pharmaceuticals and at the MRC 
Laboratory of Molecular Biology. He was on the faculty of the Department of 
Genetics of the Washington University School of Medicine for 11 years before 
moving to Janelia Farm.
Dr. Stanley Falkow is the Robert W. and Vivian K. Cahill Professor of Mi-
crobiology and Immunology at Stanford University School of Medicine. He 
formulated molecular Koch’s postulates, which have guided the study of the 
microbial determinants of infectious diseases since the late 1980s. Dr. Falkow 
received his BS from the University of Maine and went on to earn his PhD from 
Brown University. He discovered that infectious microorganisms use genes that 
are activated only inside host cells. Dr. Falkow has published numerous articles 
and has served on the editorial boards of several professional publications. In 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
0 APPENDIX B
addition, he has received numerous awards for his achievements in science, 
including the Bristol-Myers Squibb Award for Distinguished Achievement in 
Infectious Disease Research, the Altemeier Medal from the Surgical Infectious 
Diseases Society of America, the Howard Taylor Ricketts Award Lecture at the 
University of Chicago, and the Paul Ehrlich–Ludwig Darmstaedter Prize. In 
2003, he received the Abbott Lifetime Achievement Award from the American 
Society for Microbiology and the Selman A. Waksman Award in Microbiology 
from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). He received the Robert Koch 
Award in 2000. Dr. Falkow was president of the American Society for Micro-
biology in 1997–1998. He was elected to the Institute of Medicine in 1997 and 
received the Maxwell-Finland Award from the National Foundation for Infec-
tious Diseases in 1999. Also in 1999, he was named an honorary doctor of sci-
ence by the University of Guelph, Canada, and received the University of Maine 
Alumni Career Award. He has received honorary doctorates in Europe and the 
United States. Dr. Falkow is a member of NAS and the National Academy of 
Arts and Sciences. He is also an elected fellow of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science and a foreign member of the UK Royal Society. 
Dr. Falkow was nominated twice for a Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine. 
In 2008, Dr. Falkow received the Lasker Award for medical research.
Ms. Rachel E. Levinson, a 25-year veteran of science policy at the national 
level, is the director of the Arizona State University (ASU) Washington office 
and is responsible for special projects and research initiatives in the Office 
of the Vice President for Research and Economic Affairs. She joined ASU in 
2005 as the director of the Government and Industry Liaison Office, Biodesign 
Institute at Arizona State University. Ms. Levinson heads an office responsible 
for facilitating mutually beneficial relationships between university researchers, 
federal funding agencies, and private-sector entities. Most recently, she was with 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident, where she was assistant director of life sciences. She began her career as 
a biologist at the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH). She advanced to become deputy director of the NIH Office of Recom-
binant DNA and senior policy adviser in the Office of Technology Transfer. 
Ms. Levinson earned her BS in zoology from the University of Maryland at 
College Park and her MA in science, technology, and public policy from the 
George Washington University School of Public and International Affairs.
Dr. John Mulligan founded Blue Heron Biotechnology in 1999 after a decade 
of genomics research, including establishment and management of one of the 
two Human Genome Centers at Stanford University and direction of genomics 
research at Darwin Molecular. Blue Heron Biotechnology is a pioneer in and 
leader of the gene-synthesis market.
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Dr. Alison D. O’Brien is a professor in and chair of the Department of Micro-
biology and Immunology at the Uniformed Services University of the Health 
Sciences. She is a past president of the American Society for Microbiology. She 
received her PhD from Ohio State University in 1976. Research in Dr. O’Brien’s 
laboratory focuses on the molecular mechanisms by which the Shiga toxins 
from enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC) contribute to hemorrhagic 
colitis and the hemolytic uremic syndrome, the involvement of toxins from 
uropathogenic E. coli (UPEC) in the host response to urinary tract infections, 
and development of therapeutics against infections caused by Bacillus anthracis 
and B. cereus.
Dr. Francisco Ochoa-Corona, a forensic plant pathologist, specializes in deliver-
ing and developing reference diagnostics for exotic, naturalized, and indigenous 
plant viruses and other phytopathogens of relevance to agricultural biosecurity. 
His work is applicable to plant pathogens that can be intercepted at the border 
or detected through general surveillance in field settings or in transitional facili-
ties. Dr. Ochoa-Corona’s research in plant pathology contributes scientific input 
to regulatory officials regarding plant health emergencies. He joined Oklahoma 
State University in 2008 from the Investigation and Diagnostic Centre of Bi-
osecurity New Zealand, in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, where he 
was principal adviser in virology.
Prof. Jane S. Richardson earned a bachelor’s degree from Swarthmore College 
and a master’s degree from Harvard University in 1966. Since 1970, she has 
been at Duke University Medical Center, where she and her husband, Da-
vid, work together in investigating the three-dimensional structure of proteins 
and RNA. They were early pioneers in protein crystallography, in molecular 
computer graphics, and in the field of de novo protein design, proposing and 
then making novel amino-acid sequences designed to fold into specific 3D 
structures. Prof. Richardson was the developer of ribbon drawings of protein 
structures, originally done by hand but since universally adopted in molecular 
graphics. She identified many well-known structural motifs, such as the helix 
N-cap, and has recently concentrated on new methods for the validation and 
improvement of protein and RNA crystal structures. She became a MacArthur 
Fellow in 1985, a member of the National Academy of Sciences in 1991, and a 
member of the Institute of Medicine in 2006, and she was an assessor for last 
year’s CASP8 structure predictions.
Dr. Margaret Riley is a professor of biology at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst (Umass Amherst). She received her PhD in population genetics from 
Harvard University and performed postdoctoral research in microbial popula-
tion genetics with a Sloan Postdoctoral Fellowship in Molecular Evolution. She 
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joined the faculty of Yale in 1991 and recently moved to UMass Amherst. She 
has a broad set of research interests that range from studies of experimental 
evolution of microorganisms to development of novel antimicrobials and re-
definition of the microbial species concept. Dr. Riley studies the evolution of 
microbial diversity with an emphasis on the ecology and evolution of microbial 
toxins. Her recent work has revealed that the production of toxins is a primary 
force in the generation and maintenance of microbial diversity. Those studies 
led to an interest in applying ecologic and evolutionary theory to the design 
of novel antimicrobials for use in animal and human health. She is cofounder 
of Origin Antimicrobials, Inc., whose mission is to discover and refine novel 
antimicrobials to address the challenge of antibiotic resistance. Dr. Riley is the 
director of the Organismic and Evolutionary Biology Program and the director 
of the Museum of Natural History at UMass Amherst. From 1999 to 2002, she 
chaired the Gordon conference on molecular evolution; from 2003 to 2005, she 
chaired the Gordon conference on microbial population biology and evolution. 
She is a fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology.
Mr. Tom Slezak has been involved with bioinformatics at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) for 30 years after receiving a BS and an MS in 
computer science from the University of California, Davis. He is currently the 
associate program leader for informatics for the Global Security Program ef-
forts at LLNL. He was involved in the Human Genome Program from 1987 
to 2000, leading the informatics efforts at LLNL and then the Department of 
Energy Joint Genome Institute from 1997 to 2000. In 2000, he began to build 
a pathogen bioinformatics team at LLNL, pioneering a novel whole-genome 
analysis approach to DNA signature design. His team developed signature tar-
gets for multiple human pathogens that were used at the 2002 Winter Olympic 
Games under the BASIS program and later adapted for use nationwide in the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) BioWatch program. Under a close 
collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the LLNL 
team has been called on for computational help on smallpox, SARS, monkey-
pox, avian influenza, and numerous other diseases. In addition to continuing 
work on human and agricultural pathogens, Mr. Slezak team is focusing on 
signatures of mechanisms of virulence, antibiotic resistance, and evidence of 
genetic engineering. They have been working on detecting novel, engineered, 
and advanced biothreats for several years, leveraging high-risk Information 
Technology Industry Council and DHS funding. Mr. Slezak has chaired or 
served on multiple advisory boards, including those of the rice genome project, 
mouse and maize genetics databases, the spruce tree genome project (Canada), 
plant pathogens, and a National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
sequencing center contract renewal.
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NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL STAFF
Dr. India Hook-Barnard is a program officer with the Board on Life Sciences 
of the National Research Council. She came to the National Academies from 
the National Institutes of Health where she was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow 
from 2003 to 2008. Her research investigating the molecular mechanism of gene 
expression focused on the interactions between RNA polymerase and promoter 
DNA. Dr. Hook-Barnard earned her PhD from the Dept. of Molecular Micro-
biology and Immunology at the University of Missouri. Her graduate research 
examined translational regulation and ribosome binding in Escherichia coli. At 
the National Academies, she contributes to projects in a variety of exciting topic 
areas. Much of her current work is related to issues of biosecurity, microbiol-
ogy, and genomics. She is the study director or staff officer for several ongoing 
projects including the U.S. Canada Regional Committee for the International 
Brain Research Organization, Animal Models for Assessing Countermeasures 
to Bioterrorism Agents, and Framework for Developing a New Taxonomy of 
Disease.
Mr. Carl-Gustav Anderson is a senior program assistant with the Board on Life 
Sciences of the National Research Council. He received a BA in philosophy 
from American University in 2009, completing significant research projects 
exploring on the philosophy of the Kyoto School. He has worked closely with 
the All Women’s Action Society (Malaysia), helping to engage young men in 
feminist dialogue and to present a feminist response to the unique identity 
politics of contemporary Malaysia. He has focused his research interests on 
Buddhist encounters with the West, with particular emphasis on Buddhist 
responses to Western feminism, communism, transcendental philosophy, and 
existentialism.
Since joining the Board on Life Sciences in 2009, he has served as senior 
program assistant for Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and 
Toxins (2009) and Challenges and Opportunities for Education about Dual Use 
Issues in Life Sciences Research (2010). In addition to several consensus com-
mittees, he also serves as senior program assistant for the United States-Canada 
Regional Committee to the International Brain Research Organization.
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Appendix C
HHS and USDA Select Agents and Toxins
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Appendix D
2009 Workshop Agenda
Scientific Milestones for the Development of a Gene-Sequence-
Based Classification System for Oversight of Select Agents
Thursday, Sept. 3rd, 2009
The National Academy of Sciences Building: Lecture Room
2100 C St., N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20037
AGENDA
8:30 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
James LeDuc, committee chair—The Uniersity of Texas 
Medical School
The workshop in context of the study and the statement of task
9:00 a.m. Session 1: The Current Structure for Oversight
What are the current forms of oversight? Are there gaps in the 
oversight, and if so, are these gaps emerging as a result of new 
technology, new user communities, or new perceptions? How 
might a sequence based system be helpful in addressing these 
gaps/ concerns?
*Moderator: Rachel Leinson
•  Julia Kiehlbauch, United States Department of 
Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serice
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•  Rob Weyant, Centers for Disease Control and 
Preention—Synthetic DNA and the Select Agent 
Regulations.
•  Claudia Mickelson, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology—IBC, RAC guidelines and concerns about 
sequences.
•  Edward You, Federal Bureau of Inestigation—
Surveillance of Select Agent list and emerging concerns.
•  Amy Patterson, National Institutes of Health, Office of 
Biotechnology Actiities—Comprehensive view and the 
need for this study.
Panel discussion: ~30 min
10:30 a.m. Break
10:45 a.m. Session 2: Current Mechanisms and Criteria for Screening and 
Surveillance
What is currently being done? How are sequences chosen to 
monitor? What is a “sequence of concern”?
*Moderator—John Mulligan
•  Pete Pesenti, Department of Homeland Security—What 
are the factors and process used for risk assessment? 
What are the criteria or characteristics of agents (or 
sequences) considered a threat?
•  John Mulligan, Blue Heron Biotechnology—What 
are the current screening practices, standards, and 
procedures in the industry? What are challenges and 
concerns?
•  Marcus Graf, GeneArt and Claes Gustafsson, DNA 
.0—Representing companies working to harmonize 
screening techniques. What would they like to know to 
help the decision making process?
•  Stephen M. Maurer, Uniersity of California at 
Berkeley—Interface of biosecurity, synthetic biology, and 
industry.
Panel discussion: ~30 min ** Ed You, FBI will join panel 
** 
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12:15 p.m. Lunch
1:00 p.m. Session 3: Virulence
What is virulence? Why is it so hard to predict? What attributes 
make a pathogen a threat to biosecurity? —to public health? Is 
there a difference?
*Moderator—Stan Falkow
•  Stan Falkow, Stanford Uniersity—Overview of 
virulence, meaning of genomics in prediction.
•  Jeff Taubenberger, National Institutes of Health, 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—
Influenza virulence and the role of genotype-phenotype 
relationships.
•  Michael Katze, Uniersity of Washington—Systems 
biology and the difficulty predicting the importance of a 
sequence.
•  Ralph Baric, Uniersity of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill—SARS, systems genetics and pathogenesis.
•  Ramon Felciano, Ingenuity Systems—Systems biology 
and pathway modeling of pathogenesis and host 
response.
Panel discussion: ~30 min
3:10 p.m. Break
3:25 p.m. Session 4: Predicting Pathogenicity from Sequence
Speakers will address gaps, challenges, and timeframe for 
milestones.
*Moderator—Sean Eddy
•  Sean Eddy, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Janelia 
Farm Research Campus—Overview of sequence analysis; 
how reliably can protein function be predicted from 
protein sequence?
•  Jonathon Eisen, Uniersity of California at Dais—
Phylogenomic inference of protein function and the 
importance of genomic context.
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•  Elliot J Lefkowitz, Uniersity of Alabama at 
Birmingham—Bioinformatics support for pathogen 
research; Viral gene discovery and pathogenic potential.
•  John Moult, Uniersity of Maryland Biotechnology 
Institute, Center for Adanced Research in 
Biotechnology—Protein structure and function 
prediction.
•  Ian Lipkin, Columbia Uniersity, Mailman School of 
Public Health—Identification of emerging or novel 
microorganisms—pathogen surveillance.
Panel discussion: ~30 min
5:45 p.m. Closing Remarks
6:00 p.m. Adjourn 
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Appendix E
Applicability of the Select 
Agent Regulations to Issues 
of Synthetic Genomics
In a December 2006 report entitled “Addressing Biosecurity Concerns 
Related to the Synthesis of Select Agents” (www.biosecurityboard.gov/links.
asp), the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity recommended that 
the federal government take steps to “Increase awareness among providers 
and users of synthetic genomic materials regarding compliance with the select 
regulations; and provide a list of genomic materials explicitly covered by the 
regulations.”
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance regarding the ap-
plication of the current select agent regulations to those who create and use 
synthetic genomic products. The current select agent regulations implement the 
provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. Select 
agents are bacteria, viruses, fungi, other microorganisms and toxins that have 
been deemed to have the potential to pose a significant risk to public health, 
plant or animal health, or plant or animal production. Regulation of the posses-
sion, use, and transfer of select agents is implemented by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) 
and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (HHS/CDC). Individuals applying for access to select 
agents must undergo a security risk assessment by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, Criminal Justice Information Service (FBI/CJIS). Information on the 
select agent regulations (42 CFR Part 73, 9 CFR Part 121, and 7 CFR Part 331) 
can be found at the national select agent Web site (www.selectagents.gov).
The select agent regulations provide that the following genetic elements, 
recombinant nucleic acids, and recombinant organisms are select agents (See 
section 3(c) of 42 CFR Part 73, 9 CFR Part 121, and 7 CFR Part 331):

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• Nucleic acids that can produce infectious forms of any of the select 
agent viruses.
• Recombinant nucleic acids that encode for the functional form(s) of 
select agent toxins if the nucleic acids:
   Can be expressed in io or in itro or,
   Are in a vector or recombinant host genome and can be expressed 
in io or in itro.
• Select agents and toxins that have been genetically modified.
The purpose of this regulatory language is to address advancements in 
molecular biology that may influence the production of infectious forms of 
select agent viruses, or the active forms of select agent toxins. It has been dem-
onstrated, for example, that the single stranded (positive strand) RNA viruses 
and certain double stranded DNA viruses that utilize host polymerases contain 
nucleic acids that can produce infectious forms. Examples of select agent vi-
ruses that meet this criterion, and would therefore be regulated, include:
• Tickborne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses:
   Central European Tick borne encephalitis
   Far Eastern Tickborne encephalitis
   Russian Spring and Summer encephalitis
   Kyasanur Forest Disease
   Omsk Hemorrhagic Fever
• Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus
• Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus
• Classical Swine Fever Virus
• Foot-And-Mouth Disease Virus
• Japanese Encephalitis Virus
• Swine Vesicular Disease Virus
• Cercopithecine Herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus)
• Malignant Catarrhal fever Virus (Alcelaphine Herpesviurs Type 1)
Under the current select agent regulations the following are examples of 
materials that would not be regulated as a select agent:
• Non-infectious components of select agent viruses including:
   Material from regulated genomes that has been rendered 
non-infectious
   cDNA made from regulated select agent genomes
   Genomic fragments from select agents (unless they encode for a 
functional form of a select agent toxin)
   Complete genomes of single-stranded negative-strand RNA vi-
ruses, double-stranded RNA viruses, and double-stranded DNA 
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viruses that require a unique polymerase (Variola major virus,* 
Monkeypox virus, African swine fever virus, camelpox virus, Goat 
pox virus, lumpy skin disease virus, and Sheep pox virus)
   Genomic material from select agent bacteria or fungi
  (*It should be noted that, although the current select agent regu-
lations to not apply to Variola major genetic elements, the World 
Health Organization places significant restrictions on the posses-
sion, use, and transfer of these materials. Institutions other than 
the two currently recognized WHO collaborating centers may not 
possess genetic fragments exceeding 20 percent of the Variola 
 virus genome. For additional information on WHO Guidelines for 
 Variola virus research, please see http://www.who.int/csr/disease/
smallpox/research/en/index.html, and the report, also published in 
the Weekly Epidemiologic Record in 2008, on permissible use of 
variola genetic material http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/
SummaryrecommendationsMay08. pdf).
• Genomic material from Select Agent strains that have been excluded 
from regulation under section 3(e) of the select agent regulations
Additionally, select agent nucleic acid sequence information is not 
regulated.
Individuals or entities that possess, use, or transfer select agents must meet 
all of the requirements of the select agent regulations (42 CFR Part 73, 7 CFR 
Part 331, and 9 CFR Part 121) prior to possession, use, or transfer. These regu-
lations, the associated enabling legislation, related guidance documents, regis-
tration forms, and contact information for the Select Agent Programs can be 
found at the National Select Agent Registry website (www.selectagents.gov).
The following examples, while not inclusive of all potential scenarios, 
illustrate the application of the current select agent regulations to activities 
involving synthetic genomics or synthetic biology.
Example scenarios involving synthetic genomic select agent materials.
1.  An individual submits to a producer (facility that manufactures the mate-
rial) a full genome sequence of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus (FMDV) 
and requests that it be synthesized and shipped to the submitter (individual 
that requests the material).
•  Does the processing of this order fall under the current select agent 
regulations?
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 Yes. An individual or entity in possession of the full FMDV genome, re-
gardless of how the individual or entity came into possession of it, or for 
however brief a time period, would be required to be preregistered under 
provisions of the select agent regulations, meeting all of the safety, security 
and personnel reliability requirements therein. Transfer of the full FMDV 
genome would require prior approval from the select agent program.
•  Does the sequence information that this individual submitted fall un-
der the current select agent regulations?
 No. The current regulations do not cover sequence information.
•  The producer is registered with the Select Agent Program for pos-
session of infectious FMDV genomic material. Once this material is 
produced, can the producer send it to the submitter?
 Yes, with stipulations. First, the submitter must also be registered with the 
Select Agent Program to possess select agents. Second, all domestic trans-
fers of select agents must be preauthorized by either the CDC or APHIS 
Select Agent Program. All international exports must be preauthorized by 
the Department of Commerce. Since the producer is registered with the Se-
lect Agent Program, the program must first authorize the domestic transfer. 
Instructions and forms for use in obtaining this authorization are available 
on the National Select Agent Registry Web site (www.selectagents.gov).
2.  An individual submits an unidentified sequence to a producer and asks 
for its synthesis. Screening of this sequence by the producer shows a high 
degree of homology with the pXO2 virulence-associated plasmid of Bacil-
lus anthracis.
•  Does the processing of this order fall under the current Select Agent 
Regulations?
 No. Although B. anthracis organisms are regulated, the current regulations 
do not cover individual B. anthracis genetic elements. Unless the functional 
form of a select agent toxin is included in the product, select agent bacte-
rial genomic material is not covered by the current regulations. However, 
all international exports of B. anthracis genetic elements associated with 
pathogenicity must be preauthorized by the Department of Commerce. 
Instructions for obtaining an export license are available on the Bureau of 
Industry and Security Web site, www.bis.doc.gov.
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3.  An individual submits a genomic sequence for Y. pestis and asks for its 
synthesis.
•  Does the processing of this order fall under the current Select Agent 
Regulations?
 No. Unless the functional form of a select agent toxin is included in the 
product, select agent bacterial and fungal genomes are not covered under 
the regulations. However, all international exports of Y. pestis genetic 
elements associated with pathogenicity must be preauthorized by the De-
partment of Commerce. Instructions for obtaining an export license are 
available on the Bureau of Industry and Security Web site, www.bis.doc.
gov.
4.  An investigator in Canada submits an order for the synthesis and delivery 
to Canada of the genome of the Omsk Hemorrhagic Fever virus from a 
producer located in the United States.
•  Does the processing of this order fall under the current Select Agent 
Regulations?
 Yes. The possession of this material is regulated by the Select Agent Regu-
lations and the entity performing the synthesis would have to be registered 
with the Select Agent Program. However, because the material is to be 
exported, it will require an export license from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security instead of a Select Agent 
Program authorization. Instructions for obtaining this license are available 
on the Bureau of Industry and Security Web site, www.bis.doc.gov.
5.  A foreign national works at a laboratory and is trained to grow Eastern 
Equine Encephalitis virus (EEE) in order to produce a vaccine.
•  Does this activity fall under the current Select Agent Regulations?
 Yes. The facility housing this work would have to be registered with the 
Select Agent Program and the foreign national involved in this work would 
have to have a clear Select Agent Security Risk Assessment in order to 
access the virus. In addition, there are “deemed export” licensing require-
ments from the Department of Commerce for the transfer of production 
technology to the foreign national working in the United States. An export 
license is required to transfer the technology to produce the EEE (1E001). 
Even though the final end use is a vaccine which is controlled under 1C991, 
the technology involves the virus strain and thus controlled. Instructions 
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for obtaining an export license are available on the Bureau of Industry and 
Security Web site, www.bis.doc.gov.
6.  A synthetic genomics producer located outside the U.S. receives an order 
from a laboratory within the U.S. for the genome of the Russian Spring and 
Summer encephalitis virus.
•  Does this activity fall under the current Select Agent Regulations?
 Yes, in part. Although the producer is not required to follow the Select 
Agent Regulations, the receiving laboratory must be registered with the 
Select Agent Program. In addition, the receiving laboratory must obtain 
an import permit from the CDC’s Etiologic Agent Import Permit Program 
prior to importing this material. Information on obtaining import permits 
can be obtained from the National Select Agent Registry Web site (www.
selectagents.gov).
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Appendix F
Summary of Relevant Legislation, 
Regulation, and Guidance
• Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC): Signed in 1972 and 
entered into force in 1975,1 the BWC functions as an international effort 
to control biological weapons and focuses on the prohibition of the de-
velopment, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. 
Of most immediate relevance is Article I, which states: “Each State Party 
to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other 
biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of produc-
tion, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means 
of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or 
in armed conflict.It is important to note that the BWC neither prohibits 
research on defenses against biological weapons, nor establishes any list of 
prohibited agents.”
• The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-
298, May 22, 1990): To implement the norms established by the BWC, 
the United States enacted the BWATA, which “established penalties for 
violating the Convention’s prohibitions, unless “(1) such biological agent, 
toxin, or delivery system is for a prophylactic, protective, or other peace-
ful purpose; and (2) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system, is 
of a type and quantity reasonable for that purpose.” In keeping with the 
treaty, the legislation focused on the purpose for which agents or toxins 
1 The BWC treaty’s formal title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction.

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were possessed, rather than the agents themselves. The law authorizes the 
government to apply for a warrant to seize any biological agent, toxin, or 
delivery system that has no apparent justification for peaceful purposes, but 
prosecution under the law would require the government to prove that an 
individual did not have peaceful intentions (Atlas 1999).(BSAT 33)” Criti-
cally, the BWATA reified the tenets of the BWC by establishing the first 
explicit criminal punishments for the development, manufacture, transfer, 
or possession of a biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a 
weapon. The BWC and its implementation in the form of the BWATA form 
the groundwork of the Select Agent Regulations.
• The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 
104-132, April 24, 1996) provides the first instance of list-based attempts 
at the regulation of biological agents. “The Act required the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations to govern the 
transport of biological agents with the potential to pose a severe threat to 
public health and safety through their use in bioterrorism. In establishing 
the list of materials to regulate, the Secretary was to consider: ‘(I) the effect 
on human health of exposure to the agent; (II) the degree of contagiousness 
of the agent and the methods by which the agent is transferred to humans; 
(III) the availability and effectiveness of immunizations to prevent and 
treatments for any illness resulting from infection by the agent; and (IV) 
any other criteria that the Secretary considers appropriate’ (Public Law 
104-132, April 24, 1996, Sec. 511). The Secretary delegated the authority 
to regulate these “select agents” to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). To ensure that the transfer of these agents was carried 
out only by and between responsible parties, the CDC required that labo-
ratories transferring select agents be registered and report each transfer”2 
(NRC 2009b).
• Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Public Law Pub.
L. 107-56) expands on the BWATA, making “it an offense for a person to 
2 “The purpose of registration was to control domestic transfers based upon a permitting system. 
A registered laboratory could legally transfer select agents only to another registered laboratory; 
some transfers were denied because of concerns about the adequacy of the facility proposed to 
receive the agent. Transfers to nonregistered laboratories were prohibited. Registration, however, 
was principally a matter of notification: A laboratory was obligated to notify relevant authorities of 
a transfer to another registered facility and that the transfer itself complied with applicable safety 
standards. Specific information about particular pathogens that the facility possessed did not have 
to be reported, not even if they were the subjects of extensive research, so long as they were not 
transferred. This was not intended to be a strict licensing system but merely a way of overseeing 
transfers and shipments of lethal pathogens” (NRC 2004).
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knowingly possess any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type 
or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified 
by prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose” 
(NRC 2009b).
• Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act, known as the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–188, June 
12, 2002): “This Act added requirements for regulations governing posses-
sion of select agents, including approval for laboratory personnel by the 
Attorney General following a background check by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI). It also gave the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), through its Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), 
the authority to regulate the possession, use, and transfer of BSAT that re-
late to plant and animal health and products, complementing the authority 
granted to CDC for human pathogens. The regulation of select agents and 
toxins is thus a shared federal responsibility involving HHS/CDC, USDA/
APHIS, and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Bioterrorism Act has 
been implemented through a series of regulations; the final regulations—42 
CFR 73 (human pathogens), 9 CFR 121 (animal pathogens), and 7 CFR 331 
(plant pathogens)—became effective in the spring of 2005.3 (NRC 2009)”
• Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and 
Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins (7 CFR 331; 9 CFR 121) estab-
lished the initial list of biological agents and toxins determined to have the 
potential to pose a severe threat to animal or plant health, or to animal or 
plant products.
• Applicability of the Select Agent Regulations to Issues of Synthetic Ge-
nomics: The CDC has provided guidance regarding the application of the 
current Select Agent Regulations to those who create and use synthetic 
genomic products. Specifically, the guidance defines the organisms whose 
genomes are covered and provides examples that clarify the application of 
these rules (Appendix E).
• Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA 
Providers: HHS has issued guidance to Synthetic DNA Providers, which 
requests that providers identify and follow up on sequences with homol-
ogy unique to a Select Agent sequence. Thus, the guidance aims to define 
the boundaries between the sequence of a a Select Agent and a similar 
sequence from a related species.
3 Agents that can affect both human and animals, called “overlap agents,” are listed in both the 
CDC and USDA lists.
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•  Executive Order July 2, 2010: Optimizing the Security of Biological Select 
Agents and Toxins in the United States directs federal agencies to institute 
changes in the current implementation of the Select Agent Regulations. 
The Executive Order also directs federal agencies to take actions to im-
prove the overall coordination, consolidation and oversight of select agents 
and toxins: (See Appendix M)
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Influenza A and SARS-CoV
INFLUENZA A
The influenza A virus proapoptotic PB1-F2 protein has been clearly im-
plicated as a major virulence factor in some highly pathogenic influenza virus 
strains, but the H1N1 swine-origin influenza virus pandemic strain codes for a 
truncated PB1-F2 protein that terminates after 11 amino acids. It was predicted 
that the truncation would attenuate swine influenza pathogenesis, identify-
ing a possible key mutation that could emerge to enhance H1N1 virulence 
and contribute to an expanding epidemic. However, disruption of PB1-F2 
expression in several other influenza virus backgrounds or by intermixing 
functional PB1-F2 between strains had little effect on viral lung load in mice. 
The data suggests that the PB1-F2 virulence determinant may be context- or 
host-dependent, perhaps by enhancing virulence by other mechanisms that 
are independent of replication. The effects of restoring a full length functional 
PB1-F2 protein on 2009 swine H1N1 in vivo pathogenesis are difficult to pre-
dict because its virulence-enhancing activities may depend on co-evolutionary 
changes elsewhere in the genome. As a working model for predicting virulence 
from sequence information, the preponderance of influenza data suggest that 
restoration of a full length PB1-F2 protein will enhance the virulence of swine 
H1N1—a hypothesis that will probably be tested using reverse genetics in the 
near future (McAuley, Zhang et al.)
SARS-COV
It is also clear that distantly related viral proteins can interact with a con-
served cellular protein target and thereby augment their pathogenic potential. 
Among coronaviruses as with many other viruses, receptor interactions are 
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an important determinant of species specificity, tissue tropism, virulence, and 
pathogenesis. Pathogenesis depends upon the ability of a virus to dock and 
enter into a suitable human host cell. For example, the highly pathogenic 
emerging group 2 coronavirus that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome, 
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and a distantly related less pathogenic group 1 human 
coronavirus, NL63-CoV, both encode a large 180/90kDa spike glycoprotein 
(S) that engages a host cellular receptor(s) to mediate docking and entry into 
cells. The SARS-CoV and NL63-CoV S glycoproteins are about 40 percent 
identical and encode novel, yet unrelated receptor binding domains (RBD) 
in S that engage the same cellular receptor, angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 
(ACE2) to mediate virus docking and entry into cells. Despite the absence of 
structural homology in the RBD cores of NL63-CoV and SARS-CoV, the two 
viruses recognize common ACE2 regions by using novel protein-protein folds 
and interaction networks. On the basis of sequence, it was not possible to pre-
dict that the two highly divergent coronavirus RBDs would engage a similar 
“hot spot” on the surface of the ACE2 receptor and thus mediate docking and 
entry into cells. Moreover, the pathogenic potential of the two human corona-
viruses are distinct: SARS-CoV causes an atypical pneumonia that results in 
acute respiratory distress syndrome with mortality exceeding 50 percent in 
people over 60 years old, whereas NL63-CoV causes a self-limiting denuding 
bronchiolitis and croup, primarily in infants and children. Clearly, other factors 
besides virus-receptor interaction and entry are regulating severe acute end-
stage lung-disease outcomes during SARS-CoV infection, and this complicates 
 sequence-based predictions of virus-receptor interaction networks and viru-
lence outcomes (Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2009 Nov 24;106(47):19970-19974. 
Epub 2009 Nov 9. Crystal structure of NL63 respiratory coronavirus receptor-
binding domain complexed with its human receptor (Wu, Li et al. 2009).
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Appendix H
Virus-Host Interactions
Virus-host interactions play a critical role in regulating disease severity 
and distribution in human populations. Moreover, it is likely that pathogenic 
microorganisms have shaped the genetic population structure of humans. For 
example, noroviruses are category B biodefense pathogens and the primary 
etiologic agent responsible for epidemic viral gastroenteritis worldwide. Mem-
bers of this diverse family of viruses are the most common causes of sporadic 
diarrhea in community settings and a major burden on the military, restaurant 
services, the cruise-ship industry, university campuses, hospitals, and retire-
ment communities. Humans encode a highly diverse set of histo-blood group 
(HBGA) carbohydrates on mucosal surfaces that are regulated by several highly 
polymorphic fucosyltransferase genes designated FUT1, FUT2, and FUT3 and 
by the enzymes that regulate A and B carbohydrate expression, resulting in dra-
matic differences in HBGA expression in human populations. Several studies 
have indicated that different HBGAs function as the receptors or coreceptors 
for productive norovirus infection in humans. People who cannot express HB-
GAs on mucosal surfaces (FUT2–/–) are highly resistant to Norwalk virus (NV) 
and perhaps other noroviruses, whereas people who express O type HBGAs 
on mucosal surfaces are more susceptible to NV. The most prevalent strains 
(GII.4) caused global pandemics of severe gastroenteritis in 1996, 2002, and 
2006. Epidemic GII.4 viruses appear to have evolved two techniques to main-
tain their high prevalence in human populations. First, new epidemic GII.4 
variants have emerged from ancestral strains and have altered HBGA-receptor 
binding profiles, allowing new strains to target unique susceptible human popu-
lation groups that were probably resistant to ancestral strains. Second, like 
influenza viruses, exigent GII.4 norovirus variants undergo antigenic variation 
and so escape herd immunity. Thus, it is clear that host genetics have profound 
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influences in regulating susceptibility to and virulence of iruses (Norovirus 
pathogenesis: mechanisms of persistence and immune evasion in human popu-
lations. Donaldson EF, Lindesmith LC, Lobue AD, Baric RS. Immunol Rev. 
2008 Oct;225:190-211; Human susceptibility and resistance to Norwalk virus 
infection (Lindesmith, Moe et al. 2003).
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Appendix I
Botulinum Neurotoxin,  
B. Anthracis and Variola Virus
This appendix describes the complexity of the pathogenic mechanisms of 
the select agents botulinum neurotoxin, Bacillus anthracis, variola virus, filovi-
ruses, and coronaviruses. It discusses the general mechanisms for acquisition 
of pathogenicity and the important role of the host in the calibration of the 
pathogenic potential of a microorganism
Botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT), B. anthracis, and variola virus have a major-
ity of the attributes of pathogenicity that are considered important for inclu-
sion on the Select Agents list. The toxin and both pathogens were featured in 
at least one nation-state bioweapons program in the last century, are associ-
ated with high case-fatality rates, and are relatively easy to produce or grow. 
However, there are important differences among them. BoNT is easy to isolate 
from Clostridium botulinum, is the most poisonous substance known, but is 
difficult to disseminate. B. anthracis is found in nature in the United States, 
is extremely stable in the environment, and is also poorly transmissible from 
human to human. Variola virus no longer circulates in the human population, 
is less stable in the environment, and is transmitted efficiently from human to 
human in large-droplet aerosols. Both B. anthracis and variola virus encode a 
large number of virulence genes that are responsible for their capacity to infect 
and sometimes kill humans.
BOTULINUM NEUROTOXIN
The presence of a toxin gene may contribute to the pathogenicity of an or-
ganism. In some cases, the acquisition of a toxin genetic element may transform 
a relatively benign bacterium into a potent threat, as in the case of Clostridium 
botulinum. Although small-molecule toxins are found in shellfish or fungi and 
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peptide toxins are found in venom from animal species, we will focus on the 
larger-protein toxins produced by bacteria and some plants. For the purpose 
of this appendix, we define a toxin as any protein that has a deleterious effect 
on health and fitness when ingested.
Seven immunologically distinct and extremely potent protein neurotoxins 
are produced by C. botulinum: A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Types A, B, and E are 
most frequently associated with human disease, and types F and G are less often 
reported. Types C and D are associated with disease in fowl. The BoNTs are all 
expressed as single polypeptides that are posttranslationally proteolyzed to give 
a heavy chain and a light chain that are linked by a disulfide bond. The heavy 
chain is responsible fo r toxin adherence to the cell surface and translocation 
of the light chain into the cytosol. The light chain contains the zinc protease 
active site that is responsible for cleavage of the soluble N-ethylmaleimide-
sensitive-factor attachment protein receptor (SNARE). BoNTs bind ganglioside 
receptors on the neuronal cell surface in the presynaptic terminals and, by 
their action as metalloendoproteases, selectively cleave proteins involved in the 
neuroexocytosis apparatus; this results in inhibition of acetylcholine release at 
the myoneural junctions and later flaccid paralysis that can lead to respiratory 
arrest.
The enzymatic active site of these toxins has been well characterized. A 
crystal structure of BoNT/A demonstrated that zinc is coordinated by the 
HisGluXXHis motif in the active site alpha helix through His-222 and His-226 
and by Glu-261 (Lacy, Tepp et al. 1998). Site-directed mutagenesis experiments 
demonstrated the importance of these residues for toxin activity (Fujii, Kimura 
et al. 1992). Because the zinc binding site of this class of toxins is so well con-
served (Fujii, Kimura et al. 1992) it would seem possible to predict from the 
gene sequence whether a bacterium is able to produce active toxin. However, 
data that argue against the use of BoNT sequence to predict activity comes 
from Agarwal et al. (Agarwal, Binz et al. 2005), who determined the structure 
of BoNT/E light chain with single amino acid substitutions outside of the ca-
nonical active site in regions adjacent to the catalytic residues. They found that 
the relatively minor change of glutamate to glutamine at position 335 rendered 
the enzyme unable to bind zinc. Other mutations in these regions also had 
large effects on the activity of the toxin. These findings serve to emphasize that 
biological toxin activity not only depends on the primary sequence but also on 
the three-dimensional structure of the folded protein.
BACILLUS ANTHRACIS
Disease
Bacillus anthracis is a gram-positive, spore-forming rod that is an etiological 
agent of pulmonary, cutaneous, and gastrointestinal anthrax. In cases of pulmo-
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
APPENDIX I 
nary anthrax, spores are inhaled into the airway and taken up by macrophages. 
The generally accepted model of pathogenesis is as follows: Germination of the 
spores begins to occur in alveolar macrophages and continues as the macro-
phages migrate to the mediastinal lymph nodes, where vegetative growth of the 
bacilli occurs. In the final stages of pulmonary anthrax, the bacilli disseminate 
throughout the body and cause death of the host. In cutaneous anthrax, spores 
penetrate the skin through a wound. The spores germinate into vegetative ba-
cilli and proliferate locally to cause formation of an eschar. In some patients, 
the bacilli can migrate into and multiply in the bloodstream, spread to various 
organs, and, if left untreated, cause death of the host. Antibiotic treatment ini-
tiated before dissemination of the bacteria into the bloodstream during either 
type of infection dramatically reduces the onset of multiorgan failure and death. 
However, because the symptoms of early pulmonary anthrax mimic those of 
other infections, the disease is often not diagnosed until the patient is unable to 
recover, even with broad-spectrum intravenous antibiotic therapy. The bimodal 
life cycle of B. anthracis contributes extensively to the pathogenesis of disease. 
The organism survives outside the mammalian host as a spore that is resistant 
to heat, chemicals, desiccation, and so on. B. anthracis spores are coated with 
at least 34 chromosomally encoded proteins, many of which are immunogenic 
and protect the bacterium. The genes encoding the components of the spore are 
regulated by a complex temporal network of sporulation-specific sigma factors. 
Germination into vegetative bacilli occurs rapidly in the host in response to as 
yet unidentified signals.
Virulence Genes
Vegetative bacilli produce the two toxins edema factor (EF) and lethal 
factor (LF). The genes encoding the components of EF (pagA and cya) and 
LF (pagA and lef) are found on the 182-kb pXO1 plasmid. In addition, the 
bacilli are encapsulated by a poly-D-γ-glutamic acid capsule that is produced 
by enzymes encoded by genes (capBCAD) on the pXO2 virulence plasmid. 
Both plasmids are required for full virulence of B. anthracis strains. The genes 
encoding both the toxins and the capsule are activated by the master regula-
tor of virulence AtxA, the gene for which is also on pXO1. The toxin genes 
are directly activated by AtxA, which also activates acpA and acpB, pXO2-
encoded genes whose products activate the capsule operon. AtxA also exerts 
an effect on chromosomal genes that encode surface components, including 
the surface-layer proteins Sap and EA (sap and eag, respectively), by activation 
of the pXO1-encoded pagR; PagR represses sap and activates eag. Thus, at a 
minimum, a fully virulent strain of B. anthracis requires the genes necessary for 
spore, toxin, and capsule formation and a large array of regulatory factors and 
other genes that are chromosomally encoded. However, given the conserva-
tion of the B. anthracis genome over decades, if an isolate was identified as B. 
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anthracis by standard microbiologic means and if orthologous toxin and poly-
D-glutamic acid capsular gene sequences were present, a presumption of viru-
lence could be made. Proof of that assumption would require assessment of the 
relative lethality of spores prepared from the isolate in an animal model—mice, 
rabbits (better), or non-human primates (best).
VARIOLA VIRUS
Disease
There are three distinct clades of variola virus that coincide roughly with 
low, intermediate, and high case-fatality rate. Clade A was associated with an 
intermediate (8-12 percent) case-fatality rate. Clade B (variola minor) was as-
sociated with a low (below 1 percent) case-fatality rate and caused a disease 
referred to as amaas in Africa or alastrim in the Americas. Clade C (variola 
major) was associated with a high (16-30 percent) case-fatality rate and caused 
the disease classic or ordinary smallpox. Clinically, smallpox in an unvaccinated 
person has an incubation period of 7-19 days from the time of infection of the 
upper respiratory tract until the first symptoms of fever, malaise, headache, 
and backache occur. The characteristic rash then follows. The rash starts with 
papules, which sequentially transform into vesicles and then pustules; most of 
these lesions are on the head and limbs (often confluent) rather than on the 
trunk (centrifugal pattern). Lesions are 0.5-1 cm in diameter and can spread 
over the entire body. Once pustules have dried, scabs form and eventually 
desquamate during the next 2-3 weeks. The resulting feature of the cutaneous 
lesions is the formation of the classic pock scar that is apparent on the skin of 
surviving patients.
Virulence Genes
The protein coding regions of the variola virus genome is 96 percent 
identical at the nucleotide level to other orthopoxviruses. The majority of the 
sequence diversity occurs in the flanking regions of the genomes, which contain 
the virulence genes that target host apoptosis and the innate/immune response 
functions. Each poxvirus has 90 core genes and a unique complement of viru-
lence genes, the latter of which determine in large part the unique biology of 
each orthopoxvirus species. These virus-specific features include the reservoir 
and incidental hosts, cell/tisariola virus encodes 71 virulence genes, of 41 of 
which something is known about function or location in the virion or infected 
cell; there is no experimental information on the remaining 30 genes. The puta-
tive roles of virulence genes in the natural life cycle of variola virus have been 
determined by the study of orthologous genes in other orthopoxvirus-animal 
models (such as vaccinia virus-mouse, ectromelia virus-mouse, and myxoma 
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virus-rabbit). A number of the virulence genes encode cytokine-binding pro-
teins, which can have varied specificity against ligands from different animal 
species. For example, the variola virus IL-18-binding protein has a higher 
affinity for mouse than for human IL-18; this suggests that adaptation to the 
human host does not always require or result in optimal specificity for the hu-
man ligand. Thus, the experimentally determined specificity of a gene product 
for host ligands may or may not support an inference of host biology. Some 
virulence genes target the same pathways. For example, NFκB is a key factor 
for transcription of host genes that mediate innate and immune responses and is 
targeted by a number of pathogens, including poxviruses (see Box I-1). Variola 
virus has at least five virulence genes thought to target that pathway: One gene 
product acts extracellularly by binding to IL-18, and the other four act intra-
cellularly against signaling pathways or the NFκB complex. The importance of 
a gene for virulence is defined not only in the context of the host in which the 
virus replicates but also by the route of infection. For example, in the case of 
vaccinia virus infections of the mouse, 50 percent of 16 individual gene deletion 
or insertion mutants showed a phenotype distinct from that of controls in intra-
nasal or intradermal infections but not both (Tscharke, Reading et al. 2002).
Even with the same complement of virulence genes, the case-fatality rate of 
variola virus isolates appears to vary, presumably because of subtle functional 
differences in individual genes or groups of genes, which are not understand-
able from sequence analysis. For example, amino acid differences in the coding-
region sequences revealed that a consensus of 67 open reading frames (ORFs) 
distinguished clade A strains (middle-range case-fatality rates) from clade B 
strains (low case-fatality rates), and 15 ORFs distinguished the middle-range 
from the low case-fatality rate groups of clade C virus strains from Africa (Es-
posito, Sammons et al. 2006).
Variola virus is one of the few Select Agents that transmit efficiently from 
person to person during disease. That process does not occur at the primary 
site of infection; rather, it depends on a large number of virus-replication cycles 
in different cell types and tissues in the face of a rapidly activated, innate or 
adaptive immune response. High transmissibility depends on effective systemic 
virus spread and later establishment of sufficient foci of infection in the oropha-
ryngeal mucosa to produce virus concentrations in the respiratory gases that are 
high enough to infect contacts. Although monkeypox virus differs from variola 
virus in only 12 virulence genes, it is unable to sustain transmission in human 
populations after introduction from an animal source. The genetic basis of the 
difference in transmissibility between monkeypox and variola virus is unknown, 
and there are no physiologically relevant animal models that could be used to 
answer the question.
In summary, many virulence genes are required for the full virulence of 
B. anthracis and variola virus, and a number of these genes are directly or in-
directly contextual to the particular animal species, route of infection, cell or 
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biochemical pathways. For poxviruses, the presence or absence of a virulence 
gene is not informative as to the infectivity of the virus in any animal species, in-
cluding humans. Furthermore, in some situations, it is likely that subtle changes 
in the activity of one or more variola virus genes alone can affect pathogenicity. 
Those hypothesized subtle differences in activity cannot now be predicted from 
sequence analysis.
In the following section, a number of general mechanisms for the evolution 
of pathogenicity and sustainability in a host are described with an emphasis 
on the important observation that closely related pathogen species or strains 
can evolve to be pathogenic in a host in unique and sometimes unpredictable 
ways.
FILOVIRUS PATHOGENESIS
Disease
The filovirus family, Filoviridae, consists of two genera: Marburgirus, 
which comprises various strains of the 1967 Lake Victoria marburgvirus 
(MARV), and the antigenically distinct Ebolairus. Ebolaviruses were first dis-
covered in 1976. The genus contains five species: Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV), 
Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV), Ivory Coast ebolavirus (CIEBOV)), Bundibugyo 
ebolavirus, (BEBOV), and Reston ebolavirus (REBOV). Filoviruses are among 
the deadliest of all human pathogens, causing hemorrhagic fever with mortal-
ity that can approach 90 percent. Several reports indicate high seroprevalance 
in many areas of Africa. Assuming that the serologic tests were specific, either 
EBOV is endemic or there are a set of uncharacterized, cocirculating, non-
pathogenic, antigenically cross-reactive viruses. In support of that idea, REBOV 
is not pathogenic in humans.
Filoviruses are filamentous, nonsegmented negative-strand RNA viruses 
that have about a 19-kb RNA genome, have a highly conserved gene order, 
and are surrounded by a helical nucleocapsid structure and a lipid bilayer 
that contains several virus glycoprotein spikes. These viruses probably target 
bats as reservoir species, although Marburg Reston is maintained in swine in 
the Philippines. In uninterrupted human-to-human transmission, nucleotide 
sequence changes are rare, except in an Angola outbreak characterized by 
targeted evolution in VP40 and VP24. It is possible that these viruses require 
minimal evolution for human replication and pathogenesis.
Early in infection, filoviruses target cells of mononuclear lineage, notably 
macrophages, monocytes, and dendritic cells (DCs), but not lymphocytes. In-
fected monocytes release inflammatory cytokines, such as TNF-α, whereas DCs 
are anergic (characterized by limited cytokine production, DC maturation, and 
diminished antigen presentation for T-cell activation). Neutrophils rapidly be-
come activated, most likely by viral glycoprotein interaction with the TREM-1 
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ligand, and this results in increased cytokine production. Massive bystander 
apoptosis of natural killer cells and lymphocytes occurs intravascularly and in 
lymphoid organs. Innate immunity and adaptive immunity are delayed during 
filovirus infections, and this allows increased virus replication and disease ex-
acerbation as many cells (such as monocytes and neutrophils) are continuously 
triggered to release cytokines. As infection increases, filoviruses infect a wide 
variety of cells and organs, including the liver and endothelial cells. Dysfunc-
tions in hemostasis occur as a consequence of hepatic damage and the release 
of TNF-α and other proinflammatory cytokines. In fatal cases, death occurs 
6-16 days after the onset of symptoms, usually because of multiorgan failure and 
coagulopathy that results in disseminated intravascular coagulation and shock. 
Hemorrhagic disease occurs in about 25-45 percent of the patients and is most 
likely triggered by immune-mediated mechanisms.
Virulence Determinants
Filovirus virulence determinants include viral proteins that antagonize 
adaptive and innate immune responses, suggesting a role for inflammation in 
resistance and disease. Extensive replication of filoviruses in primates is regu-
lated by two key viral proteins that antagonize host interferon responses. VP35 
inhibits the activation of transcription factor IRF3 by binding to dsRNA and 
inhibiting retinoic acid induced gene-I (RIG-I) signaling. VP35 also interferes 
with the activation of the dsRNA-binding kinase, PKR. Mechanistically, VP35 
expression likely augments the conjugation of a small ubiquitin-like modifier 
(SUMO) protein to IRF3/IRF7 through TLR and RIG-1 signaling, leading to 
increased inhibition of IFN transcription by IRF3/7. Thus, VP35 activates a 
normal negative feedback loop that regulates IFN signaling to weaken host 
innate immunity. In contrast, VP24 inhibits the cellular response to exogenous 
IFN by interacting with karyopherin α1, preventing the nuclear accumulation 
of tyrosine phosphorylated STAT1 and STAT2.
The GP glycoprotein, including its soluble sGP form, also functions as 
a major virulence determinant, playing an important role in virus attachment 
and entry, cell rounding, cytotoxicity and down-regulation of host proteins. GP 
toxicity is thought to be mediated by a dynamin-dependent protein trafficking 
pathway and a ERK mitogen activated protein kinase pathway. Importantly, 
exposure of primate PBMCs to select ZEBOV, or MARV GP peptides or 
inactivated ZEBOV resulted in decreased expression of activation markers on 
CD4 and CD8 cells; CD4 and CD8 cell apoptosis; blocked CD4 and CD8 cell 
cycle progression; decreased interleukin (IL)-2, IL12-p40 and IFN-gamma; but 
increased IL-10 expression. Thus, GP likely encodes an immunosuppressive 
motif that likely antagonizes adaptive immunity during infection.
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SARS CORONAVIRUS
Pathogenesis
Coronaviruses encode a ~30 kb single-stranded positive polarity RNA 
genome that is wrapped in a helical nucleocapsid composed of multiple copies 
of a nucleocapsid protein and surrounded by a lipid envelope bearing three 
or more glycoprotein spikes. The virus family is divided into group 1 (alpha 
coronaviruses), 2 (beta coronaviruses), and 3 (gamma) coronaviruses based on 
sequence homology (See above Fig—Coronavirus Phylogeny) Coronavirus phy-
logeny and biology are characterized by frequent host-shifting events, including 
animal-to-human (zoonosis), human-to-animal (reverse zoonosis) or animal-to-
animal. Over the past 30 years, several coronavirus cross-species transmission 
events as well as changes in virus tropism have given rise to new significant 
animal and human diseases. Most notably, severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), a human lower respiratory disease that was first reported in late 2002 
in Guangdong Province, China, quickly spread worldwide over a period of four 
 
Figure Appendix I--Corona
Bitmapped
FIGURE I.1 Coronavirus phylogeny.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
 APPENDIX I
months. The virus infected over 8,000 individuals, killing nearly 800 before it 
was successfully contained by aggressive public health intervention strategies. 
The etiological agent of SARS (SARS-CoV) was determined to have crossed 
into human hosts from zoonotic reservoirs including bats as well as Himalayan 
palm civets (Paguma larata) and raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides) that 
were sold in exotic animal markets in China. Of note, another human corona-
virus (HCoV-229E) likely emerged from African bat coronavirus lineages some 
200 years earlier while HCoV OC43 likely emerged from closely related bovine 
coronaviruses about 100 years ago. SARS-CoV was recently proposed as a new 
select agent based primarily on its high virulence and transmission potential in 
human populations and the lack of effective vaccines and therapeutics. This 
recommendation models many of the difficulties in using sequence-based cri-
teria for determination of virulence potentials. SARS-CoV is a group 2b corona-
virus, which includes closely related civet and raccoon dog strains (>99 percent 
sequence identity) as well as more variant bat coronaviruses, HKU3 and RB3. 
Protein sequence identity is greater than 95 percent across most of the genome 
of human epidemic SARS-CoV and bat group2b coronaviruses although the 
S glycoproteins are only 80-90 percent identical. It has been proposed that bat 
coronaviruses were the progenitor strains for all group 1 and group 2 corona-
viruses and genome homologies range from 43 to >90 percent amino acid 
identity. Obviously, some viral genes are more highly conserved than others.
Age was a major virulence determinant as mortality rates were less than 
1 percent for individuals below 21 years of age, but >50 percent in individuals 
greater than 65 years of age. The predominant pathological features of SARS-
CoV infection in the human lung included diffuse alveolar damage (DAD), 
hyaline membranes, atypical pneumonia with dry cough, persistent fever, pro-
gressive dyspnea and sometimes abrupt deterioration of lung function. Virus 
infection primarily targeted ciliated epithelial cells and type II pneumocytes 
in the lung as well as epithelial cells in the intestine. Major pathologic lesions 
include inflammatory exudation in the alveoli and interstitial tissue with hyper-
plasia of fibrous tissue and fibrosis. Two phases of disease were identified 
during SARS-CoV infection in humans. Acute respiratory distress syndrome 
(ARDS) develops within the first 10 days with DAD, edema, and hyaline 
membrane formation. After the acute phase, an organizing phase DAD with 
increased fibrosis is observed. Increasing age, male sex, presence of comorbid 
conditions, high early viral RNA burdens, and high lactate dehydrogenase levels 
are associated with greater risk of death. In serum, dynamic changes in cytokine 
levels have been reported following SARS-CoV infection including increases in 
IFN-γ, IL-18, TGF-β, IL-6, MP-10, MCP-1, MIG and IL-8, but not TNF-α, 
IL-2, IL-4, IL-10, IL-13 or TNFRI. The data suggested that an IFN-γ-related 
cytokine storm might be involved in the immunopathological damage noted in 
SARS patients.
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Virulence Determinants
SARS-CoV Cross-Species Transmission. The SARS-CoV outbreak is 
unique in that a chronological set of sequence changes were obtained, pro-
viding precise sequence signatures associated with expanding waves of the 
global epidemic. By comparing the earliest full length human isolate (GZ02; 
early December 2002) to civet cat isolates SZ16 and HZ/SZ/63 and key strains 
epidemiologically linked to an expanding epidemic, 12 amino acid changes in 
ORF1a, 2 in ORF1b, 17 in the S glycoprotein, 4 in ORF3a, 1 in the M glyco-
protein and the ORF8 29 nt deletion were identified that may have allowed for 
increased replication, transmission, and pathogenesis in human hosts (See Fig-
ure above). In general, civet/raccoon dog-related strains and strains identified 
in sporadic human cases prior to the onset of the epidemic were thought to be 
significantly less transmissible and pathogenic than those identified during the 
early, middle and late stages of the epidemic. Except for a couple of mutations 
in S and M which either promoted entry into human cells or promoted efficient 
egress, respectively, the role of most mutations in the expanding epidemic still 
remain unclear. Importantly, civet and raccoon dog strains do not replicate in 
human cells, despite having greater than 99 percent sequence identity. Only two 
or three mutations are needed for to promote efficient replication in human 
airway cells, yet animal strains whose S RBD recognize hACE2 receptors are 
only weakly pathogenic and require extensive adaptation in S and elsewhere 
in the genome. Current proposals to include “SARS-CoV” as a potential select 
agent are unclear regarding the disposition of the closely related but human 
host range-restricted, civet and raccoon dog SARS-like strains, sporadic hu-
man strains identified in 2004 that are mostly zoonotic in origin, as well as bat 
SARS-CoV-like strains in this classification scheme. More importantly, given the 
close homology but receptor mediated restriction and/or limitation in hACE2 
recognition by these animal-origin strains, defining SA status by global genome 
sequence homology seems arbitrary and not grounded in any rational scientific 
method.
At ~180 kDa in mass, the S glycoprotein is a trimer in the virion and or-
ganized into two subunit domains, an amino-terminal S1, which contains the 
~200-aa receptor binding domain (RBD), and a carboxy-terminal S2, which 
contains the putative fusion peptide, two heptad repeat (HR) domains, and 
a transmembrane domain (TM). This domain organization groups the CoV 
S spike glycoprotein with other class I viral fusion proteins, such as Influenza 
HA, HIV-1 env, SV5 F, and Ebola Gp2. The RBD of Spike is generally ac-
knowledged as the principal determinant of coronavirus host range and two key 
mutations in S, K479N and S487T, were shown to be responsible for promoting 
efficient interaction with either the civet or human ACE2 receptor, respectively. 
Given these findings, it seems that reasonable criteria could be developed to use 
sequence-based criteria to categorize “human and animal” strains for oversight 
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purposes. However, multiple pathways of S-driven host range expansion exist, 
complicating sequence based predictions of host range expansion. For example, 
re-adaptation of the civet SZ16 strain to human airway epithelial cells identified 
a different set of key “humanizing” mutations at K479N, Y442F and L472F. 
In addition, K479T and K479I also allow for efficient S RBD interaction with 
hACE2 demonstrating that multiple genetic mutation pathways exist, which 
would allow for differential recognition of civet and/or human ACE2 recep-
tors. Importantly, the SARS-CoV RBD is highly plastic and can be recombined 
into closely related group2b bat and animal strains, promoting efficient growth 
in human airway epithelial cells. These strains are significantly less efficient at 
replicating in mouse models of human disease, suggesting that additional adap-
tation and mutation would be required to promote efficient disease potential in 
humans. In fact, the S ectodomains are readily interchangeable between group 
1 and 2 coronaviruses and these recombinant viruses grow efficiently. Given the 
high recombination frequency noted in mixed coronavirus infection, recom-
bination driven “host shifts” are likely common in coronavirus phylogenies. 
Finally, by completely novel mechanisms, as little as 2-4 mutations in some 
coronavirus fusion peptide and HR1 domains have promoted host range expan-
sion into multiple species in cell culture. Although the mechanism is unclear, 
it represents an entirely different pathway to host range expansion. Clearly, the 
extensive plasticity and existence of multiple interaction networks by which S 
can augment receptor(s) interactions and entry, makes sequence based predic-
tions of host range specificity difficult if not usually impossible.
Mutations that effect virus replication efficiency also must be considered 
an important virulence determinant. It is likely that a number of mutations 
that occurred during the SARS-CoV outbreak selected for more efficient virus-
human host interactions that promoted efficient replication, gene expression 
and release. Consonant with this hypothesis, mutations in virtually any essential 
gene attenuates virus replication and pathogenesis in vivo, demonstrating the 
importance of efficient virus growth in disease progression. In general, this 
seems to be a common truism for most RNA virus genomes. Nevertheless, 
SARS-CoV also encodes a number of proteins that strongly antagonize the in-
nate immune sensing/signaling pathways and which likely function as important 
virulence determinants that regulate pathogenesis. Among the 16 SARS-CoV 
ORF1 replicase proteins, nsp1, nsp3 (PLP-papain like protease), nsp7 and 
nsp15 all encode strong interferon antagonist activities that either block type 1 
interferon and/or NFκB sensing/signaling pathways. These four non-structural 
proteins are encoded in all coronavirus genomes but are highly variable in 
primary amino acid sequence making it difficult to predict whether similar in-
nate immune antagonism activities are universally encoded in all Coronaviridae 
genomes. In addition, nsp1 is reported to block host translation and promote 
host, but not viral, mRNA degradation, and nsp1 and PLP mutations have 
been described which attenuate innate immune antagonism activities and/or 
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attenuate virus pathogenesis. However, even in closely related coronaviruses, 
these homologous proteins may or may not encode similar innate immune an-
tagonism functions, making it difficult to predict activity based on sequence ho-
mology and biologic precedent. For example, the HCoV NL63 and SARS-CoV 
nsp3 encoded PLP domains are highly variable, differing by over 80 percent 
in amino acid identity, yet both likely form similar structures and antagonize 
IFN signaling. It is not clear whether common sequence motifs regulate this 
activity. In addition to the non-structural proteins encoded in ORF1, antagonist 
activities are also encoded in ORF3b, ORF6 and the N protein, which either 
block type 1 interferon sensing and/or signaling by targeting novel cellular 
components essential for signal transduction. Except for ORF6 from the closely 
related Bt-SARS-CoV HKU3, it is not clear whether closely related group2b 
homologs also encode similar IFN antagonist activities. Several SARS-CoV 
proteins (e.g., S, M, ORF3a, ORF6, ORF7, N, etc.) are pro-apoptotic and likely 
contribute to virus cell killing and pathogenesis as well.
The nsp1 proteins of coronaviruses are highly variable, both in terms of 
size and amino acid sequence variation. The SARS-CoV NSP1 is a 20kd protein 
that is localized to the cytoplasm of infected cells. In some reports, the NSP1 
was able to block IFN-β mRNA induction but did not antagonize the IRF3 
signaling pathway. NSP1 expression degraded not only IFN-β mRNA but also 
several endogenous cellular mRNAs as well and inhibited in translation of 
cellular mRNAs. As SARS-CoV infected cells also degraded cellular mRNA, 
these authors proposed that nsp1 degradation of host mRNA is an important 
mechanism of blocking host antiviral defenses. However, other work suggests 
that SARS-CoV NSP1 inhibits the signal transduction pathways involving IRF3, 
STAT1 and NF-kB. Interestingly, these authors did not observe the mRNA 
degradation phenotype seen in the previous studies.
ORF6 is a 63aa ER/Golgi membrane protein that has its C terminal tail fac-
ing the cytoplasm and its N terminus either in the ER lumen or associated with 
the ER membrane. ORF6 blocks the nuclear import of the STAT1/STAT2/IRF9 
and STAT1/STAT1 complexes in the presence of IFNβ or IFNγ treatment, re-
spectively, and resulted in the reduction of STAT1-dependent gene induction. 
The C terminal 10aa were critical for this import block; mediated by a recruit-
ment of nuclear import factors to the ER/Golgi membrane. Karyopherin alpha 
2 (KPNA2) specifically binds to the C-terminal tail of ORF6, retaining KPNA2 
at the ER/Golgi membrane. This interaction subsequently recruits Karyopherin 
beta 1 (KPNB1) to the ER/Golgi membrane as well. The recruitment of KPNB1 
onto membrane complexes limited the bioavailability of KPNB1, an essential 
component for the nuclear import of STAT1 complexes as well as other cargo. 
Consequently, ORF6 blocked nuclear import of the STAT1 complexes. ORF6 
may affect other signaling pathways since KPNB1 is a common component of 
the classical nuclear import pathways. In recombinant viruses, ORF6 has also 
been shown to increase pathogenesis of the normally non-lethal MHV-A59 
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virus. In vitro studies with the MHV/ORF6 virus show that ORF6 expression 
increased the virus production from cells compared to WT virus. Recently, Hus-
sain et al showed that ORF6 expression blocked proteins containing classical 
import signals but not proteins that use non-importin nuclear import mecha-
nisms (Hussain, Perlman et al. 2008). MHV’s accessory proteins have not been 
implicated in impacting the innate immune response however they may clearly 
play a role in MHV’s capacity to evade the innate immune sensing proteins as 
deletion of some, but not all impact in vivo pathogenesis. The clear association 
of SARS-CoV ORF6 and Ebola VP24 with the host nuclear import pathway 
identifies nuclear import as a key site by which highly pathogenic viruses regu-
late the intracellular environment. By modulating the kinetics of nuclear import 
during infection, the virus controls innate immune, adaptive immune, apoptotic 
and cell stress signaling networks. While the mechanism may vary, it would be 
surprising if other pathogenic viruses don’t modulate the same pathways as seen 
in SARS-CoV during their infection process.
The SARS-CoV and MHV nucleocapsid protein have also been shown to 
affect different aspects of the innate immune response and appear to modulate 
several signaling pathways in the cell. Many of these studies were performed 
using over expression constructs in isolation and have not been confirmed 
in the context of virus infection. He et al. showed that N protein is able to 
induce AP-1 signaling in vitro. SARS-CoV N was able to block the induc-
tion of reporter gene expression from an IFN-β promoter and also block 
NF-kB signaling. These data indicate that the N protein is also able to inhibit 
an ISRE promoter in response to Sendai infection but not IFN-β treatment. 
The mechanism by which this inhibition is occurring is unknown and under 
investigation. The MHV N protein has been shown to inhibit the activation of 
PKR, a strongly antiviral protein, in the cytoplasm from poxvirus vectors and in 
MHV-infected cells. PKR activation normally leads to a block in protein synthe-
sis by phosphorylating the alpha subunit of the translation factor eIF2. While 
N does not itself prevent PKR activation, it alters PKR’s function such that it 
no longer signals properly. The N proteins between these two distinct group 2 
coronaviruses are quite conserved, so it will be interesting to determine if they 
both encode overlapping functions during infection or whether they mediate 
distinct inhibitory mechanisms.
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Appendix J
Pathogenicity Acquisition
The following sections discuss mechanisms, and provide examples, of how 
a microorganism may acquire pathogenicity.
GENE GAIN
Generation of Multidrug Resistant Bacterial Pathogens
The emergence of multidrug resistant bacterial pathogens, including Staph-
ylococcus aureus, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and Pseudomonas aeruginosa, 
highlights the importance of understanding the mechanisms by which antibiotic 
resistance is transferred among different genera of bacteria. The acquisition of 
resistance to multiple antimicrobial agents is a hallmark of methicillin-resistant 
S. aureus (MRSA), organisms that can cause life-threatening skin and soft tissue 
infections, endocarditis, and pneumonia. The SCCmec cassette, which confers 
resistance to methicillin and other β-lactams, is chromosomally-encoded but is 
transferred by a mobile genetic element. Mobile genetic elements, including 
transposons, plasmids, and bacteriophage, are the most common sources of 
acquired antibiotic resistance in MRSA. In addition, spontaneous mutations in 
chromosomally encoded genes can confer resistance to antibiotics (e.g., rpsL 
and streptomycin).
The two types of MRSA circulating within the human population are 
community-acquired (CA-MRSA) and healthcare-associated (HA-MRSA) 
MRSA. HA-MRSA strains have been propagated in healthcare facilities in the 
face of antibiotic pressure and continue to survive and multiply as a result of 
acquisition of multiple elements conferring resistance to antibiotics. In contrast, 
CA-MRSA strains have been propagated in the absence of extreme selective 
8
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pressure and have acquired resistance to fewer antibiotics. Both types of MRSA 
maintain chromosomal mutations that confer resistance to some therapies; 
these mutations are selected for and maintained in healthcare environments. 
HA-MRSA strains cause disease in immunocompromised individuals and 
are rarely isolated from patients with MRSA infections that are not linked to 
healthcare settings. In contrast, CA-MRSA strains typically cause infection in 
immunocompetent and otherwise healthy people. The mechanisms underlying 
this difference are still unclear and are likely multifactorial. Some evidence 
suggests that the acquisition of multiple antibiotic-resistance determinants by 
HA-MRSA strains actually reduces the “fitness” of the organism, which makes 
them unable to colonize and/or infect otherwise healthy people.
Toxins
Protein toxins in bacteria are often associated with mobile genetic elements 
such as phages and plasmid DNA. For this reason many toxin genes have 
spread between species by horizontal gene transfer. Production of active toxin 
sometimes requires the presence of accessory proteins for posttranslational 
modification and/or export. Thus the detection of a toxin gene is not neces-
sarily predictive of virulence. These toxins may be grouped into two broad 
categories, structural and enzymatic. Structural toxins produce an effect solely 
through interactions with the target cell while enzymatic toxins catalyze a spe-
cific reaction that has an effect on the cell.
Acquisition of Shiga toxin-encoding bacteriophage. The emergence of Shiga 
toxin-producing E. coli strains in the early 1980s provides a clear example of 
how common bacteria may acquire bacteriophages that encode virulence traits 
such as bacterial toxin genes. This horizontal transfer of genetic material among 
bacteria via phage infection can result in the rapid evolution of new pathogens. 
The E. coli serotype O157 cited above was previously unknown as a pathogen in 
humans; however, the incorporation of genes homologous to those that encode 
Shiga toxin in the related agent of bacillary dysentery, Shigella dysenteriae type 
1, generated a strain that produces hemorrhagic colitis and the life-threatening 
hemolytic uremic syndrome in humans.
Shiga toxins are AB5 toxins (one polypeptide chain that has enzymatic 
activity and 5 cell-binding subunits) that are among the most potent toxins 
known. They kill sensitive cells by shutting down protein synthesis in a manner 
identical to that of ricin. Indeed, Shiga toxins, like ricin, are classified as SAs. 
In addition to E. coli O157, several other serotypes of E. coli and some related 
species including Shigella sonnei, Aeromonas hydrophila, and Enterobacter cloa-
cae have been described that encode related Shiga-type toxins within lysogenic 
(chromosomally-integrated) bacteriophages and cause disease in humans. Bac-
teriophages are thought to be the most plentiful infectious forms on Earth. 
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The ubiquitous nature of these agents, and the frequency with which they 
recombine with one another during bacterial infection, provides an enormous 
opportunity for the exchange of phage and bacterial DNA. Furthermore, dur-
ing the lytic cycle of bacteriophage replication, numerous phage particles are 
generated and released upon lysis of an infected bacterium. This provides the 
opportunity for additional bacterial infections and transfer of phage-encoded 
virulence factors. Indeed, transfer of Shiga toxin-bearing phages from patho-
genic strains of E. coli to “bystander” E. coli strains that constitute normal 
intestinal flora has been observed during experimental infections in animals 
and certainly occurs in nature.
Cholera toxin acquisition ia toxin-coregulated pilus mediated CTXΦ 
uptake. Vibrio cholerae is the etiological agent of cholera, a disease that mani-
fests as either mild self-limited diarrhea or potentially fatal watery diarrhea 
and vomiting. The hallmark watery diarrhea results from intoxication with 
cholera toxin (CT), an AB5 toxin that binds to the ganglioside GM1 on the 
surface of intestinal epithelial cells. Five B subunits form a pentameric pore to 
facilitate entry of the A subunit into the cell; the internalized A subunit trans-
fers ADP-ribose to a G protein that activates adenylate cyclase, which leads to 
increased cAMP production and hypersecretion of water and electrolytes. The 
genes encoding CT (ctxAB) are encoded on CTXΦ, a filamentous phage that 
is thought to be transferred from one bacterium to another during infection of 
the small intestine (McLeod, Kimsey et al. 2005). The V. cholerae surface recep-
tor for CTXΦ is the toxin-coregulated pilus (TCP), a type IV bundle-forming 
pilus whose synthesis is encoded by genes found on a PAI on the V. cholerae 
large chromosome. In addition to its function as the receptor for CT, TCP is 
factor that is required for V. cholerae intestinal colonization. Once CTXΦ is 
internalized into the bacterial cell, it integrates into the host genome using 
host machinery. Transcription of phage genes required for phage replication 
and virion production is repressed during lysogeny. Expression of ctxAB and 
the tcp loci is controlled by a complex network of regulatory elements known 
as the ToxR regulon (Matson, Withey et al. 2007). Unlike most phage that 
encode virulence factors, CTXΦ is never excised from the chromosome; the 
mechanism underlying this phenomenon is not known. Instead, phage replica-
tion occurs during genome replication, and new virions are produced as a result 
of transcription and translation of integrated chromosomal phage genes when 
transcription is derepressed under stress conditions (McLeod, Kimsey et al. 
2005). Virions are secreted using machinery encoded by both the phage and the 
host; once secreted into the extracellular milieu, phage can bind to the TCP of 
a susceptible host cell and be internalized. Identification of the ctxAB genes in 
the Vibrio cholerae genome would suggest that the particular strain could cause 
water diarrhea; however, regulation of ctxA is sufficiently complicated that mere 
identification of the toxin genes would not be predictive of virulence.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
8 APPENDIX J
Capsule Switching in Streptococcus Pneumoniae
Streptococcus pneumoniae is an etiologic agent of otitis media, pneumonia, 
meningitis, and septicemia. The incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease has 
decreased since the introduction of two vaccines that protect against infection 
with S. pneumoniae. The vaccines are composed of capsular polysaccharides 
from 7 (Prevnar™) or 23 (Pneumovax®) of the most commonly isolated se-
rotypes of S. pneumoniae. To date, 91 serotypes of S. pneumoniae have been 
described based upon their unique capsule structures (Park, Pritchard et al. 
2007). Recombination of capsule loci, or capsular switching, is a common 
mechanism utilized by S. pneumoniae to evade host defenses. The regions flank-
ing the capsule loci are very similar among capsular serotypes, and this sequence 
characteristic facilitates homologous recombination of capsule genes acquired 
through horizontal gene transfer in this naturally competent organism. Routine 
vaccination of young children with Prevnar™ has led to a significant decrease in 
the incidence of pneumococcal disease caused by the 7 serotypes in the vaccine. 
However, because S. pneumoniae is readily able to undergo horizontal transfer 
of its capsule genes, non-vaccine serotypes of the pneumococcus have emerged 
as important causative agents of invasive disease. Thus, the bacteria are rapidly 
adapting to an alteration in host susceptibility.
O-Antigen Evolution in Salmonella
Salmonella species are masters of adaptation to the host environment 
(Kingsley and Bäumler 2000). Upon infection with a Salmonella species to 
which it is susceptible, the host will develop symptoms of salmonellosis, which, 
in humans, is often characterized by gastroenteritis. The majority of humans will 
resolve the symptoms of Salmonella typhimurium subsp typhi infection within 
a day or two. In a small subset of cases, the bacteria enter the bloodstream to 
cause bacteremia. Ultimately, Salmonella migrates to the gall bladder, which 
is an immunologically protected environment, and resides there for years in a 
chronic colonization state. Occasionally Salmonella are released back into the 
intestine when bile is secreted, which allows for shedding of the organism and 
transmission to a new host.
The vast majority of mammals that become infected with Salmonella spp. 
produce antibodies against the lipopolysaccharide (LPS) O-antigen; O-antigen 
is the highly variable terminal oligosaccharide structure that forms the basis 
for the serogroups of Salmonella. Once a host develops antibodies against the 
O-antigen, the host is protected from reinfection with the same or a different 
strain that harbors the same O-antigen. Within a population, infection followed 
by protective antibody generation eventually reduces the virulence of strains 
that harbor a particular O-antigen to the point that the organism must evolve 
in order to survive. The genes that encode the enzymes required for O-antigen 
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synthesis routinely undergo horizontal gene transfer in the face of host adapta-
tion. When the O-antigen structure changes, the population becomes suscep-
tible to infection with the strain that expresses the newly acquired O-antigen, 
and the cycle begins anew.
GENE LOSS
Shigella spp
The evolution of a non-pathogenic bacterial species into a genetically 
related but pathogenic species typically occurs as a result of the acquisition of 
genes encoding virulence factors, often via transfer of pathogenicity islands. 
However, loss of a gene or genes can also be critical to the capacity of a non-
pathogenic organism to be converted to one that causes serious disease. Such 
is the case for the evolution of non-pathogenic Escherichia coli into pathogenic 
Shigella spp. and the genetically and clinically similar enteroinvasive E. coli 
(EIEC). Laboratory strains of E. coli contain a gene, cadA, that encodes lysine 
decarboxylase, an enzyme that catalyzes the decarboxylation of lysine to form 
cadaverine. The cadA locus has been deleted from E. coli during the evolution 
of the pathogenic Shigella spp. and EIEC. While cadaverine does not affect the 
invasive capacity of Shigella spp. and EIEC, it completely inhibits enterotoxin 
activity of Shigella spp.(Maurelli, Fernandez et al. 1998). Thus, the loss of cadA 
enhanced the virulence of the Shigella spp. and EIEC.
Y. pestis
Gene loss was a key mechanism in the evolution of Yersinia pseudotuber-
culosis to Y. pestis. Y. pseudotuberculosis is a free-living bacterium that causes 
mild gastroenteritis in humans and animals. In contrast, Y. pestis is an extremely 
virulent organism that causes bubonic and pneumonic plague. The host range 
for the two organisms differs considerably in that Y. pestis requires a vector (the 
flea) for transmission between mammalian hosts, while Y. pseudotuberculosis is 
transmitted freely between mammalian hosts. Genomic analyses of representa-
tive strains from each species demonstrated that, despite the difference in host 
range, the two organisms are very closely related at the nucleotide level, and 
that Y. pseudotuberculosis is the most recent ancestor of Y. pestis (Chain P). 
However, and perhaps owing to the need to adapt to different host niches, up 
to 13 percent of the Y. pestis chromosome is inactivated.
GENE MUTATION
Filoiruses. The Marburg and Ebola filoviruses and the SARS-CoV coro-
navirus replicate poorly in adult mice. Mouse adaptation of these viruses has 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
8 APPENDIX J
provided an opportunity to identify mutation sets that are responsible for high 
virulence and cross species adaptation, although the approach is often limited 
by the isogenic host background as compared with outbred populations in 
natural settings. By blind serial passage in progressively older mice, mouse-
adapted Ebola (MA-ZEBOV) acquired eight amino acid changes that were 
associated with high virulence, as well as a variety of silent changes. Using 
recombinant viruses, introduction of wild-type alleles into MA-ZEBOV VP24 
and/or the NP protein were significantly associated with decreased virulence 
in the BALB/c mouse model. Moreover, efficient MA-ZEBOV replication in 
mice required the mouse adapted NP and VP24 genes, the latter is a potent 
inhibitor of type I interferon signaling. Recombinant viruses encoding the MA-
VP24 mutation grew extremely efficiently in IFN-treated mouse peritoneal 
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Figure  Appendix J -- Genome
FIGURE J.1 Genome organization of icMA15 (Panel A). A series of chimeric icMA15 
viruses were generated with different subsets of 5 icMA15 mutations in the icSARS-
CoV WT genome, noting that wildtype positions in nsp9 and the S gene attenuated 
virulence in young but not aged animals (Panel B). Smaller combinations of the MA15 
mutation set showed that 2-set nsp9/S or S/M were sufficient to kill aged animals only 
(Panel C).
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macrophage cell lines. The data indicate that VP24 type I interferon antagonist 
activity is a significant virulence factor for ZEBOV replication and pathogenesis 
in mammals, although the molecular mechanisms governing its in io function 
remain unclear (Ebihara, Takada et al. 2006). Ebola VP24-mediated inhibition 
of cellular responses to IFNs correlates with the impaired nuclear accumula-
tion of tyrosine-phosphorylated STAT1; mostly likely by VP24 interactions with 
karyopherin alpha1, but not with karyopherin alpha2, alpha3, or alpha4. It is 
possible that the mouse adapted mutations in VP24 confer increased targeting 
and antagonism of murine Karyopherin alpha 1 protein import machinery, 
although direct proof is lacking. Serial passage of Marburg virus was first 
done in immunodeficient (SCID) mice, and then in immunocompetent mice. 
In io adaptation has also resulted in a mouse-adapted strain MARV-Ravn. 
MARV-Ravn also caused uncontrolled viremia and high viral titers in the liver, 
spleen, lymph node, and other organs; profound lymphopenia; destruction of 
lymphocytes within the spleen and lymph nodes; and marked liver damage and 
thrombocytopenia in BALB/c mice. Sequence analysis of the mouse-adapted 
MARV-Ravn strain revealed differences in 16 predicted amino acids from the 
progenitor virus, although the exact changes required for adaptation are un-
clear at this time.
Serial passage of the late phase epidemic SARS-CoV Urbani in 10-week-
old BALB/c mouse lungs also resulted in mouse adapted strains after 15 or 25 
2-3 day passages. Under near identical conditions in 1-year-old animals, only 5 
passages were sufficient for mouse adaptation demonstrating the increased sus-
ceptibility of aged populations to lethal SARS-CoV infection (data not shown). 
Importantly, these viruses cause an ARDS phenotype reminiscent of acute 
human infections in aged animals, and pneumonia in young animals. Thus, 
age, genetic background of the host and immune status likely facilitate cross-
species transmission and adaptation potential of zoonotic RNA viruses. Se-
quence analysis of young-mouse-adapted strains revealed mutations in common 
genes sets, notably nsp5, nsp9, the M glycoprotein genes, including changes 
within the RBD of S. Unique targets in icMA15 and MA25 included nsp3, 
nsp12 and nsp13. Using recombinant chimeras between icMA15 and wildtype 
SARS-CoV, mutations in nsp9 and the S glycoprotein were most important for 
eliciting fatal disease in young, but not aged animals, although these changes 
were still highly interdependent on the other mutations as well. In aged ani-
mals, however, smaller subsets (2 mutations) of mutations encoded by icMA15 
genotype were capable of producing fatal disease. Interdependency of the allele 
sets was mostly lost as virtually all two or four set combinations tested were 
lethal and the S gene mutation set also resulted in significant morbidity with 
an ARDS pathogenic phenotype. These data are consistent with the idea that 
aged populations are more compliant hosts for rapid SARS-CoV adaptation to 
virulence.
Although the mutation sets in S were different in icMA15 and MA25, both 
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sets of RBD mutation putatively enhanced S interaction with the mouse ACE2 
receptor, likely increasing virus replication efficiency in the lung by 2-3 logs of 
titer (See above Figure. Mouse Adapted Mutations in the S Glycoprotein RBD-
hACE Interaction Site). Other unique pathways to SARS-CoV S RBD mACE2 
recognition have also been identified (data not shown), reiterating the plasticity 
of coronavirus RBD-receptor interaction networks. Thus, the in io models 
of SARS-CoV adaptation to the murine host reflected the key role that the S 
glycoprotein plays in mediating cross-species adaptation and pathogenesis. 
Notably, and in contrast to results seen with filoviruses, no evolution was noted 
in the six different antagonists of innate immunity. It is noteworthy that each in 
io adapation model selected for unique sets of mutations that enhanced virus 
replication efficiency, resulting in increased pathogenic outcomes. Although 
mutation sets targeted key genes essential for efficient virus-host interaction, 
Figure Appendix J -- Mouse
FIGURE J.2 Mouse adapted mutations in the S glycoprotein RBD-hACE interaction 
site.
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the actual mutation sets were different, demonstrating the existence of mul-
tiple genetic pathways to increased virulence and the same pulmonary disease 
outcome. Moreover, host background (e.g., genetics, age, immune status, etc.) 
was a major selective force in the evolution of virulence, further complicating 
the development of universal laws governing cross-species transmission and 
virulence.
GENE REGULATION
Regulation of Bacterial Pathogenicity
If an organism possesses specialized gene products for its virulence, it must 
be able to utilize them when needed, but not squander its metabolic energy pro-
ducing them aimlessly or risk having them detected by host defenses and neu-
tralized prematurely. Consequently, regulation of virulence factor expression 
is an additional, yet essential, complication of a pathogenic microorganism’s 
life. The host presents an array of conditions that are strikingly distinct from 
those of the outside environment, conditions that are not easily reproduced in 
the laboratory. In fact, laboratory culture conditions bias our understanding 
of microbial adaptation to natural environments. V. cholerae, for example, is 
thought to persist in brackish estuaries and other saline aquatic environments, 
sometimes associated with the chitinous exoskeleton of various marine organ-
isms. Transition from this milieu to the contrasting environment of the human 
small intestinal lumen must be accompanied by substantial genetic regulatory 
events.
The microbial cell is relatively simple, yet it possesses the means to detect, 
often simultaneously, changes in temperature, ionic conditions, oxygen con-
centration, pH, and calcium, iron, and other metal concentrations that might 
appear to be subtle signals, but which are essential for the precise mobilization 
of virulence determinants. Similarly, environmental regulatory signals prepare 
the microorganism for its transition from an extracellular to an intracellular 
existence. For example, iron is a critical component of many cell metabolic 
processes; therefore, it is not surprising that animals rely on high-affinity iron-
binding and storage proteins to deprive microorganisms from access to this 
nutrient, especially at the mucosal surface. In turn, most pathogens sense iron 
availability and induce or repress various iron acquisition systems accordingly. 
Indeed, many microorganisms possess toxins that are regulated by iron such 
that low iron concentrations trigger toxin biosynthesis. In addition, reversible 
regulation of virulence gene expression by temperature is a feature common to 
many pathogens. For example, E. coli may be deposited in feces and live for 
long periods of time under conditions of nutrient depletion and low tempera-
ture. However, it has learned to mobilize its colonization-specific genes when 
it is returned to the warm mammalian body. The regulatory machinery used to 
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accomplish this is an important feature of many pathogens, including Yersinia 
pestis and B. anthracis, both of which exist in multiple niches within and outside 
the mammalian host.
The number of well-characterized virulence regulatory systems is rapidly 
increasing, in part because of the development of rapid methods for screening 
gene expression on a genome-wide basis (e.g., with the use of DNA microar-
rays). At the same time, relatively little is known about both the specific envi-
ronmental signals to which these systems respond and the exact role of these 
responses in the course of human infection. One common mechanism for bacte-
rial transduction of environmental signals involves two-component regulatory 
systems that act on gene expression, usually at the transcriptional level. Such 
systems make use of similar pairs of proteins; one protein of the pair spans the 
cytoplasmic membrane, contains a transmitter domain, and may act as a sensor 
of environmental stimuli, whereas the other is a cytoplasmic protein (“response 
regulator”) with a receiver domain that regulates responsive genes or proteins. 
These regulatory systems are common in both pathogens and non-pathogens so 
their detection by sequence analysis cannot be employed as a reliable predictor 
of pathogen vs. non-pathogen.
The coordinated control of pathogenicity incorporates the important con-
cept of a regulon. A regulon is a group of operons and/or individual genes 
controlled by a common regulator, usually a protein activator or repressor. A 
regulon provides a means by which many genes can respond in concert to a 
particular stimulus. At other times the same genes may respond independently 
to other signals. Global regulatory networks are a common feature of microbial 
virulence as well as basic microbial physiology and therefore their sequences, 
while often essential for a pathogen, are also not reliable predictors of virulence. 
The apparent complexity of virulence regulation in a single microbial pathogen 
is magnified by the coexistence of multiple interacting (“cross-talking”) systems 
and by regulons within regulons.
Proper presentation of certain virulence-associated gene products on the 
microbial surface is now recognized to be as important to pathogenicity as the 
initial expression of these genes. Presentation entails export pathways, associa-
tion with other periplasmic or surface factors, macromolecular assembly at the 
surface (for some), as well as regulation of the export components themselves. 
Among bacterial pathogens and non-pathogens alike that inhabit the human 
body, shared homology is apparent among families of proteins involved in 
these processes. Folding, transport, and assembly of specific proteins enable 
a microorganism to present a specific array of surface molecules necessary 
for eukaryotic cell tropism, intoxication, or entry. The precise configuration 
of a number of microbial surface molecules might be viewed as a cooperative 
“attack complex,” a property not found in any of the individual components. 
However, remarkably similar complexes are used by harmless microorganisms 
in the colonization of mucosal surfaces. In one case, the harmless microorgan-
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ism remains attached to the host surface and causes no harm while, in the other 
case, the organism attaches to the mucosal surface and breaches this barrier to 
cause infection and disease.
Pathogenic microorganisms have developed many different mechanisms by 
which to regulate expression of virulence factors. For organisms with multiple 
hosts, such as Y. pestis, differential expression of virulence factors is required 
for adaptation and survival within each host environment. In the case of com-
mensal organisms that cause infection opportunistically, such as Staphylococcus 
aureus, control of virulence factor expression is niche-dependent.
The lifestyle of Y. pestis requires survival of the organism in the flea host 
and the mammalian host. The primary reservoir for Y. pestis is rodents. Rodent-
to-rodent transmission can occur, which can lead to epizootic plague. Fleas be-
come infected by feeding on rodents that are bacteremic as a result of Y. pestis 
infection. The bacteria multiply rapidly in the flea midgut, and cause blockage 
of the proventriculus. Transmission of Y. pestis from flea to human occurs as 
the flea bites and attempts to feed on the human. Because the proventriculus is 
blocked, the flea regurgitates the Y. pestis into the bite, which, in turn, may lead 
to human infection. The virulence factors required for each host environment 
are regulated primarily by the temperature of the host. LcrF and Caf1R are pos-
itive regulators of virulence factors that are expressed in the mammalian host 
(Reviewed by Konkel and Tilly 2000). LcrF regulates expression of ~50 genes 
that encode the Yops (Yersinia outer proteins); the Yop effector proteins are 
secreted via a type III secretion system that is part of the Yop family. In addi-
tion to being controlled by temperature, lcrF is regulated post-transcriptionally 
because the ribosome binding site of the lcrF transcript is sequestered in a 
stem-loop structure at low temperature. When the host temperature increases 
(i.e., when the bacteria enter the mammalian host), the stem-loop unfolds and 
permits binding of the ribosome to promote translation of lcrF. Caf1R regulates 
expression of the Y. pestis capsule genes. The capsule provides protection from 
phagocytosis of Y. pestis; such protection is critical to survival of the organism 
in the mammalian bloodstream. In contrast, the hms locus is induced at low 
temperature, when Y. pestis is in the flea. The hms locus encodes genes whose 
products are required for hemin storage. Inactivation of the hms genes results 
in Y. pestis strains that are unable to block the flea proventriculus, but, as an-
ticipated, has no effect on pathogenesis in mammalian hosts because the genes 
are expressed only at low temperature (in the flea).
In conclusion, the inherent pathogenicity of a microorganism can be al-
tered by gene additions or losses or through genetic regulation of essential 
genes for virulence.
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Appendix K
Interactions of Infectious 
Agents with the Host
PLANT PATHOGENS
Examples are given by the major evolutionary mechanisms by which plant 
pathogens have emerged as threats to agricultural ecosystems. These mecha-
nisms take place over variable time scales ranging from short to hundreds or 
thousands of years.
Host-Tracking
Host-tracking refers to a co-evolution of a pathogen with its host during 
the process of host domestication, which includes the formation of a specific 
agro-ecological system. Host-tracking includes the selection and cultivation of 
desirable host genotypes, processes that simultaneously select for pathogen gen-
otypes adapted to the selected individuals and the agro-ecological conditions 
in which the process occurred. The process can take seven to twelve thousand 
years and pathogen and host share the same center of origin. A documented 
example is Mycosphaerella graminicola on wheat, (Stukenbrock, Banke et al. 
2007). The emergence of this pathogen causing the Septoria tritici leaf blotch 
disease on wheat was studied by genealogical and model-based coalescent ap-
proaches on seven selected genes from 184 isolates (Stukenbrock, Banke et al. 
2007). Two related but genetically differentiated wild grass-infecting popula-
tions of M. graminicola named S1 and S2, and adapted to wheat, were identified 
on wild grasses collected in northwest Iran. The S1 and S2 populations were 
encountered on three different weedy grass species growing in the proximity of 
fields cultivated with wheat. The analysis indicated that the split between the 
most closely related wild grass infecting population S1 and M. graminicola oc-
curred approximately 10,000 to 12,000 years ago, which coincides with the time 

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that wheat was domesticated, suggesting a co-speciation of the host and patho-
gen. Similarly, another fungal pathogen Magnaporte oryzae, the causal agent of 
rice blast disease, underwent a host speciation due to the loss of the avirulence 
gene AVR-Co that was frequent in haplotypes from other hosts. The genetic 
isolation and divergence of an epidemic lineage from other populations on 
grasses may have resulted from rapid clonal propagation and strong selection 
mediated by the new domesticated host and its associated agro-ecosystem. The 
subsequent intensification and dissemination of this crop favored the propaga-
tion and global dispersal of clones of the rice-infecting blast pathogen (Couch, 
Fudal et al. 2005).
Host Shift
Host shift is a process in which a new pathogen emerges by adaptation to 
a new host that is a close relative of the former host (e.g., shifting from a wild 
crop to the new domesticated selection or variety of the crop). The process 
takes from less than 500 to 7,000 years, and the pathogen and host do not 
always originate in the same center of origin (Stukenbrock and McDonald 
2008). An example is the shift of Rhynchosporium secalis from wild grasses 
to barley and rye. This was an abrupt evolutionary change that took approxi-
mately 2,500-5,000 years, much later than the domestication of barley and 
rye. R. secalis causes scald diseases and infects barley (Hordeum ulgare), rye 
(Secale cereale), and other grasses. A RFLP allelic diversity analysis of 1,366 
geographical isolates indicated that the center of diversity of this pathogen did 
not coincide with the center of origin of barley, similar to the pattern found for 
the avirulence gene NIP (O.24). NIP has a dual function as both an elicitor of 
plant defense and as a toxin-encoding gene (O.25). NIP is often deleted (O.26) 
because its role as elicitor for plant defense drives this gene under positive di-
versifying selection. Further analysis of R. secalis revealed phylogenetic relation-
ships between different host-related lineages (O.27). These analyses confirmed 
a later emergence of the scald pathogen, most likely between 1,200-3,600 years 
after the introduction of the barley agro-ecosystem into northern Europe.
Host Jump
Host jump describes a process through which a new pathogen emerges in 
a host species that is genetically distant from the original plant host (e.g., from 
another class or order). In this case, the geographical origin of the host does 
not always correspond with the geographical origin of the pathogen as observed 
in the host shift process. An example is the emergence of Magnaporthe oryzae, 
which also fits into a host-tracking co-evolutionary scenario with rice; however, 
the emergence of a rice-infecting lineage also involved a number of host shifts 
from Setaria millet to rice (Couch, Fudal et al. 2005). The close proximity 
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between crop plants can facilitate a host jump of pathogens associated with ei-
ther one of the species. We will consider the evolutionary relationship between 
M. oryzae haplotypes on rice and on weeds of rice. The more ancestral haplo-
types originated from rice, whereas haplotypes from weeds of rice were found 
at the tips of a haplotype network. After additional host jumps that occurred to 
common weeds of rice, including cutgrass (Leersia hexandra) and torpedo grass 
(Panicum repens), the host specialization of the rice-infecting lineage occurred 
(Couch, Fudal et al. 2005).
HOST SPECIES TROPISM
Variola and Monkeypox Viruses
 What we know concerning variola and monkeypox virus virulence 
genes involved in host species tropism comes by analogy to well-characterized 
orthopoxvirus orthologues. Different poxviruses encode a different pattern of 
virulence genes that is the basis for their unique host biology. The function of a 
large number of these virulence genes is to ensure the infected cell or neighbor-
ing cells are metabolically active and capable of efficient production of progeny 
virus. Virulence genes encoded by monkeypox and variola viruses are listed for 
convenience as targeting five pathways:
• inhibitors of apoptosis, an early cellular protective response that elimi-
nates virus-infected cells and limits virus replication;
• inhibitors of pathogen recognition receptor (PRR) pathways that are 
triggered by pathogen associated molecular patterns (PAMPs) such as 
dsRNA and DNA;
• inhibitors of the interferon response, which induces a large number of 
unique antiviral molecules;
• modulators of the ubiquitin ligase system that regulates a large number 
of intracellular processes
• modulators of cell cycle and processes associated with transcription, 
DNA replication, and protein synthesis.
Genome comparisons identified 12 virulence genes that differed between 
variola and monkeypox viruses. The majority of these genes affect cell processes 
(i.e., apoptosis blockers, 2 genes and PRR and IFN responses, 7 genes). These 
differences are hypothesized to explain the dramatic difference in the animal 
species that act as reservoir or incidental hosts for the viruses. Monkeypox virus 
has a broad host range and several animal species may act as reservoir hosts in 
nature. In addition, field studies conducted in the lowland tropical forests of the 
Congo Basin and West Africa revealed that monkeypox virus can infect many 
animal species, including squirrels (Funisciurius spp. and Heliosciurus spp.) 
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and non-human primates (such as Cercopithecus spp.; Parker S). Variola virus, 
on the other hand, has human as the sole reservoir species and fails to cause 
experimental disease in standard adult, small animal, and non-human primate 
models under physiological conditions.
Franciscella Tularensis
Tularemia is a zoonotic disease caused by one of several subspecies of 
Francisella tularensis. F. tularensis subsp tularensis and subsp holarctica are 
most commonly associated with disease in humans. Outbreaks of disease in 
humans commonly occur during disease cycles in rodents and lagomorphs, 
mostly as a result of transmission from one mammal to another by one of a 
number of arthropod vectors. F. tularensis is a facultative intracellular bac-
terium that can infect humans via the skin (ulceroglandular), the conjunctiva 
(oculoglandular), the mouth (oropharyngeal or gastrointestinal), or the airway 
(pneumonic). Macrophages are the primary target cell for F. tularensis, which 
is taken up by asymmetric pseudopod loops formed by the macrophage in a 
complement-dependent manner. Intracellular survival of F. tularensis is a com-
plicated process that involves, but is likely not limited to, genes encoded on 
the large Francisella pathogenicity island. Genomic and proteomic analysis of 
F. tularensis spp. identified a large number of hypothetical genes/proteins with 
no homology to known genes and proteins. Thus, F. tularensis spp. provide 
ideal examples of organisms for which knowledge of genomic sequence does 
not allow for prediction of virulence.
Rickettsia Species
The Rickettsia genus contains at least 18 species, all of which are flea- or 
tick-borne bacteria (Gillespie, Ammerman et al. 2009). R. prowazekii and R. 
typhi are the etiological agents of typhus and murine typhus, respectively, and 
R. rickettsii is the causative agent of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. R. prowa-
zekii is transmitted from louse to mammalian host in the feces of the louse; 
the rickettsia are deposited onto the host skin by the louse and subsequently 
enter the bloodstream of the host via scarification of bites. Naïve lice become 
infected through feeding of the mammalian host, thus renewing the life cycle 
of the rickettsia. R. typhi are transmitted to rodents, primarily rats, by a similar 
mechanism except that the arthropod vector is the flea. An uncommon sequela 
to typhus is the development of a recrudescent illness, known as Brill-Zinsser 
disease, during which R. prowazekii can sequester itself within the host for 
months to years. Because infection of a mammalian host results from death of 
the louse, Brill-Zinsser disease may represent a mechanism by which R. prowa-
zekii can be maintained and transmitted for many years following the initial 
infection. R. rickettsii, on the other hand, is transmitted to its mammalian host 
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through the bite of a tick; the tick can infect multiple hosts because it does not 
die as a result of the R. rickettsii infection. Little information is available about 
the rickettsial genes that are required for entry into and replication within the 
arthropod vector of any of the known Rickettsia species. The genomes of the 
typhus-causing rickettsia and R. felis (another insect-borne Rickettsia species) 
are surprisingly different given that they share similar arthropod hosts and 
cause similar diseases (of varying intensity) in their mammalian hosts. Of note, 
only two open reading frames are shared specifically by the insect-borne Rick-
ettsia species (R. prowazekii, R. typhi, and R. felis); these genes are linked on 
the chromosome and are thought to have been acquired by lateral gene transfer, 
which is a newly discovered phenomenon in the rickettsial species (Gillespie, 
Ammerman et al. 2009). However, the function of the open reading frames is 
unknown. Thus, once again, knowledge of the genome sequence of a group of 
related organisms does not allow us to predict the pathogenicity of any of the 
organisms.
HOST INNATE RESPONSES AND PATHOGEN-
ENCODED COUNTERMEASURES
Microbial pathogens have evolved complex and efficient methods to over-
come both innate and adaptive immune host responses to infection. Here we 
provide a few examples from the large number of the diverse approaches that 
viruses and bacteria have evolved to evade and subvert key, innate antimicrobial 
responses in animals and plants.
Plant Innate Defense System
Plants have evolved resistance (R) genes encoding proteins that confer 
resistance to specific pathogens. The plant pathogen molecule that specifically 
elicits R-protein-mediated responses is termed an avirulence (Avr) determinant. 
The Avr proteins are usually necessary for successful infections and are virulence 
factors in a susceptible host (Soosaar, Burch-Smith et al. 2005). For example, the 
Arabidopsis thaliana RCY gene confers resistance to the Y strain of Cucumber 
mosaic virus (CMV), but not to the O strain. When the Y strain of CMV infects 
RCY-containing plants, a defense response that restricts the virus to the infec-
tion site and prevents disease is initiated. The virus is an avirulent pathogen on 
these resistant plants and this is termed an incompatible interaction (Soosaar, 
Burch-Smith et al. 2005). A. thaliana encodes a second R gene, HRT, which con-
fers a hypersensitive response (HR) to Turnip crinkle irus (TCV). Both RCY 
and HRT genes are allelic and encode proteins that share 91 percent similarity 
but confer resistance to unrelated viruses: CMV, a cucumovirus and TCV, a 
carmovirus, respectively. Another example in Nicotiana glutinosa is the N gene 
which confers resistance to Tobacco mosaic irus (TMV, a Tobamovirus) (Soosaar, 
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Burch-Smith et al. 2005; Bent and Mackey 2007). In order to establish a rapid 
and productive infection, a plant virus must enter the plant cell with defense 
proteins or immediately synthesize them. Examples include the following:
• The P1-HcPro encoded by Turnip mosaic irus (TuMV), a virus with 
a RNA genome, interferes with the miRNA-controlled development 
pathways that share components with the antiviral RNA-silencing 
pathway. This interference acts as a viral counter-defense mechanism 
that enables systemic infection by TuMV (Dunoyer, Lecellier et al. 
2004);
• The p19 proteins from a number of tombusviruses including Tomato 
bushy stunt irus, Cymbidium ringspot irus, and Carnation Italian 
ringspot irus allow a high accumulation of viral RNAs and also are 
responsible for TBSV pathogenesis (Qiu, Park et al. 2007).
• The CP (capsid protein), p20, and p23 proteins of Citrus tristeza virus 
each have an unique suppressor of RNA silencing activity (Lu, Foli-
monov et al. 2004).
• The 2b protein encoded by CMV performs as a suppressor of RNA 
silencing and a pathogenicity determinant (Anandalakshmi, Pruss et 
al. 1998; Brigneti, Voinnet et al. 1998).
• The p25 of Potato irus X which blocks the host silencing signal from 
spreading to other cells (Voinnet, Lederer et al. 2000).
• Pseudomonas syringae AvrPto and AvrPtoB act upstream of the MAP 
kinase signaling to suppress transcription of a few transcripts induced 
by flagellin via PRR FLS2.
• Other bacteria with avirulence genes are: Pseudomonas syringae pv. gly-
cinea (arA, arB and arC); Pseudomonas syringae pv. Tomato (arD, 
arRpt, and arPto); Xanthomona campestris pv. Vesicatoria (arBs, 
arBs); and Xanthomonas campestris pv. raphani (arXca) (Vivian and 
Gibbon 1997)
• A number of fungal virulence genes have also been discovered: Nectria 
haematococca (PEP and PDA); tomato leaf mold fungus Cladosporium 
fulum (syn. Passalora fula (Ars and Ecps); and Magnaporte oryzae 
(AVR-CO) (van der Does and Rep 2007).
Pattern-Recognition Receptor Signaling
The plant and animal germ-line encoded PRRs of the innate immune system 
sense through pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs) the presence 
of a bacterial, viral or fungal infection (Medzhitov R). One type of PRR, the 
toll-like receptor (TLR) family, recognizes a vast array of microbial molecules, 
including lipopolysaccharide (TLR4), bacterial flagellin (TLR5), viral double-
stranded RNA (TLR3), and bacterial and viral DNA (TLR9). All PRRs initiate 
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signaling pathways that converge at the activation of the transcription factors 
IRF3, IRF7, and/or NF-κB, which leads to the expression of IFN-β and the 
IFN-stimulated genes. Some PRRs also instruct the adaptive immune system, 
thereby orchestrating an optimal response against the particular pathogen.
Viruses more so than bacteria directly interfere with PRR signaling. The 
importance of this pathway in the control of virus replication is underscored 
by the identification of greater than 19 inhibitors of PRR signaling encoded 
by protypic viruses from 9 virus families (Bowie and Unterholzner 2008). 
Some viruses interfere in the PRR signaling pathway at multiple points as 
mentioned previously for variola virus (i.e., Cop-M2, Cop-K1, Bsh-D7, Cop-
N1 and Cop-A46). Similarly, hepatitis C virus NS3-4A protein inhibits TLR3 
signaling though the degradation of TRIF, and the NS5A protein inhibits the 
activity of IFN-inducible dsRNA-dependent protein kinase, 2’,5’-oligoadenyl-
ate synthase, and myeloid differentiation primary-response gene 88. In addition, 
a single step in the PRR pathway can be targeted by convergent evolution by a 
number of viruses. Ebola virus VP35, vaccinia virus E3L, influenza virus A NS1 
and reovirus σ3 all sequester double-stranded RNA that prevents activation 
of RIGI and MDA5. Evidence of bacterial pathogens directly interfering with 
TLR signaling is limited; however there is at least one example of downstream 
modulation of PRR responses. LcrV is encoded on pYV virulence plasmid 
common to Y. pestis, Y. pseudotuberculosis, and Y. enterocolitica. Like many 
virulence factors, LcrV is described to be involved in several functions includ-
ing regulation of production of Yops and the type III protein secretion system 
that translocates Yops into host cells. In addition, LcrV is an immunomodulator 
involved in TNF-α and IFN-γ down-regulation and IL-10 induction through 
interaction with cell surface CD14/TLR2 (Sing, Reithmeier-Rost et al. 2005). 
Plant pathogenic bacteria also target plant PRR using mechanisms both unique 
to plants and conserved in plants and animals. One such conserved mechanism 
is the delivery of type III effector proteins via a type III secretion system pres-
ent in P. syringae and other Gram-negative pathogens. There is a great diversity 
of effectors both within and among bacterial species based on sequence level 
comparisons; over 30 effectors are likely to be delivered by P. syringae pathovar 
tomato (Chang, Urbach et al. 2005). One effector, AvrPto, suppresses signal-
ing from the plant surface PRR FLS2 that senses the conserved flg peptide of 
flagellin (Abramovitch, Anderson et al. 2006).
Complement
The complement system in mammals consists of more than 35 soluble 
proteins and receptors that play a key role in innate and adaptive immunity. 
Complement is activated through three different pathways: alternative, lectin 
and classical. In innate immunity, the functions mediated by complement acti-
vation products include phagocytosis and cytolysis of pathogens, solubilization 
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of immune complexes, and inflammation (Walport 2001a, 2001b). The comple-
ment system is present in invertebrate species and is at least 600 million years 
old, which explains the varied mechanisms employed by microorganisms to 
block or subvert its action.
To date bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites have been reported to encode 
38, 10, 3, and 8 distinct proteins, respectively, which target the complement 
pathway (Lambris, Ricklin et al. 2008). The activity of these proteins falls 
into three classes: (1) recruitment or mimicking of complement regulators; 
(2) modulation or inhibition of complement protein by direct interactions; 
and (3) inactivation of complement regulators by enzymatic degradation. In 
addition, bacteria and viruses employ passive features to subvert complement 
function. The surfaces of certain enveloped viruses such as orthopoxviruses 
contain host-derived regulators of complement activation, decay-accelerating 
factor and membrane cofactor protein which block lysis (Moulton, Atkinson 
et al. 2008). The cell walls of the Gram-positive bacteria such as S. pneumoniae 
and S. aureus are resistant to membrane-attack complex formation (Joiner, 
Brown et al. 1983). M. tuberculosis employs a C2a-dependent entry pathway 
that results in surface deposition of C3b. The opsonized bacteria are taken up 
into the macrophage via the complement receptor CR3 where they replicate 
within phagosomes (Schorey, Carroll et al. 1997).
Inflammatory/Immune Cytokines
Cytokines and chemokines play crucial roles in inducing the migration of 
inflammatory/immune cells to areas of infection, in antimicrobial defense, and 
in the orchestration of the adaptive immune response. As such, cytokine/che-
mokine signaling pathways are key targets of microbial evasion and subversion 
mechanisms that act inside the cell, at the plasma membrane, and outside the 
cell.
Microbial pathogens block or subvert the intracellular production and/or 
intracellular signaling of cytokines and chemokines by a number of mecha-
nisms. A common target for microbial pathogens is the transcription factor 
NF-κB. Poxviruses encode 15 unique proteins that inhibit different steps in 
the signaling pathways leading to NF-κB activation, and an additional 5 pro-
teins that uniquely and directly interact with the NF-κB complex (Mohamed, 
Rahman et al. 2009). S. flexneri type III secretory system effector OspG and 
rotavirus NSP1 protein inactivate the cellular E3 ubiquitin ligase complex 
SCFβ–TrcP, which is required for degradation of IκBα (Kim, Lenzen et al. 
2005; Graff, Ettayebi et al. 2009). YopJ (Y. pseudotuberculosis) inhibits MAPK 
(mitogen-activated protein kinase) and NF-κB activity. The NF-κB inhibi-
tory activity is likely mediated by yet another unique mechanism as YopJ has 
homology with the cysteine proteases of the “ubiquitin-like protease” family, 
and the substrates for YopJ were shown to be highly conserved ubiquitin-like 
molecules (e.g., SUMO-1) (Orth K). The YopJ family contains proteins found 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
APPENDIX K 0
in other microorganisms with intimate relationships with eukaryotes, both ani-
mals and plants (e.g., adenovirus, adenovirus protease; S. typhimurium, AVrA; 
plant pathogen, Xanthomonas campestris, AvrBsT). Importantly, the predicted 
catalytic triad of YopJ and AvrBsT were required for inhibition of MAPK and 
NF-κB signaling in animal cells and for the induction of localized cell death in 
plants, respectively (Neish 2004).
Viruses also modify the activity of cytokines/chemokines at the plasma 
membrane prior to engagement of the receptor. For example, herpesviruses 
and poxviruses collectively encode over 40 viral members of the seven 
transmembrane–spanning G protein-coupled chemokine receptor superfamily 
(Sodhi, Montaner et al. 2004). Other classes of viral virulence genes interfere 
with cell surface binding of cytokines. The poxvirus IFN-α/βBP can bind type 
I IFNs in the extracellular milieu, and can also bind back to the surface of 
infected or uninfected cells to act as a decoy receptor, preventing the binding 
of type I IFNs to cellular receptors and the induction of an antiviral response 
(Xu, RH).
Finally, cytokines/chemokines are sequestered or destroyed outside the 
cells (Alcami 2003). Some pathogens sequester cytokines by soluble, virus 
homologs of host receptors or binding proteins [e.g., orthopoxviruses have 
binding proteins for IL-1β, IL-18, TNF, CD30, type I and type II IFNs (Alcami 
2003)]. Certain viruses downregulate the cellular synthesis of pro-inflammatory 
cytokines and/or other antiviral functions of innate cells by expressing viral 
homologues of cytokines IL-10 (Epstein Barr Virus, BCRF1; orf virus, vIL-
10), IL-17 (herpesvirus saimiri, ORF 13), IL-6 (Karposi’s sarcoma-associated 
herpesvirus, K2), and semaphorin (asinine herpesvirus, SEMA; vaccinia virus 
A39). Chemokines are also targeted by pathogens in order to disrupt the 
chemokine gradient that diminishes or blocks the migration of inflammatory 
cells to a focus of infection in tissue. The chemokine gradient is disrupted by 
sequestering or destroying the relevant chemokine(s) [e.g., poxviruses, binding 
proteins for CC-chemokines; herpesviruses, binding proteins for CC-, CXC-, 
C-, and CX3C-chemokines; Alcami A)] or by the release of pathogen-encoded 
antagonists or agonists (e.g., poxviruses, antagonist, for CC- and CXC; herpes-
viruses, agonists for CC-, CCR8, CCR4, and CXCR2; antagonists for C-, CC, 
CXC, and CX3C-; Alcami A). Another example of this strategy can be found 
with Streptococcus pyogenes. S. pyogenes has several mechanisms to modulate 
neutrophil-mediated antibacterial activity, including the targeted degradation 
of chemoattractant molecules C5a by SCPA (Ji Y) and IL-8, GCP-2 and GROα 
by spyCEP(Sumby, Zhang et al. 2008).
Inflammatory Cell Response
Natural killer cells, macrophages, neutrophils, and dendritic cells are key 
inflammatory cells of the innate response. The latter three cell types are im-
portant in the control of both bacterial and viral infections through the release 
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of cytokines/chemokines and microbicidal factors, and phagocytosis of the 
pathogen. Due to the 1-3 micron size of bacteria, phagocytosis is an effective 
mechanism for bacterial clearance, and has driven the evolution of microbial 
countermeasures to a number of steps in the phagocytosis pathway.
Translocated bacterial effector proteins can kill cells through necrosis (i.e., 
toxins) or by inducing apoptosis or inhibiting anti-apoptotic signaling, which 
can prevent necrotic release of proinflammatory signals (e.g., Shigella flexneri, 
IpaB (Zychlinsky, Kenny et al. 1994); Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, YopJ (Orth 
K). Other effectors inhibit uptake of microorganisms by disrupting the host cell 
cytoskeleton (e.g., Y. pseudotuberculosis, YopE and YopH (Fallman, Andersson 
et al. 1995; Black and Bliska 2000). Certain microorganisms are able to escape 
from the phagosome and/or block the phagosome-lysosome fusion. L. monocy-
togenes is an example of a microbe that efficiently escapes the phagosome and 
replicates in the cytosol. The phagosomal membrane is disrupted by the action 
of listeriolysin O and two membrane-active phospholipase C enzymes (e.g., 
phosphoinositol-specific phospholipase C and broad-range phospholipase C 
encoded by genes plcA and plcB, respectively; (Flannagan, Cosio et al. 2009). 
M. tuberculosis is an example of a microbe that arrests phagosomal maturation. 
An array of factors, including the lipids phosphatidylinositol mannoside and 
lipoarabinomannan, as well as phosphatidylinositol-3-phosphate phosphatase 
SapM, prevent the transition of early phagosomes to the late and phagolyso-
somal stages (Flannagan, Cosio et al. 2009).
SELECTION PRESSURE
Borrelia Relapsing Fever
Tick-borne relapsing fever is caused by Borrelia hermsii, a spirochete that 
infects the Ornithodoros hermsi tick. O. hermsi is a fast-feeding tick that trans-
mits B. hermsii during a blood meal. Characterization of the bacterial surface 
proteins during different stages of its life cycle revealed that the spirochetes al-
ter their surface in response to their environment (Schwan and Piesman 2002). 
When the spirochetes are in the gastrointestinal tract of the tick, they express an 
Outer Surface Protein (Osp) identical to the Osp expressed in their most recent 
previous mammalian host. The same is true during the first spirochetemic phase 
of mammalian infection. However, the spirochete undergoes antigenic varia-
tion in the host as a mechanism by which to evade the host immune response. 
As many as 30 different versions of a single Variable Major Protein (Vmp) of 
B. hermsii have been identified following outgrowth from a single starting cell 
in the presence of selective pressure. Each round of spirochetemia (relapsing 
fever) occurs as a result of antigenic variation of the Vmp so that the pathogen 
can evade the host defenses mounted by the host to overcome the previous 
fever episode.
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RNA Viruses
As noted earlier, filoviruses and highly pathogenic coronaviruses target 
a variety of host pathways to enhance virus cross-species transmission, host 
range and virulence. Among filoviruses, these seem to be mediated by mutation 
driven processes, while coronaviruses utilize a mixture of recombination and 
mutation driven pathways to evolve and/or acquire new gene functions. Viru-
lence genes encoded by filoviruses and coronaviruses are listed for convenience 
as targeting several unique and common pathways.
• Virus-receptor interactions to promote cross species transmission 
(SARS-CoV S; Filoviruses: role of GP-mediated host range less clear)
• Proapoptotic genes that contribute to virus induced cell killing and 
pathogenesis (SARS-CoV-ORF3a/b, ORF6, ORF7a/b, ORF8, S and 
M glycoproteins; Filoviruses: GP/sGP);
• Inhibitors of the interferon response, which induces a large number 
of unique antiviral molecules; (SARS-CoV: nsp1, nsp3(PLP), nsp7, 
nsp15, ORF3b, ORF6 and N; Ebola Virus: VP24 and VP35)
• Inhibitors of NF-kB signaling machinery (SARS-CoV: nsp1, PLP)
• Inhibitors of nuclear import machinery (SARS-CoV-ORF6; 
Ebola-VP24)
• Modulators of the ubiquitin ligase system or SUMO modification ma-
chinery that regulate a large number of intracellular process; (SARS-
CoV: nsp3(PLP) deubiquitinase activity; Ebola VP35-causes increased 
SUMOylation of IRF7)
• Modulators of cell cycle and processes associated with transcription, 
DNA replication and protein synthesis (SARS-CoV nsp1)
• Immunosuppression of adaptive immunity (Ebola/Marburg: GP immu-
nosuppressive motif; SARS-CoV: lymphopenia and thrombocytopenia-
genetic mechanisms unknown)
IMMUNODEFICIENCY
HIV Infection
The classical example of a microbe that suppresses the immune system is 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV-1). Over time after infection with 
the HIV-1 virus, an untreated person’s helper cells become depleted. If he/she 
was previously silently infected with Mycobacterium tuberculosis (the agent of 
tuberculosis or TB), as is an estimated one-third of the world’s population, that 
individual will no longer be able to contain the replication of the TB organ-
ism. Indeed, in Africa, HIV-1-infected people who develop AIDS (Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome) as a consequence of a dearth of T-helper cells 
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frequently die of tuberculosis. Conversely, in most immunologically normal 
people who are infected with M. tuberculosis, the bacterium remains walled off 
in granulomas by a T-helper-cell-dependent host adaptive immune response 
called cellular immunity.
Organ Transplantation
For organ transplant recipients, the risk of infection and the type of 
infection are functions of the degree of immunodeficiency (i.e., type of immu-
nosuppressive regimen) and the use of preventive prophylaxis. Organ trans-
plantation for end-stage organ failure is an effective therapy, but is limited by 
the availability of donor organs. In 2005, 66,000 kidney transplants, 21,000 liver 
transplants and 6,000 heart transplants were carried out worldwide (WHO 
volumes/85/12/06-039370). The use of increasingly potent immunosuppres-
sive agents has reduced the incidence of rejection, but increased the patient’s 
susceptibility to opportunistic infections. The sources of the infections are from 
the donor organ, the recipient (preexisting condition), the community or the 
hospital environment. Although a large number of infectious agents are capable 
of infecting transplant patients, the majority of infections are caused by the 
following pathogens: cytomegalovirus, Epstein-Barr virus, adenoviruses, poly-
omaviruses BK and JC, and Pneumocystis and various fungal species (Fishman 
2007). One study documented fungal infections as a major cause of morbidity 
and mortality with incidence rates ranging from 5 percent among recipients of 
kidney transplants to as high as 40 percent among recipients of liver transplants 
(Paya 1993).
MICROBIOME
Humans are the natural host to a myriad of microorganisms that assemble 
into complex, largely beneficial communities that outnumber human cells by 
ten-fold. The dominant forms of human-microbe interactions are those in 
which microorganisms benefit the host without causing harm (commensal re-
lationships), and relationships in which both host and microorganism benefit 
(symbiotic or mutualistic relationships). Co-evolution, co-adaptation and co-
dependency are features of our relationship with our indigenous microbiota.
Our microbiota is ancient and largely conserved in the general types of 
organisms that inhabit and persist within us for life. Yet, the microbiota in 
vertebrates is not only often host-specific, it is also compartmentalized to be 
niche-specific. For example, the gut microbiota and oral microbiota have quite 
distinct microbial inhabitants. Although possibly germ-free (gnotobiotic) before 
birth, humans develop a resident microbiota shortly after birth. In the neonatal 
period, the community assembly process is dynamic and is influenced by early 
environmental (in particular, maternal) exposures and stochastic effects. The 
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composition of the indigenous microbiota evolves in a generally orderly fashion 
in response to diet and other environmental factors; it is influenced as well by a 
diverse human genetic background. The bacterial diversity in the human body 
is striking in its richness of distinct species and strains, but also noteworthy for 
the limited number of phyla commonly found in indigenous microbial com-
munities. Of the more than 50 bacterial phyla in the environment, only four 
(Firmicutes, Bacteroidetes, Actinobacteria, and Proteobacteria) dominate human 
mucosal and cutaneous habitats, suggesting that strong selective forces have 
limited diversity over at least hundreds of thousands of years of co-evolution 
(8-16). Despite this stereotypic assembly process, within a single mammalian 
species, including Homo sapiens, each individual has a virtually unique micro-
biome; its composition and the phenotypes expressed affect as well as reflect 
the overall biological diversity of humans.
The human microbiome is the subject of intensive study, including the 
major international Human Microbiome Project (HMP). Because of advances 
in DNA sequencing technologies and improvements in bioinformatics, it has 
become possible to characterize the great diversity in the human microbiota. In 
2007, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) launched the Human Microbi-
ome Project (HMP) as one of its major roadmap initiatives. This major scientific 
endeavor has the following aims:
• Determine whether individuals share a core human microbiome.
• Understand whether changes in the human microbiome can be cor-
related with changes in human health.
• Develop the technological tools to support these goals.
• Address the ethical, legal, and social complications raised by human 
microbiome research.
The human microbiome project will add an enormous amount of additional 
microbial sequence to our already burgeoning databases. This will be invaluable 
as we continue to sort out the sequences that have real predictive value instead 
of being merely suggestive because of some degree of relative homology with a 
putative virulence factor of a Select Agent.
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Appendix L
Near-Term Milestones for Consideration
The committee finds that a gene-sequence based classification system is 
feasible using current technologies. Below the committee provides near-term 
milestones that would enable such a system. While the system could have 
advantages over the current system, there are also potential negative conse-
quences that require careful deliberation. It is not the role of our committee 
to recommend specific implementation plans, nor are we properly constituted 
to do so. Many of the issues and priorities that must be considered are beyond 
the scope of our charge. Therefore, the committee has presented these ideas 
for discussion and recommends caution when considering the development of 
a gene-sequence-based oversight system.
(a.) A sequence database with a Select Agent focus: (presented in 
Chapter )
(b.) The expanding sequence database of all biology: (presented in 
Chapter )
(c.) Define the Criteria for Select Agent Designation: (presented in 
Chapter )
(d.) Stratification or reduction of the Select Agent list: (presented 
in Chapter )
(e.) Develop a Centralized System: To be useful for unambiguous 
regulations, there would need to be a single agreed-upon classification 
system, not multiple competing ones developed by different research 
groups. This would mean a centralized funding plan that would have 
to balance the benefits of single source standardization by a single SA 
classification system team against the need for oversight and review to 
maintain quality and efficiency in the absence of peer competition.
0
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(f.) Scientific Workgroups and Advisory Panel: A work group of 
scientific experts would be assembled for each Select Agent (or Se-
lect Agent group). These expert groups would evaluate the agents 
and identify a “minimal parts list” for each. This is a highly technical 
and necessary step in developing a sequence-based classification sys-
tem. The “Content Workgroups” would also identify genes necessary 
(though not sufficient) for virulence, and other “sequences of concern” 
that should be monitored as part of the yellow flag system.1 An ad-
ditional benefit of such “Content Workgroups” is that participation 
in this undertaking could raise awareness of dual-use issues among 
researchers. Moreover, to include the top experts, these content work-
groups would necessarily include international scientists, which may 
strengthen international engagement. These are major objectives of the 
National Strategy of for Countering Biological Threats,2 as well as the 
NSABB.
  In addition to the “Content Workgroups,” a panel of scientific 
advisors would be established for assessment of the Select Agent list 
and the yellow flag sequences. As previously mentioned, advisors for 
the yellow flag system would be charged to review biological data and 
make determinations as to whether a sequence raises sufficient concern 
to merit a yellow flag, needs further study, or should be removed from 
the yellow flag list. This panel would offer advice regarding whether a 
sequence construct merits consideration for Select Agent designation. 
The panel would be expected to consider information provided by the 
“Content Workgroups,” and would likely have joint members.
  The same (or a second) panel of scientific advisors would be 
charged with determining if biological criteria have been met to war-
rant designation of a pathogen or toxin as a Select Agent. In this 
capacity, the advisory panel would also work with stakeholders from 
the security community and government agencies, and therefore, the 
scientific advisors should be represented on (or function as a subcom-
1 The committee stresses that this should not be confused with prediction. It would be a mistake 
to assume that these genes would function in a genome backbone independent manner, or to apply 
this information to designate a “sequence of concern” as a Select Agent. The purpose is to classify 
genomes as “complete” and subject to the SAR, and to identify “sequences of concern” that are 
worth monitoring.
2 “The objectives of our Strategy are: . . . Reinforce norms of safe and responsible conduct: Activi-
ties that should be taken to reinforce a culture of responsibility, awareness, and vigilance among 
all who utilize and benefit from the life sciences to ensure that they are not diverted to harmful 
purposes. Transform the international dialogue on biological threats: Activities targeted to promote 
a robust and sustained discussion among all nations as to the evolving biological threat and identify 
mutually agreed steps to counter it.”
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mittee of) the NSABB, ISATAC, or the recently recommended Biologi-
cal Select Agents and Toxins Advisory Committee (BSATAC).3
(g.) Updating, improvement, and assessment: The sequence-based 
classification system and the yellow flag system, once established, 
would be updated on a regular basis. The “Content Workgroups” 
would reconvene on a regular basis to incorporate the latest scientific 
information into the parts list. Any particular parts list would only re-
flect the current state of scientific knowledge about each Select Agent. 
It would need to be subject to review and revision to stay current 
with the state of knowledge distinguishing Select Agents from other 
organisms. Likewise, the profile classification system would have to 
be updated over time, as new knowledge accrued that required newly 
discovered SA or non-SA variants to be classified. This updating 
process would resemble the ongoing curation of other profile library 
classification systems such as TIGRfams and Pfam, and would require 
a curation team.
  Assessments of the yellow flag and Select Agent lists—carried 
out by, or in collaboration with, scientific advisory panels—would 
occur on a regular basis. There is a need for increased transparency 
about the procedures and criteria for moving agents on and off the 
list.4 The updating, review and assessment cycles are consistent with 
3 2009 NRC report Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins, “RECOM-
MENDATION 2: To provide continued engagement of stakeholders in oversight of the Select 
Agent Program, a Biological Select Agents and Toxins Advisory Committee (BSATAC) should be 
established. The members, who should be drawn from academic/research institutions and the pri-
vate sector, should include microbiologists and other infectious disease researchers (including select 
agent researchers), directors of BSAT laboratories, and those with experience in biosecurity, animal 
care and use, compliance, biosafety, and operations. Representatives from the federal agencies with 
a responsibility for funding, conducting, or overseeing select agent research would serve in an ex 
officio capacity. Among the responsibilities of this advisory committee should be the following: 
Promulgate guidance on the implementation of the Select Agent Program; Facilitate exchange of 
information across institutions and sectors; Promote sharing of successful practices across institu-
tions and sectors; Provide oversight for evaluation of the Select Agent Program; Provide advice 
on composition/stratification of the list of select agents and toxins; Convene regular meetings of 
key constituency groups; and Promote harmonization of regulatory policies and practices (NRC 
2009b).”
4 2009 NRC report Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins, “RECOM-
MENDATION 2: To provide continued engagement of stakeholders in oversight of the Select 
Agent Program, a Biological Select Agents and Toxins Advisory Committee (BSATAC) should be 
established. The members, who should be drawn from academic/research institutions and the pri-
vate sector, should include microbiologists and other infectious disease researchers (including select 
agent researchers), directors of BSAT laboratories, and those with experience in biosecurity, animal 
care and use, compliance, biosafety, and operations. Representatives from the federal agencies with 
a responsibility for funding, conducting, or overseeing select agent research would serve in an ex 
officio capacity. Among the responsibilities of this advisory committee should be the following: 
Promulgate guidance on the implementation of the Select Agent Program; Facilitate exchange of 
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this goal. Moreover, they are important components for a robust and 
effective gene-sequence-based oversight system for Select Agents and 
“sequences of concern.” The periodic expert review, assessment, and 
update cycle could be coordinated well with the biennial review of the 
Select Agent and Toxin list, which is currently required by statute.5
(h.) Disclosure, transparency, review: Because it is automatic and 
software-based, the classification system could be made readily and 
transparently available on the Web, where it could be reviewed and 
challenged by scientists in the community, to be sure (for instance) 
that it was not inadvertently misclassifying non-Select Agents such as 
vaccines or attenuated research strains. This feedback would inform 
the assessment and curation processes, and facilitate engagement of 
the scientific community. Likewise, the yellow flag biosafety system 
should be accessible and open for information sharing.
Should a gene-sequence-based system be developed? We have 
concluded that a gene-sequence-based classification system could be developed. 
We have not addressed whether such a system should be developed. Here are 
some issues for consideration:
 a. Dual-Use Issue: As discussed, the development of a prediction-based 
oversight system would raise serious dual-use concerns. Providing an 
accurate mechanism for evaluating the threat posed by a synthetic 
genome sequence is equivalent to enabling the design and optimiza-
tion of a bioweapon. It is a major goal of biology to predict phenotype 
from genotype, and to improve public health by understanding patho-
genicity. However, it does not seem wise to make special plans for an 
advanced effort in predicting the sequence of would-be bioweapons.6 
information across institutions and sectors; Promote sharing of successful practices across institu-
tions and sectors; Provide oversight for evaluation of the Select Agent Program; Provide advice 
on composition/stratification of the list of select agents and toxins; Convene regular meetings of 
key constituency groups; and Promote harmonization of regulatory policies and practices (NRC 
2009b).”
5 “(42 U.S.C. 262a) . . . The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act requires that the HHS Secretary 
review and republish the list of select agents and toxins on at least a biennial basis.” “(7 U.S.C. 
8401) . . . The USDA Secretary is also required to conduct a biennial review of the USDA select 
agents and toxins list” (DHHS (2005). 42 CFR 72 and 73 and 42 CFR Part 1003: Possession, Use, 
and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins; Final Rule, Federal Register. 70: 12294-13325.
6 If infallible prediction of organisms with Select Agent properties from genome sequence were 
feasible, or became feasible, it is unclear how that prediction would be useful in the context of 
Select Agents Regulation. Suppose we could predict the virulence, transmissibility, ease of growth, 
ease of dispersion, and environmental stability of a microorganism or virus from its sequence. 
Imagine we have a black box, a computer program that we can input a genome sequence to, and 
without error the black box reports whether the sequence corresponds to an organism that has 
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A narrow focus on milestones solely to be able to predict what makes 
an agent a threat to security may be a distortion of priorities in biology. 
Once biology in general approaches the goal of determining function 
from sequence, then it would be an appropriate time to consider a 
predictive oversight system to accurately identify Select Agent status 
from a novel genome sequence. This time may not come for decades, 
and may be more than a century away.
  A classification system differs from a prediction system and would 
not directly enable the optimization of a pathogen. However, for a 
classification system to be usefully implemented, information must 
be shared. Listing the “parts” of a Select Agent and identifying other 
“sequences of concern” based entirely on their potential to be danger-
ous when incorporated into a synthetic construct, could theoretically 
facilitate the design of a synthetic pathogen by a “bad actor.” Thus, the 
committee agreed with the NSABB that “The USG should include ad-
vances in synthetic biology and advances in our understanding of viru-
lence/ pathogenicity in “tech-watch” or “science-watch” endeavors.”
b. Danger of misimplementation:
  The committee stresses that a system for classification of Select 
Agents is based on classification and should not be confused with pre-
diction. It would be a mistake to assume that “sequences of concern” 
or “parts” of Select Agents would function in a genome backbone (or 
context) independent manner. This information is partial and cannot 
be appropriately applied to designate a “sequence of concern” or 
individual “part” as a Select Agent. If the classification system were 
incorrectly implemented it would be counterproductive for security, 
and could be crippling to public health research. For example, many 
viruses encode a suite of “interferon antagonist genes” to target mul-
tiple steps in pathogen sensing, interferon signaling and innate/adap-
tive immunity. These genes are not themselves infectious or dangerous, 
and it isn’t possible to forecast if these virulence genes/sequence motifs 
would enhance disease if introduced into a different genome back-
the properties to be covered under the Select Agents Regulations. How would this black box be 
used? Individuals would not know whether they possess or are transferring a Select Agent until the 
black box has been run on their genome sequence. Would we require that the black box be run on 
all new or modified genome sequences? This would surely be impractical; the nature of modern 
biology routinely involves innumerable modified or synthetic DNA constructs. But if we don’t run 
the black box on all new or modified genome sequences, then we would need to define, with the 
clarity of a criminal statute, exactly who is required to run the black box and when. How big of a 
genetic modification requires a new black box certification? This would be a grey zone even worse 
than the problems associated with a simple Select Agents list. For new isolates of organisms from 
the wild, the genome sequence is not immediately known. Would individuals be required to obtain 
the genome sequence before commencing work on any new isolate?
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12970.html
 APPENDIX L
bone. Designating such sequences as Select Agents would have little if 
any security benefit, but could have significant negative consequences 
by imposing undue burden on important vaccine research, e.g., in-
fluenza vaccines based on ns1 mutations/truncations and cell-surface 
glycoproteins, which are components of protective immunity and key 
for tissue tropism.
  The yellow flag system would also be damaging to public health 
and security if misapplied. For instance, requiring registration or re-
stricting access to flagged genomic fragments would become a signifi-
cant barrier to scientific progress, including biodefense research. The 
yellow flag system would only be effective if maintained as a broad 
and flexible system for guidance and monitoring. The yellow flag 
system would provide valuable information to researchers, synthesis 
companies, and DNA hobbyists. Likewise, the yellow flag system could 
function as a nonintrusive information resource for law enforcement 
and the intelligence community.
c.  Opportunity—Cost: A gene-sequence based oversight system, aimed 
at preention, may not be the best use of resources. Such a system 
would be far from fail proof since a determined “bad actor” could 
produce synthetic DNA without the aid of synthesis companies; this 
would certainly include those operating outside of the United States.7 
Moreover, such an oversight system would be moderately expensive to 
implement in terms of both money and the time required of the highly 
skilled staff and expert advisors involved. The Commission on the Pre-
vention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 
recently concluded that “[d]eterrence of bioterrorism rests upon the 
ability of the nation to mitigate the effects of an attack,” and that “the 
United States is woefully behind in its capability to rapidly produce 
vaccines and therapeutics, essential steps for adequately responding 
7 We must recognize that from the standpoint of impeding bioterror scenarios, there will be 
 myriad ways to get around any screening procedure used by DNA synthesis companies, ranging 
from splitting an order into apparently innocuous pieces across multiple companies, to using 
offshore companies that do not adhere to U.S. regulations, to simply not using a DNA synthesis 
company at all. The technology of DNA synthesis is rapidly being commoditized, and DNA oligo-
nucleotide synthesis machines can already be purchased cheaply from Ebay. An ebay.com search 
on “oligo synthesizer” on 10 October 2009 found a used Applied Biosystems 394 DNA/RNA 
oligo synthesizer on sale for $8,900 (plus $106.16 shipping within 3-8 business days to a commit-
tee member’s home in Northern Virginia). With difficulty, genes and even whole genomes can be 
assembled from individual short oligonucleotides. In much the same vein, a determined bioterrorist 
can obtain isolates of a select agent from the wild. The SAR can only raise the difficulty bar for 
acquiring cultures of proven highly virulent agents, and provide law enforcement with tools to 
prosecute for possession of variants of such agents; because natural biological organisms are widely 
available, readily engineered, and increasingly easy to create, it is unrealistic to try to design the 
SAR to preclude acquisition completely.
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to a biological threat, whether natural or man-made.” Therefore, it 
is worth considering that, even in the context of national security, 
resources may be better used toward understanding infectious disease 
and developing response capabilities.
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Executive Order: Optimizing the 
Security of Biological Select Agents 
and Toxins in the United States
For Immediate Release   July 2, 2010
EXECUTIVE ORDER
OPTIMIZING THE SECURITY OF BIOLOGICAL SELECT AGENTS 
AND TOXINS IN THE UNITED STATES
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section . Policy. It is the policy of the United States that:
 (a) A robust and productive scientific enterprise that utilizes biological 
select agents and toxins (BSAT) is essential to national security;
 (b) BSAT shall be secured in a manner appropriate to their risk of misuse, 
theft, loss, and accidental release; and
 (c) Security measures shall be taken in a coordinated manner that balances 
their efficacy with the need to minimize the adverse impact on the legitimate 
use of BSAT.
Section . Definitions. (a) “Select Agent Program” (SAP) means the regulatory 
oversight and administrative activities conducted by the Secretaries of Health 
and Human Services and Agriculture and the Attorney General to implement 

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the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 and the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002.
 (b) “Select Agent Regulations” (SAR) means the Federal regulations found 
in Part 73 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 331 of Title 7 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, and Part 121 of Title 9 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.
 (c) “Biological Select Agents and Toxins” means biological agents and tox-
ins with the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, animal 
and plant health, or animal and plant products and whose possession, use, and 
transfer are regulated by the Department of Health and Human Services and 
the Department of Agriculture under the SAR.
Section . Findings. (a) The use of BSAT presents the risk that BSAT might 
be lost, stolen, or diverted for malicious purpose. The SAP exists to provide 
effective regulatory oversight of the possession, use, and transfer of BSAT that 
reduces the risk of their misuse or mishandling. The absence of clearly defined, 
risk-based security measures in the SAR/SAP has raised concern about the need 
for optimized security and for risk management.
 (b) In addition, variations in, and limited coordination of, individual execu-
tive departments’ and agencies’ oversight, security practices, and inspections 
have raised concerns that the cost and complexity of compliance for those who 
are registered to work with BSAT could discourage research or other legitimate 
activities.
 (c) Understanding that research and laboratory work on BSAT is essential 
to both public health and national security, it is in the interest of the United 
States to address these issues.
Section . Risk-based Tiering of the Select Agent List. To help ensure that BSAT 
are secured according to level of risk, the Secretaries of Health and Human 
Services and Agriculture shall, through their ongoing review of the biological 
Select Agents and Toxins List (“Select Agent List”) contained in regulations, 
and no later than 18 months from the date of this order:
 (a) designate a subset of the Select Agent List (Tier 1) that presents the 
greatest risk of deliberate misuse with most significant potential for mass ca-
sualties or devastating effects to the economy, critical infrastructure, or public 
confidence;
 (b) explore options for graded protection of Tier 1 agents and toxins as 
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described in subsection (a) of this section to permit tailored risk management 
practices based upon relevant contextual factors; and
 (c) consider reducing the overall number of agents and toxins on the Select 
Agent List.
Section . Reision of Regulations, Rules, and Guidance to Accommodate a 
Tiered Select Agent List. Consistent with section 4 of this order, I request that:
 (a) The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture, no 
later than 15 months from the date of this order, propose amendments to their 
respective parts of the SAR that would establish security standards specific to 
Tier 1agents and toxins.
 (b) The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture each, 
no later than 27 months from the date of this order, promulgate final rules and 
guidance that clearly articulate security actions for registrants who possess, use, 
or transfer Tier 1 agents and toxins.
Section . Coordination of Federal Oersight for BSAT Security. To ensure that 
the policies and practices used to secure BSAT are harmonized and that the 
related oversight activities of the Federal Government are coordinated, the 
heads of executive departments and agencies identified in section 7(a)(ii) of 
this order shall:
 (a) no later than 6 months from the date of this order, develop and imple-
ment a plan for the coordination of BSAT security oversight that:
  (i) articulates a mechanism for coordinated and reciprocal inspection 
of and harmonized administrative practices for facilities registered with the 
SAP;
  (ii) ensures consistent and timely identification and resolution of BSAT 
security and compliance issues;
  (iii) facilitates information sharing among departments and agencies 
regarding ongoing oversight and inspection activities; and
  (iv) provides for comprehensive and effective Federal oversight of 
BSAT security; and
 (b) no later than 6 months from the issuance of final rules and guidance as 
described in section 5 of this order, and annually thereafter, review for inconsis-
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tent requirements and revise or rescind, as appropriate, any regulations, direc-
tives, guidance, or policies regarding BSAT security within their department 
or agency that exceed those in the updated SAR and guidance as described in 
section 5 of this order.
Section . Implementation. (a) Establishment, Operation, and Functions of the 
Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel.
  (i) There is hereby established, within the Department of Health and 
Human Services for administrative purposes only, the Federal Experts Security 
Advisory Panel (Panel), which shall make technical and substantive recommen-
dations on BSAT security concerning the SAP.
  (ii) The Panel shall consist of representatives from the following, 
who may consult with additional experts from their department or agency as 
required:
   — the Department of State;
   — the Department of Defense;
   — the Department of Justice;
   — the Department of Agriculture (Co-Chair);
   — the Department of Commerce;
   — the Department of Health and Human Services(Co-Chair);
   — the Department of Transportation;
   — the Department of Labor;
   — the Department of Energy;
   — the Department of Veterans Affairs;
   — the Department of Homeland Security;
   — the Environmental Protection Agency;
   — the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
   — the Office of Science and Technology Policy;
   — the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
   —  any other department or agency designated by the 
Co-Chairs.
  (iii) To assist the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Ag-
riculture and the Attorney General in implementing the policies set forth in 
sections 1, 4,5, and 6 of this order, the Panel shall, no later than 4 months from 
the date of this order, provide consensus recommendations concerning the SAP 
on:
   1. the designation of Tier 1 agents and toxins;
   2. reduction in the number of agents on the Select Agent List;
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   3. the establishment of appropriate practices to ensure reliability 
of personnel with access to Tier 1 agents and toxins at registered facilities;
   4. the establishment of appropriate practices for physical secu-
rity and cyber security for facilities that possess Tier 1 agents. The Department 
of Homeland Security shall Chair a Working Group of the Panel that develops 
recommended laboratory critical infrastructure security standards in these ar-
eas; and
   5. other emerging policy issues relevant to the security of 
BSAT.
Thereafter, the Panel shall continue to provide technical advice concerning the 
SAP on request.
  (iv) If the Panel is unable to reach consensus on recommendations for 
an issue within its charge, the matter shall be resolved through the interagency 
policy committee process led by the National Security Staff.
  (v) The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture and 
the Attorney General shall report to the Assistant to the President for Home-
land Security and Counterterrorism on the consideration and implementation 
of Panel recommendations concerning the SAP, including a rationale for failure 
to implement any recommendations.
  (vi) The Panel shall be chartered for a period of4 years subject to 
renewal through the interagency policy committee process led by the National 
Security Staff.
 (b) To further assist the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and 
Agriculture and the Attorney General in implementing the policy set forth in 
sections 1, 4, 5, and 6 of this order, the National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity shall provide technical advice and serve as a conduit for public 
consultation, as needed, on topics of relevance to the SAP.
 Section 8. Sharing of Select Agent Program Information. (a) Consistent with 
applicable laws and regulations, the Secretaries of Health and Human Services 
and Agriculture and the Attorney General shall, no later than 6 months from 
the date of this order, develop a process and the criteria for making SAP infor-
mation available to executive departments and agencies when such information 
is necessary for furthering a public health, safety, security, law enforcement, or 
national security mission.
 (b) SAP information shall continue to be safeguarded properly and han-
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dled securely to minimize the risk of disclosing sensitive, personal, and other 
information protected by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a.
Section . General Proisions. (a) The National Security Staff shall, on a biennial 
basis, review the implementation and effectiveness of this order and refer to the 
interagency policy committee process any issues that require further delibera-
tion or adjudication.
 (b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect 
the authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof, or 
functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to 
budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
 (c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and 
subject to the availability of appropriations.
 (d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against 
the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, 
or agents, or any other person.
BARACK OBAMA
THE WHITE HOUSE, July 2, 2010.
